Föderalismus und Entwicklungsländer: Ist Dezentralisierung ein geeignetes Instrument der Entwicklungspolitik?

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 337-356
Author(s):  
Christian Leßmann ◽  
Gunther Markwardt

AbstractThis paper analyzes decentralization as an instrument of development policy. The positive experience of high developed countries with federal government structures has shifted the focus of international development organizations to decentralization. In particular, decentralization should promote economic prosperity and reduce corruption. This paper argues, however, that the particular institutional framework of developing countries should be taken into account. This study demonstrates that fiscal decentralization tends to harm the effectiveness of foreign aid, whereas forms of political decentralization are less problematic. Moreover, decentralization can increase corruption in less liberal countries. In light of these findings, national and international development agencies should carefully consider potential negative consequences from decentralization.

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406612110442
Author(s):  
Tobias Heinrich ◽  
Yoshiharu Kobayashi ◽  
Edward Lawson

Pundits, development practitioners, and scholars worry that rising populism and international disengagement in developed countries have negative consequences on foreign aid. However, how populism and foreign aid go together is not well understood. This paper provides the first systematic examination of this relationship. We adopt the popular ideational definition of populism, unpack populism into its core “thin” elements, and examine them within a delegation model of aid policy—a prominent framework in the aid literature. In so doing, we identify specific domestic political processes through which the core components of populism may affect aid spending. We argue that increases in one component of populism—anti-elitism—and in nativist sentiments, an associated concept, in a donor country lead to a reduction in aid spending through a public opinion channel. We supply both micro- and macro-evidence for our arguments by fielding surveys in the United States and United Kingdom as well as by analyzing aid spending by a large number of OECD donors. Our findings show that nativism and anti-elitism, rather than populism per se, influence not only individual attitudes toward aid but also actual aid policy and generate important insights into how to address populist challenges to foreign aid. Beyond these, our study contributes to the broader International Relations literature by demonstrating one useful analytical approach to studying populism, nativism, and foreign policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Honig

AbstractBureaucracies with field operations that cannot be easily supervised and monitored by managers are caught between two sources of dysfunction that may harm performance. The first source of dysfunction is straightforward: field workers can use operating slack and asymmetric information to their own advantage, thwarting an organization's objectives. The second source of dysfunction is often overlooked: attempts to limit workers’ autonomy may have deleterious effects, curbing agents’ ability to respond efficaciously to the environment. I find that the parliaments and executive boards to whom International Development Organizations (IDOs) are accountable differentially constrain IDO organizational autonomy, which in turn affects management's control of field agents. Tight management control of field agents has negative effects, particularly in more unpredictable environments. Attempts by politicians to constrain organizations in an effort to improve performance can sometimes be self-undermining, having net effects opposite those intended.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Shuyong Guo ◽  
◽  
Yulin Sun ◽  
Pavel Demidov ◽  
◽  
...  

With their growing economic power and international influence, the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are paying increasing attention to international development assistance. Although the BRICS countries started later than western developed countries, the speed of their development is staggering and their share in foreign aid is gradually increasing. The BRICS countries continue to innovate forms of assistance and cooperation in their own international development assistance, to strengthen cooperation with recipient countries, and to plan their own foreign aid work through the establishment of relevant institutions and the publication of relevant documents. But, at the same time, the BRICS countries are facing certain challenges in the process of international development assistance. This article examines the historical practice of BRICS’ international development assistance, analyzes the role BRICS plays in international development assistance, and considers the future prospects for BRICS’ participation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Skladany

AbstractExisting best practices for aid delivery are well known and largely uncontroversial but often neglected by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies because of domestic political considerations and bureaucratic resistance. Developing countries should unilaterally ratify an agreement committing them, in the future, after they have experienced sustained and robust economic, social, and political development, to establish their own foreign aid programs that follow existing best practices for aid delivery. Such foreign aid reciprocity agreements would have numerous benefits, including: being an international tool to signal a developing country’s resolve to reform and a domestic tool to pressure corrupt public officials to improve; enabling developing countries to take a leadership position in international development discourses; putting pressure on developed countries to implement best practices; and encouraging other developing countries to support and eventually adopt aid reciprocity agreements, which would lead to an increase in the amount of aid in the future. Furthermore, the idea of unilateral reciprocity agreements could potentially be expanded to areas of international interaction beyond foreign aid such as finance, trade, security, technology transfer, migration, and environmental policies.


1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-490
Author(s):  
Nurul Islam

Foreign economic aid is at the cross-roads. There is an atmosphere of gloom and disenchantment surrounding international aid in both the developed and developing countries — more so in the former than in the latter. Doubts have grown in the developed countries, especially among the conservatives in these countries, as to the effectiveness of aid in promoting economic development, the wastes and inefficiency involved in the use of aid, the adequacy of self-help on the part of the recipient countries in husbanding and mobilising their own resources for development and the dangers of getting involved, through ex¬tensive foreign-aid operations, in military or diplomatic conflicts. The waning of confidence on the part of the donors in the rationale of foreign aid has been accentuated by an increasing concern with their domestic problems as well as by the occurrence of armed conflicts among the poor, aid-recipient countries strengthened by substantial defence expenditure that diverts resources away from development. The disenchantment on the part of the recipient countries is, on the other hand, associated with the inadequacy of aid, the stop-go nature of its flow in many cases, and the intrusion of noneconomic considerations governing the allocation of aid amongst the recipient countries. There is a reaction in the developing countries against the dependence, political and eco¬nomic, which heavy reliance on foreign aid generates. The threat of the in¬creasing burden of debt-service charge haunts the developing world and brings them back to the donors for renewed assistance and/or debt rescheduling.


Author(s):  
Dan Honig

This chapter traces the relationship between political authorizing environments, international development organization (IDO) management, and IDO field agents, drawing on the empirics presented in chapters 6 and 7. It digs into the experience of working for USAID as compared to DFID. It also extends the discussion of delegation to implementing contractors and brings this book’s theorizing of Navigation by Judgment into conversation with other foreign aid solutions aimed at incorporating local knowledge, such as establishing country offices or ensuring projects have country ownership. This chapter connects Part II’s empirics more tightly to the mechanisms theorized in Part I , particularly the role of authorizing environment insecurity and the need to “manage up” (Chapter 4) and their implications for the workplace experience of agents (Chapter 3) and the entry and exit of personnel.


Author(s):  
Paul Walsh ◽  
Ciara Whelan

Ireland’s involvement in international development has become a significant aspect of its foreign economic policy. Its engagement has moved from priorities that were largely domestically determined in the early 1970s and based on bilateral relationships between Ireland as donor and the recipient programme countries, toward priorities and involvements within a multilateral policy framework. This has come about through Ireland’s increasing engagement with international organizations, particularly the UN and the EU. However as the boundaries blur between Overseas Development Aid (ODA) policy and shared global goals, such as addressing climate breakdown and mitigating the scale of international distributive inequality, this can lead to tensions within countries about the implications of international commitments for the priorities at play in domestic politics. This is evident where Ireland’s ODA-driven commitments in the international field are in tension with domestic policy priorities, but also where tension arises in the area of national economic development policy.


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