Liberalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 221-245
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug

Chapter 8 argues that liberal values of freedom and equality not only form the basis for social justice (as argued in Chapter 4), but shared liberal values also provide a social basis for trust, solidarity, and egalitarian redistribution. More specifically, it is argued that shared liberal values have positive institutional, distributive, and direct value effects on social cohesion. Rawls made similar claims, but here a more thorough argument is provided. First, shared liberal values facilitate electoral support for universal, social democratic welfare states, which are conducive to institutional and generalized trust and redistributive solidarity. Second, shared liberal values facilitate electoral support for egalitarian redistribution, where socio-economic equality tends to promote trust and solidarity. And third, shared liberal values have direct value effects, where people who share such values tend to have a more inclusive conception of their in-group, and extend their trust and solidarity to, for example, immigrants.

2019 ◽  
Vol 189 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-357
Author(s):  
Mikael Rostila

Abstract In this issue of the Journal, Baranyi et al. (Am J Epidemiol. 2019;000(00):000–000) examine the longitudinal associations of perceived neighborhood disorder and social cohesion with depressive symptoms among persons aged 50 years or more in 16 different countries. An important contribution of their article is that they study how neighborhood-level social capital relates to depression in different welfare-state contexts. Although the authors provide empirical evidence for some significant differences between welfare states in the relationship between social capital and depression, they say little about potential explanations. In this commentary, I draw attention to welfare-state theory and how it could provide us with a greater understanding of Baranyi et al.’s findings. I also discuss the potential downsides of grouping countries into welfare regimes. I primarily focus on the associations between social cohesion and depression, as these associations were generally stronger than those for neighborhood disorder and depression. Finally, I provide some suggestions for future research within the field and discuss whether the findings could be used to guide policies aimed at increasing social cohesion and health.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosta JOSIFIDIS ◽  
John B. HALL ◽  
Novica SUPIC ◽  
Emilija BEKER PUCAR

This paper examines the nature of changes within the EU–15 welfare states affected by the 2008 crisis. We try to answer the question of whether the differences that exist among different welfare state regimes, according to prevailing welfare state typologies, lead to different responses to the consequences of the crisis. Welfare state regimes are the result of different institutional perceptions of social risks hence it is realistic to expect specific responses to the effects of crisis among different welfare state regimes, and similar responses among the countries that belong to the same welfare state regimes. In order to recognize convergent vs. divergent processes, we perform a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the key welfare state determinants of the EU–15 countries, grouping according to welfare state regimes, in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The results indicate that institutional rigidity and inherent inertia has remained a key factor of convergent welfare state processes in countries that belong to the Social Democratic and Corporatist welfare state regimes. Deviations from such a course are the most evident in the Mediterranean welfare state regimes, especially in Greece and Portugal where austerity measures have been formulated under the strong influence of the Troika.


2021 ◽  
pp. 210-218
Author(s):  
Ana Aliverti

The Conclusion reflects on the key contributions of the book, revisiting some of the concepts and arguments presented in the Introduction. The section concludes by posing a number of questions on the implications of the findings presented for the academic field of policing and, more importantly, for social justice and democratic governance. I argue that migration policing is a privileged entry point to understanding the relationship between policing and society in a globalized, postcolonial world. The policing of immigration subverts—or rather unveils—the veneer of legality in the work of maintaining order. By foregrounding the non-rational, magic-like operation of state power, the book intended to unsettle rigid received epistemologies to theorizing policing in northern state bureaucracies. Ultimately, the morally and politically contested domain where front-line officers operate, the fragility, contingency, and provisionality of their authority, the fortuitous, capricious, and arbitrary nature of their decisions, the futility of the violence and harms they exert and the pains they endure, reveal also a frail, impotent, and inchoate state seeking to assert itself amid a fluid, murky, interconnected, and polarized world. The impetus to reassert the national by enforcing a bordered order reveals the exclusionary foundations of social democratic institutions and poses serious questions about the viability of these institutions and the modern nation-state to foster social justice. Equally, this juncture is an opportunity to think anew our political and economic institutions, take stock of global interdependence and its implications for livelihoods, and foster new forms of human conviviality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 80-122
Author(s):  
Nils Holtug

Chapter 4 turns to normative political philosophy and introduces and defends the liberal egalitarian framework that provides the normative basis for assessments of policies that aim to promote social cohesion in diverse liberal democracies. Apart from the basic liberties, this framework includes a concern for equality, where a distinction between equality of opportunity and luck egalitarianism is introduced, and versions of each are developed, and it is pointed out that both these egalitarian theories can be used to support the conclusions about immigration and integration policies that are developed in the book. It is also argued that both theories should be sensitive to inequality of religious and cultural opportunities and that the concern for equality sometimes speaks in favour of multicultural policies.


2019 ◽  
pp. 66-87
Author(s):  
Fabio Wolkenstein

This chapter addresses the following question: How do contemporary party members view themselves, their party, and their role in it? This question is important because the success of party reforms depends centrally on whether the newly-created channels of participation and engagement are recognized as meaningful and valuable by those who engage in parties (or are generally inclined to engage in them); and to find out what could be considered meaningful and valuable by these individuals we need to understand what they expect from a party in terms of participation and opportunities to make one’s agency felt. The basis of the study, as will be explained in detail, are focus group interviews held with party members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), two parties that were chosen as empirical cases because Social Democratic parties are arguably on top of the list of the parties that may be considered ‘victims’ of the trend of shifting participatory norms, having lost much of their once-great electoral support across most of Europe. An important finding the chapter presents is the tendency of party members to demand (not more direct participation like membership ballots or the like but) more face-to-face contact and two-way communication with party elites and their fellow activists—which strengthens the general case for a more deliberative understanding of parties that the book advances.


Author(s):  
David Miller

The idea of social democracy is now used to describe a society the economy of which is predominantly capitalist, but where the state acts to regulate the economy in the general interest, provides welfare services outside of it and attempts to alter the distribution of income and wealth in the name of social justice. Originally ’social democracy’ was more or less equivalent to ’socialism’. But since the mid-twentieth century, those who think of themselves as social democrats have come to believe that the old opposition between capitalism and socialism is outmoded; many of the values upheld by earlier socialists can be promoted by reforming capitalism rather than abolishing it. Although it bases itself on values like democracy and social justice, social democracy cannot really be described as a political philosophy: there is no systematic statement or great text that can be pointed to as a definitive account of social democratic ideals. In practical politics, however, social democratic ideas have been very influential, guiding the policies of most Western states in the post-war world.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881986133
Author(s):  
Karl Loxbo ◽  
Jonas Hinnfors ◽  
Magnus Hagevi ◽  
Sofie Blombäck ◽  
Marie Demker

Social democratic parties are crumbling at the polls. Surprisingly, however, the causes of this demise remain largely unexplored. This article contributes to filling this gap in the research by studying the long-term impact of welfare state generosity on the vote share of social democratic parties in 16 Western European democracies. If the welfare state indeed was a key factor behind social democratic growth in the past, we ask whether the recent plight of these parties is down to a reversal of their previously dominant success factor? The article makes three principal findings. First, we show that social democratic parties primarily benefited electorally from expansive reforms at lower levels of welfare state generosity. Second, we find that this dynamic of diminishing returns also helps explain the demise of the Social Democratic party family in the whole of Western Europe. Lastly, our results reveal that programmatic turns to the right predict electoral losses in the least generous welfare states, whereas such shifts either pass unnoticed or predict vote gains in the most generous ones. We conclude by arguing that the structure of welfare state institutions is one important explanation for variations in the demise of the once powerful Social Democratic party family.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. 16
Author(s):  
Magnus Olof Karlsson

Kerala is considered as the most social advanced state of India, and can in many respects be seen as “the Scandinavia of India”. But despite the fact that Kerala scores high on the Human Development Index as well as many other welfare indicators, there are arguments that generalized trust—when people trust most people even if they do not know them—is low. In this text, Kerala is sometimes compared to Sweden, one social-democratic well-developed welfare state in Scandinavia, and it is argued that the family constellations, the historical relations between the working-class movement, the employers and the government, as well as the extensive remittance economy characterising Kerala, have reduced trust through creating large inequalities and decreasing civil engagement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Erik R. Tillman

Although the radical right is gaining support in many West European societies, there remain a few states such as Ireland without a successful radical right party. This absence raises the question of whether unique historical or cultural factors prevent the rise of the radical right in these countries or whether it is contingent. This chapter examines potential electoral support for a radical right party in Ireland. It presents the results of a novel survey experiment, in which voters read about the formation of a hypothetical new party and expressed their willingness to vote for it compared to existing parties. The results show that high authoritarians express greater willingness to vote for a hypothetical new radical right party compared to a hypothetical new mainstream party, while low authoritarians display the opposite pattern. In addition, high authoritarians express greater concern about declining social cohesion in Ireland. Because authoritarianism does not structure voting behaviour, a new radical right party could draw high authoritarians from all of the established parties. These results confirm that the same latent patterns of radical right party support exist in Ireland as in other West European societies and challenge arguments emphasizing cultural uniqueness.


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