Nuclear Deterrence—Another Perfect Storm

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Rendall
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Business As Usual ◽  
Global Heating ◽  
Perfect Storm

This chapter applies Stephen M. Gardiner’s model of the perfect moral storm to nuclear deterrence. Most damage from a major nuclear war would fall on third parties rather than the belligerents. Some would be present-day people in neutral countries and nonhuman animals, but future generations would be the largest group of victims. This makes ongoing reliance on large nuclear arsenals ethically indefensible. It presents many of the same problems, however, as global heating. One is that future damages are not salient to present-day publics and politicians. Another is that nuclear weapons reduce the probability of major war while greatly increasing the damage if it occurs. This affects the intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits. Nuclear deterrence is a ‘front-loaded’ good: its benefits arrive right away, whereas its costs will most likely arrive only in the future. Nuclear war is inevitable if states rely on it in perpetuity, but for a given generation, the likelihood may be small. “Business-as-usual” may thus be a good self-interested gamble for each generation until nuclear war actually occurs. Not surprisingly, it finds many defenders. The last part of the chapter considers possible solutions.

The Subtle Knife

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Peter Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Polar Opposite

This article looks to tie together the polar opposite of hybrid warfare and nuclear deterrence. The reason for this is that hybrid warfare and its effects on nuclear deterrence need to be explored as there appears to be substantial increases in hybrid warfare’s usage. This article found that hybrid warfare has an erosion like effect on nuclear deterrence because it increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. This may be due to both the fact that hybrid warfare can ignore conventional redlines, but also because the cyber aspect of hybrid warfare has unintended psychological effects on how deterrence functions. how does this relate to nuclear war? In short, cyber warfare attacks key concepts which make nuclear deterrence a viable strategy including the concepts of stability, clarity, and rationality. Therefore, hybrid warfare increases the chance of nuclear use.

A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear Hardware and Power: The War of Perceptions

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-766
Author(s):  
Trudy Govier
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Extended Deterrence ◽  
Natural Connection ◽  
Ethical Point ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Nuclear Diplomacy

Nations possessing nuclear weapons have seen them as useful for many purposes. These include classic nuclear deterrence (preventing a nuclear attack), extended nuclear deterrence (preventing a conventional attack on the nuclear nation or allied countries), the fighting of a nuclear war ‘if deterrence fails,’ and a ‘diplomatic’ use in which the weapons are seen as implements of coercive political power. Concerning all these uses profound ethical questions arise. It is the last use which will be the focus of attention in this paper.I have chosen this subject partly because I believe that it has received insufficient attention from those reflecting on nuclear policies from an ethical point of view. Discussions tend to focus on the use, threat to use, or intention to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack. The retention of nuclear weapons for such a purpose is far easier to rationalize than is the development of such weapons for extended deterrence, nuclear ‘diplomacy,’ or the actual waging of a nuclear war. Historically, nuclear weapons have been held by nuclear states for all these purposes. In fact, there are natural relations between the functions. When a power possesses nuclear weapons, the ultimate token of military power in the modern world, it is natural that it will seek to use them for purposes less restricted than the sole one of deterring nuclear war. Hence there is a natural development from classic deterrence to extended deterrence and the coercive use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of national interest. There is also a natural connection between classic deterrence and the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of fighting and ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war. An opposing state is to be prevented from attacking by the belief that an attack would be followed by retaliation. That requires that a nuclear state indicate the will and capacity to retaliate-that is, to use these weapons in a real war if necessary.

Minimizing the Danger of Nuclear Weapons

2018 ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Steven P. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
The World ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Global Peace ◽  
The Cold War

Many of those concerned about global peace advocate a policy of nuclear disarmament in order to eliminate the danger posed by these weapons. The logic is that eliminating the weapons would eliminate the danger they pose. But I argue that these are separate goals, that eliminating the weapons would not eliminate the danger, and in fact might make it worse. After the cold war, many thought that it was finally possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons, but since 1991, the world has not moved substantially towards this goal. The reason is that nuclear weapons create a security dilemma in which efforts to use them to make societies safer, through the practice of nuclear deterrence, end up making them less safe. This is because efforts (through minimum deterrence) to use them to avoid a deliberate nuclear attack create risk of nuclear war by escalation, and efforts (through counterforce deterrence) to minimize the risk of nuclear war by escalation, create the risk of deliberate nuclear attack. The way out of this dilemma is through delegitimization of nuclear weapons.

Immoral Risks: A Deontological Critique of Nuclear Deterrence

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas P. Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Present Form ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Principal Criterion

I. Beyond UtilitarianismIn the summer of 1982, I published an article called “Missiles and Morals,” in which I argued on utilitarian grounds that nuclear deterrence in its present form is not morally justifiable. The argument of “Missiles and Morals” compared the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under nuclear deterrence (DET) with the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under American unilateral nuclear disaramament (UND). For a variety of reasons, I claimed diat the number of casualties in a two-sided nuclear war developing under DET would be at least fifteen times greater than the number of casualties in a one-sided nuclear attack developing under UND. If one assumes that human lives lost or saved is the principal criterion by which nuclear weapons policies should be measured, it follows that DET is morally superior to UND on utilitarian grounds only if the chance of a two-sided nuclear war under DET is more than fifteen times less dian the chance of a one-sided nuclear attack under UND. Since I did not believe that the chance of nuclear war under deterrence is fifteen times less than the chance of nuclear war under unilateral nuclear disarmament, I inferred diat utilitaranism failed to justify DET. Indeed, on utilitarian grounds, DET stood condemned.

Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction

1986 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 213-236
Author(s):  
Steven C. Patten
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
New Order ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
The Earth

‘The circle of responsibility is drawn around all who have or should have knowledge of the illegal and immoral character of the war.’--Richard FalkJonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, is in a large part an earnest, aphoristic essay on individual responsibility in these times. Consider a representative passage: ‘With the generation that has never known a world unmenaced by nuclear weapons, a new order of the generation begins. In it, each person alive is called on to assume his share of the responsibility for guaranteeing the existence of all future generations.’ I have no doubt that many people in most countries — citizens of representative democracies in particular — know this call and feel in some dim and tentative way that there must be special individual responsibilities that have evolved with that defensive, strategic and political doctrine we know as nuclear deterrence. And how could we expect otherwise?

scholarly journals An Asymmetric Model of Nuclear Deterrence

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-29
Author(s):  
A. Fenenko
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Territorial Expansion ◽  
Asymmetric Model ◽  
The World ◽  
The Military

The article explores the concept of an asymmetric model of nuclear deterrence. The issue of asymmetric nuclear relations is one of the most productive in the theory of nuclear deterrence. By asymmetry we mean disparity in military power between the subjects of deterrence, when the weaker subject deters the stronger one. All of the official nuclear states have tried the components of such a policy, France and China exercising its fuller capacity. In the bipolar period, nuclear deterrence was relatively simple. The two superpowers sought to deter the opponent from taking certain actions by means of a nuclear threat. However, in the early XXI century, traditional deterrence is replaced by a compellence (coercive) policy aimed at forcing the opponent to commit certain actions that he would not commit otherwise. How the potential future revisionists can use coercion policy is an issue still beyond the scope of our rationalization. The author believes that they could indeed pursue such policy and could create a concept of asymmetric deterrence in three variants: 1) the use of nuclear weapons as a “guarantor” of their security in the course of expansion; 2) modernization of the “limited nuclear war” concept; 3) non-use of nuclear weapons alongside with the abandonment of the nuclear deterrence concept (modeled on the chemical weapons during World War II). However, the theory of asymmetric nuclear deterrence is still being developed at present, and therefore has been applied mainly at the political level. We can identify two issues emerging within the theory, both of which are of practical significance: 1) the weaker agent can deter the stronger adversary despite the military disparity between them; 2) whether the stronger agent is able to ward from the weaker counterpart. Looking back in history, we can observe, at least, four scenarios of the emergence of revisionist powers: – the French scenario: when a state aiming at supremacy fails to achieve it through a number of local conflicts and instead attempts to gain global leadership; – the German scenario: when a super state with great military power feels offended and struggles to assert its place in the sun, or rather in the world; – the Italian scenario: when a regional state, which does not boast great military power, starts a territorial expansion; – the Japanese scenario: when a previously small and, by default “insignificant” state, builds up its great military power and threatens the world with its revisionist policy. It is not possible yet to predict the mechanism of nuclear deterrence in today’s world or foresee where we shall expect the emergence of revisionist states. However, what we do learn from history is that such revisionist powers will be eager to promote their ambitions at any cost. It is quite difficult to imagine now what will happen if a revisionist state does not believe in another country’s readiness to deliver a nuclear strike. Similarly, what will happen if such a revisionist regime uses a containment strategy for both its defense and territorial expansion?

scholarly journals An Illusion of the Indian Balistic Missile Defence System

Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2(59)) ◽  
pp. 39-53
Author(s):  
Ashfaq Ahmed ◽  
Saima Kausar
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Defense System ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Sense Of Security ◽  
False Sense ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense

In this paper, the Researcher has endeavored to test the hypothesis that the Indian ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) erodes the sense of mutual vulnerability. It seems that the BMDS provides a false sense of security to India. For this reason it is felt that the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) can therefore be launched against Pakistan in an attempt to actualize a disarming strike. Consequentially, the BMDS disturbs the India-Pakistan crisis and deterrence stability. Indian policymakers should realize that firstly, the operationalization of the CSD crosses Pakistan’s nuclear threshold and it requires Islamabad to unleash strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs); secondly, the Pak-India crisis and deterrence stability is functional due to the sense of mutual vulnerability; thirdly, the credibility of nuclear deterrence has not been tested and fourthly, the deterrence stability solidified the crisis and strategic stability. The BMDS deployment in South Asia will certainly result first in quantitative and qualitative nuclear proliferation; second, it weakens the NPT and; third, it may break the nuclear taboo based on non-use of nuclear weapons. India needs to understand that Pak-India can survive the long persisting threat of conventional and nuclear war because of the mutual vulnerability of counter value and counterforce targets.

Using the research on intergroup conflict in nonhuman animals to help inform patterns of human intergroup conflict

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda R. Ridley ◽  
Melanie O. Mirville
Keyword(s):  
Large Body ◽  
Nonhuman Animal ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Animal Groups ◽  
Interesting Article ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

Abstract There is a large body of research on conflict in nonhuman animal groups that measures the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, and we suggest that much of this evidence is missing from De Dreu and Gross's interesting article. It is a shame this work has been missed, because it provides evidence for interesting ideas put forward in the article.

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