Max Scheler

Author(s):  
John Cutting

This article discusses the philosophy of Max Scheler (1974–1928), a German philosopher known for his work in phenomenology, psychopathology, sociology, psychology, ethics, and philosophical anthropology. After a brief biographical sketch, the article focuses on Scheler’s philosophical trajectory, beginning with his undergraduate and postgraduate theses on some of the various realms of knowledge such as ethics, logic, psychology, and the transcendental approach of Immanuel Kant, and how he was influenced by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. It then examines Scheler’s two important treatises on the phenomenology of emotion and value: Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühl und vom Liebe und Hass (On the Phenomenology and Theory of the Feeling of Sympathy and of Love and Hate) and Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values). Scheler’s works on philosophical anthropology, metaphysics, knowledge, and the realms of existence are also considered.

Author(s):  
Francis Dunlop

Max Scheler, usually called a phenomenologist, was probably the best known German philosopher of the 1920s. Always an eclectic thinker, he was a pupil of the neo-idealist Rudolph Eucken, but was also strongly influenced by the life-philosophies of Dilthey and Bergson. While teaching at Jena he regularly met Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement, and his mature writings have a strongly phenomenological, as well as a Catholic, stamp. Later he turned towards metaphysics and the philosophical problems raised by modern science. Scheler’s interests were very wide. He tried to do justice to all aspects of experience – ethical, religious, personal, social, scientific, historical – without doing away with the specific nature of each. Above all, he took the emotional foundations of thought seriously. Many of his insights are striking and profound, and sometimes his arguments are very telling, but his power to organize his material consistently and to attend conscientiously to the business of justification is poorly developed. Scheler is best known for his anti-Kantian ethics, based on an a priori emotional grasp of a hierarchy of objective values, which precedes all choice of goods and purposes. He himself describes his ethics as ‘personalist’, and makes personal values supreme, sharply distinguishing the ‘person’ from the ‘ego’, and linking this with his analysis of different types of social interaction. In epistemology he defends a pragmatist approach to science and perception; thus philosophy, as the intuition of essences, requires a preparatory ascetic discipline. His philosophy of religion is an attempt to marry the Augustinian approach through love with the Thomist approach through reason. In his later work, to which his important work on sympathy provides the transition, he defends a dualist philosophical anthropology and metaphysics, interpreting the latter in activist terms as a resolution of the tensions between spiritual love and vital impulse.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (9999) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Aivaras Stepukonis ◽  

The article explores a special mode of the human mind outlined in the writings of Max Scheler under the notion of the functionalization of essential (a priori) knowledge. While the concept of a priori was given its profound elaboration in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Scheler applies it with a number of significant modifications. Along with the a priori of objective reality, which is the mind’s first step in grasping the autonomous world, Scheler comes to posit a species of a priori that is subjective. A person’s exposure to an objective essence exercises a special kind of influence on that person’s mind: what was once an objective a priori is appropriated as a subjective a priori, the thing thought becomes a “form” or pattern of thinking, the thing liked becomes a “form” or manner of liking. “Functionalization” characterizes precisely the mind’s ability to transmute the essential knowledge of autonomous reality into subjective a priori forms of knowing and anticipating that reality. This transmutation unfolds on three intuitive planes: that of meaning which is known, that of value which is perceived or apprehended, and that of existence which is encountered in the resistance of objects to the will of the percipient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (283 S.Esp) ◽  
pp. 269-287
Author(s):  
Miguel Armando Martínez Gallego

La fundamentación metafísica que sirve de núcleo a la ética de la responsabilidad de Hans Jonas participa de unos determinados presupuestos acerca de la relación entre los aspectos objetivo y subjetivo de la ética, donde la objetividad se atribuye automáticamente a lo teórico (radicante en la «razón» o intelecto) y la relatividad subjetiva a lo valorativo (radicante en la afectividad). Con ayuda de la crítica que realizó Max Scheler de estos mismos presupuestos en el formalismo ético de Immanuel Kant, se trata de discutirlos y mostrar que suprimen el fundamento propio de la moral, que reside en el conocimiento objetivo, pero al mismo tiempo afectivo, de cualidades materiales de valor en tanto que objetos intencionales del percibir afectivo (Fühlen).


Author(s):  
John B. Thompson ◽  
Roger Savage

Paul Ricoeur was one of the leading thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century and in the later part of his life was considered by some to be France’s greatest living philosopher. Along with the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ricoeur was one of the main contemporary exponents of philosophical hermeneutics: that is, of a philosophical orientation that places particular emphasis on the nature and role of interpretation. While his early work was strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, he became increasingly concerned with problems of interpretation and developed – partly through detailed inquiries into psychoanalysis and structuralism – a distinctive hermeneutical approach. In some of his subsequent writings Ricoeur explored the role of imagination in metaphor, narrative, and social and political life. In his later work, Ricoeur turned his attention to a philosophical anthropology of the capable human being, which was the context for his explorations into the self’s ethical constitution, the role of memory and forgetting in history, and issues of justice and recognition.


Author(s):  
V. Sabadukha

The purpose of the article is to analyze the views of I. Kant, F. Nietzsche, and M. Scheler on the problem of personality in the context of the principle of spiritual hierarchy. To do this we need to solve the following problems: first, to make a comparative analysis of their views; and second, to formulate the main theses of the author's metaphysical concept of personality. To analyze the problem of personality, the methodology of knowledge of K. Mannheim and the ideas of P. Ricker have been applied. On the basis of the principle of the spiritual hierarchy, the author's understanding of the meaning of the concept of "personality" is formulated. The metaphysical concept of personality, revives the hierarchical approach to the understanding of a person, on the one hand, and, formulates a new theoretical apparatus for the enhanced understanding of a person and personality in particular, on the other hand. The proposed concept of personality lays the foundations for rethinking the content of the educational process, places on the agenda the study of mechanisms for the perfection of man and society.


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (132) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Thiago Aquino

Resumo: Este artigo analisa a antropologia filosófica de Max Scheler enquanto fenomenologia da distinção humana cuja principal tarefa é a elaboração do conceito essencial do homem, ou seja, a definição do que o separa e o eleva acima da natureza. O artigo divide-se em duas partes: na primeira, apresenta o conceito de antropologia filosófica através da discussão do seu lugar sistemático nas investigações filosóficas; na segunda, desenvolve uma análise da questão da essência humana em correlação com o problema da determinação do seu lugar metafísico no interior da totalidade.  Abstract: This article presents an analysis of the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler as a phenomenology of human distinction, whose main task is to elaborate the essential concept of the human being, meaning to define what separates humans from Nature and elevates them above Nature. The first part ignoof this article examines the concept of philosophical anthropology through the discussion of its systematic place in philosophical investigation. The second part develops an analysis of the question of human and of the correlated problem of determining the metaphysical place of this essence within the totality.


2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (130) ◽  
pp. 239
Author(s):  
Thiago Aquino

Este artigo analisa a antropologia filosófica de Max Scheler enquanto fenomenologia da distinção humana, cuja principal tarefa é a elaboração do conceito essencial do homem, ou seja, a definição do que o separa e o eleva acima da natureza. O artigo divide-se em duas partes: na primeira, apresenta o conceito de antropologia filosófica através da discussão do seu lugar sistemático nas investigações filosóficas; na segunda, desenvolve uma análise da questão da essência humana em correlação com o problema da determinação do seu lugar metafísico no interior da totalidade.Abstract: This article presents an analysis of the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler as a phenomenology of human distinction, the main task of which is to elaborate the essential concept of the human being, that is, to define what separates and elevates this being above nature. . In the first part of the article, the concept of philosophical anthropology is presented through the discussion of its systematic place in philosophical investigation. The second part develops an analysis of the question of human essence, co-relating it with the problem of determining the metaphysical place of this essence within the totality.


1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Strack

Inthe late eighteenth century, any attempt to categorize humankind by race was necessarily tied to the controversy surrounding slavery as well as to the debate about the general perfectibility of humankind, which, in turn, focused on the potential of “primative” peoples to achieve higher (European) levels of civilization. The widespread glorification of the Pacific Islanders as unspoiled childern of nature in the wake of Rousseau's idealization of a natural state and Bougainville'sLa Nouvelle Cythèremade the debate even more complex; the enthusiastic reception of these texts in Europe bespoke an alienation from a polarized society and a dissatisfaction with rapid technological advances. Meanwhile, scientists were striving to avoid such rhetoric by attempting to define anthropology as a science, to collect data, and to categorize humankind free of political bias and the limitations of any particular philosophy of history.


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