Introduction

Over the last forty-odd years, Kit Fine has been one of the most influential and original analytic philosophers. He has made provocative and innovative contributions to several areas of systematic philosophy, including philosophy of language, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics, as well as a number of topics in philosophical logic, such as modal logic, relevance logic, the logic of essence, and the logic of vagueness. These contributions have helped reshape the agendas of those fields and have given fresh impetus to a number of perennial debates. Fine’s work is distinguished by its great technical sophistication, philosophical breadth, and independence from current orthodoxy. A blend of philosophically sound common sense combined with a virtuosity of philosophical argumentation and construction, meant to back up the former, this seems to me to be the nature of Kit Fine’s lasting contributions to the current trends in analytic philosophy. The chapter gives a general overview of the groundbreaking work of Kit Fine and connects the contributed essays with Kit Fine’s work.

Author(s):  
Scott Soames

This chapter is a case study of the process by which the attempt to solve philosophical problems sometimes leads to the birth of new domains of scientific inquiry. It traces how advances in logic and the philosophy of mathematics, starting with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, provided the foundations for what became a rigorous and scientific study of language, meaning, and information. After sketching the early stages of the story, it explains the importance of modal logic and “possible worlds semantics” in providing the foundation for the last half century of work in linguistic semantics and the philosophy of language. It argues that this foundation is insufficient to support the most urgently needed further advances. It proposes a new conception of truth-evaluable information as inherently representational cognitive acts of certain kinds. The chapter concludes by explaining how this conception of propositions can be used to illuminate the notion of truth; vindicate the connection between truth and meaning; and fulfill a central, but so far unkept, promise of possible worlds semantics.


Author(s):  
Anna L. Solomonovskaya

The article reviews different perspectives concerning the status, origin and functions of double translations in European cultural space throughout the period. The term double translation here refers to the translation of one word with two (rarely more) lexemes connected with a conjunction or another linking word. This technique was universal across medieval translation schools, whatever their geographic origin. However, only particular schools or individual translators have been studied in terms of this technique so far, so the author aims to summarize the findings, delineate some controversial issues in the domain under consideration and place the findings in a common perspective. The controversial issues comprise (but are not limited by) the causes of their emergence in translated texts (from almost accidental fixation of the translator’s hesitation to the conscious decision to apply two different methods of translation based on specific philosophy of language). Another widely discussed question is the status of the words in such a pair – whether they were regarded as synonyms or had another status. One more question that causes discussion is their functions in the text, namely whether they were a rhetorical device or a certain means of semantic differentiation. The author of the article supposes that double translation should be considered dynamically and such chronological consideration makes it possible to argue that double translations first appeared to convey the whole range of meanings of a certain word enabling the reader to make their own choice concerning the exact meaning of the word in each particular context. As for the philosophical or theological background of the technique (be it language philosophy of St. Augustine or the theory of images developed by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite) sometimes assumed to have been intentionally realized by medieval translators, it is hard to verify such claims as the utterances (Prefaces) of the medieval translators themselves hardly mention (with the possible exception of Praefatio Brixiana) either the technique or its presumed theological grounds. Moreover, word pairs (hendyadis) had been used as a rhetorical device both in the literary tradition and the national epic poetry of many European countries. This rhetorical device was widely used for emphasis, so when double translation actually lost its semantic function, it was retained by languages as set phrases or a purely stylistic device.


Author(s):  
Christopher Shields

The earliest interest in language during the ancient Greek period was largely instrumental: presumed facts about language and its features were pressed into service for the purpose of philosophical argumentation. Perhaps inevitably, this activity gave way to the analysis of language for its own sake. Claims, for example, about the relation between the semantic values of general terms and the existence of universals invited independent inquiry into the nature of the meanings of those general terms themselves. Language thus became an object of philosophical inquiry in its own right. Accordingly, philosophers at least from the time of Plato conducted inquiries proper to philosophy of language. They investigated: - how words acquire their semantic values; - how proper names and other singular terms refer; - how words combine to form larger semantic units; - the compositional principles necessary for language understanding; - how sentences, statements, or propositions come to be truth-evaluable; and, among later figures of the classical period, - (6) how propositions, as abstract, mind- and language-independent entities, are to be (a) characterized in terms of their constituents, (b) related to minds and the natural languages used to express them, and (c) related to the language-independent world.


2018 ◽  
pp. 94-109
Author(s):  
I. Petik

The paper centers on building the semantics of the modal metatheory for studying the classes of algorithmic complexity. Further the effectiveness of this calculus is studied on the example of researching the famous problem of computational complexity theory – the question of equality of the classes P and NP. The new theoretical and methodological approach to the problem is provided. The original semantics was developed that can be used for description of relations between classes of algorithmic complexity from the complexity theory. On the basis of this semantics the complete calculus of the logic of the computational complexity can be developed in future. It is the first time when modal logic is used for studying the relations between classes of algorithmic complexity. New theoretical and methodological approaches to the classical problems of the complexity theory are proposed. Paper matters for computer science, philosophy of mathematics, logic and theory of algorithms, cryptography.


Peter Aczel. Quantifiers, games and inductive definitions. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 1–14. - Kit Fine. Some connections between elementary and modal logic. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 15–31. - Bengt Hansson and Peter Gärdenfors. Filtations and the finite frame property in Boolean semantics. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 32–39. - Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala. Systematizing definability theory. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 40–62. - Herman Ruge Jervell. Conservative endextensions and the quantifier ‘there exist uncountably many.’Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 63–80. - Per Martin-Löf. About models for intuitionistic type theories and the notion of definitional equality. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 81–109. - Henrik Sahlqvist. Completeness and correspondence in the first and second order semantics for modal logic. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 110–143. - Arto Salomaa. On some decidability problems concerning developmental languages. Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Stig Kanger, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 82, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Oxford, and American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 144–153.

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. Thomason

Dialogue ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-533
Author(s):  
E.-H. W. Kluge

Frege: Philosophy of Language (Duckworth, London: 1973; xxv, 698) has been heralded as Michael Dummett's long-awaited magnum opus on Frege. Actually, however, as the author himself tells us, it is only the first of a two-volume series devoted to Frege's philosophy of language and his philosophy of mathematics respectively.The book itself has been long in preparation, the writing of it having been interrupted for several years. This fact could not help but leave some marks on the organization and content of the various chapters. Still, all in all, it presents a remarkably interesting and provocative whole. It is topical, rather than purely genetic in approach, dealing with various fundamental features of Frege's philosophy of language in some 19 chapters; e.g., with his sense-reference distinction, his theory of assertions, his conception of the nature and place of truth-values, propositions and thoughts, his views on quantification and identity, the nature of proper names, his polemic about explicit vs. implicit (contextual) definitions, his theory of incomplete (predicative) expressions, and the like. However, the historical needs of the reader are also well-served.


2015 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hacker

The phrase ‘Lebensform’ (form of life) had a long and varied history prior to Wittgenstein’s use of it on a mere three occasions in the Philosophical Investigations. It is not a pivotal concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But it is a minor signpost of a major reorientation of philosophy, philosophy of language and logic, and philosophy of mathematics that Wittgenstein instigated. For Wittgenstein sought to replace the conception of a language as a meaning calculus (Frege, Russell, the Tractatus) by an anthropological or ethnological conception. A language is not a class of sentences that can be formed from a set of axioms (definitions), formation and transformation rules and the meanings of which is given by their truth-conditions, but an open-ended series of interlocking language-games constituting a form of life or way of living (a culture). Wittgenstein’s uses of ‘Lebensform’ and its cognates, both in the Investigations and in his Nachlass are severally analysed, and various exegetical misinterpretations are clarified.


Idealism is a family of metaphysical views each of which gives priority to the mental. The best-known forms of idealism in Western philosophy are the versions developed by George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant. Although idealism was once a dominant view in Western philosophy, it has suffered almost total neglect over the last several decades. The contemporary debate has focused almost exclusively on physicalism and dualism, though the alternative views of panpsychism and neutral monism are beginning to receive more attention. This book remedies the situation by bringing together seventeen new essays by leading philosophers on idealism. They explain, attack, or defend a variety of forms of idealism—not only Berkeleyan and Kantian versions, but also Buddhist and Jewish versions, and others besides. The essays are all contributions to metaphysics, but variously focus on philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and other areas of philosophy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Bob Hale

In recent work, Kit Fine proposes a new approach to the philosophy of mathematics, which he calls procedural postulationism: the postulates from which a mathematical theory is derived are imperatival, rather than indicative, in character. According to procedural postulationism, what is postulated in mathematics are not propositions true in a given mathematical domain, but rather procedures for the construction of that domain. Fine claims some very significant advantages for procedural postulationism over other approaches. This chapter raises some questions for the view and its promised advantages. One crucial set of questions concerns how exactly the commands of procedural postulationism are to be understood. And in particular, how literally are we to take talk of construction?


1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Gross

Abstract: Vico's theory of metaphor is best understood as a monster in the tradition of classical rhetorical invention. It is the mutant offspring of metaphor characterized as “necessary” (an “ear” of com, for example) and metaphor characterized in terms of analogy. From the perspective of his method. Vico marries these apparently incompatible forms inherited from Aristotle and thereby identifies a third type of linguistic metaphor. I argue that the metaphor identifies a stipulatory definition taken out of context. In order to situate this claim, I outline Vico's genetic analysis and elaborate in general terms what metaphor and definition share. Most importantly. Vico insists that beings, actions, and events are linguistically identified in some particular diseursive context. Indeed, in many cases that context alone determines whether the expression can be called a definition or a metaphor. Like Cicero's ideal jurist, Vico's hero employs motivated words and realizes possibilities available to common sense. Henee Vico's theory of metaphor is both “constructivist”—language has the power to makes things—and “humartist”—it must do so in a form appropriate to history and culture. Vico's theory is consequently important to us because it challenges the proper/figurative distinction championed in the philosophy of language and adds a pragmatic dimension to contemporary views of metaphor at work in literary theory.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document