scholarly journals Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars P. Feld ◽  
Emmanuelle Reulier

Abstract Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with - ceteris paribus - lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.

e-Finanse ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Karpowicz

AbstractGovernments of EU Member States have been reducing statutory corporate income tax rates (“CIT”) for several years. What encourages them to take part in tax competition? The article discusses several issues which are in favor of lower CIT rates. They are selected based on their relevance. The study is performed with use of data available from applicable statistical bodies/literature and is based on literature review (especially in cases where required data is not available). It seems that the commonly raised issue of rivalry for capital in the globalizing world economy with highly mobile capital could be only one of a number of reasons for CIT rate depression. Tax competition is fueled by the various sizes of the economies of EU countries as well. The following important rationale may include the aspiration of governments to curb the local shadow economy. There are also some issues of a more theoretical nature that explain decreasing CIT rates. They include: (i) the necessity to accommodate CIT rate levels from the perspective of double taxation of dividends, (ii) the requirement to consider political responsibility of CI or (iii) the need to manage a deadweight loss. As a result of these challenges EU Member States often broaden the legal CIT base to maintain government revenues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 575-593
Author(s):  
Tahsin Mehdi ◽  
Brian Murphy

In this article, using new data released in 2019, Tahsin Mehdi and Brian Murphy examine changes in the progressivity of the federal and provincial income tax system, in conjunction with changes in the progressivity of federal and provincial cash transfers since 1992, by examining effective tax rates. Many of the major components of the system of income taxes and cash transfers have become somewhat more progressive collectively over time. This has resulted in an improved net tax position for lower-income taxfilers as well as the top third of taxfilers. On the other hand, taxfilers in the middle quintile have experienced a drop in their net tax position since 1992.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Raymond L. Richman ◽  
Jesse T. Richman ◽  
Howard B. Richman

Tax competition has morphed the corporate tax into a source-based tax with falling rates. Past proposals to integrate corporate taxes with the residence-based personal income tax were rejected because of revenue loss and poorly designed alternatives, but in light of falling tax rates and revenues, integration has become viable. An updated version of the simple and practical 1803 British system would impute corporate income to shareholders and have corporations withhold taxes paid on that income. It would reduce distortions of the current code, including that between domestic and foreign production, could provide more government revenue, and would be more progressive.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 116-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars P. Feld ◽  
Christoph A. Schaltegger

AbstractBased on a survey of the literature on the political economics of taxation we analyze in this paper with data for Switzerland which tax instruments are less intensively used when tax policy is restricted by tax competition and direct democracy. Both institutions restrict government revenue according to our results. In particular, Swiss cantons finance their government activities less by broad-based taxes, like personal income taxes, than by user charges. Both institutions thus enforce a stronger government financing according to the benefit principle instead of the ability to pay principle.


1989 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 196-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pete Bettinger ◽  
Harry L. Haney ◽  
William C. Siegel

Abstract The 1988 federal and state income tax liabilities for hypothetical forest landowners in two federal income tax brackets, each with and without timber sale revenue, were calculated for the 14 southern states. At the medium income level, the state portion of total income tax liability(without timber sale revenue) ranges from 9% in Louisiana to 20% in North Carolina. With timber sale revenue, it ranges from 7% in Louisiana to 17% in North Carolina. At the high income level, the state portion of total income taxes (without timber sale revenue) ranged from 7% in Louisianato 16% in North Carolina, and with timber sale revenue, from 6% in Louisiana to 15% in North Carolina. Capital gains exclusions, deductions for federal income taxes, tax rates and schedules, standard deductions, and personal exemptions are the most important provisions for reducing state incometax liability. The installment sale method of reporting income was used as one alternative tax planning strategy for spreading timber sale revenue over a 2-year period. The purpose was to smooth cash flows and reduce the amount of income subject to higher marginal tax rates. Georgia taxpayerselecting the installment sale method of reporting in a hypothetical case saved $1,203 and $585 in total income taxes for the medium and high income levels, respectively. South. J. Appl. For. 13(4):196-203.


Author(s):  
M. Jonathan C. Eklund

AbstractThis study examines the effect of investor-level income taxes on profit repatriation and dividend payout policies of multinational firms. The empirical estimations include two million firm-year observations in 130 countries. By augmenting the Lintner model of dividend payments, I employ parametric as well as semiparametric techniques to provide evidence that income taxes on dividends neither alter dividend payments to investors nor within-firm dividend payments. These results remain robust to a wide range of alternative specifications.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-1) ◽  
pp. 109-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Jianfu ◽  
Yudha Aryo Sudibyo

Agency conflict between minority and controlling shareholders in state owned firms has to be considered in order to examine the variability on effective tax rates. In China, state ownership helps the government to achieve its social objectives by optimizing corporate income tax. We provide a significant result to prove that state owned firms paid higher corporate income taxes than private firms. Our results also indicate that corporate effective tax rates are positively associated with firm sized and inventory intensity. However, we have no strong evidence to support the association with leverage, return on assets and capital intensity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-86
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Korečko ◽  
Alžbeta Suhányiová ◽  
Ladislav Suhányi

Political, economic, and social developments in the world have undergone relatively turbulent changes over the last two decades. The European Union has not avoided them either. Naturally, any such change directly or indirectly affects the national economies of individual countries. Governments adapt to the new conditions through measures in the areas of employment, production, taxes, levies, and the like. This paper aims to examine the development of income taxes in Slovakia and other countries of the EU. Personal income tax and corporate income tax are the most significant direct taxes in all Member States in terms of collection volume. Their development varies from one region of Europe to another. Therefore, the idea of greater tax harmonization in the Union regularly runs into the arguments of countries in favor of maintaining tax competition. The paper seeks the similarity of individual tax systems and suggests a possible procedure in their further convergence.


2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-66
Author(s):  
Ferruccio Ponzano

Abstract The aim of this paper is to show how two competitive governments can simultaneously choose their income taxes. There are two tiers of government in competition. The problem is analysed using the Leviathan hypothesis and the theory of incomplete contracts. We assume that a government includes its re-election in its utility function and study the allocation of the income tax rates between the two tiers, free from any regulatory constraint. We show that the governments are interested in meeting the re-election constraint, but this common interest does not generate an egalitarian allocation of the tax revenues.


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