Conclusion

Author(s):  
Jürgen Rüland

The chapter recapitulates the norm appropriation by the Indonesian foreign policy community. Most stakeholders localized external ideas and norms. In the process, the government was exposed to localization pressures by nonstate actors from below. Legislators and business representatives mainly drew from extant beliefs, while in their majority NGOs, academics, and the press vocally propagated the European ideas of regional integration. By charting additional pathways of norm diffusion and distinguishing defensive and offensive localization, the study nuanced existing norm diffusion theory. Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders also imported ideas from Africa and Latin America, making norm diffusion an omnidirectional process. The study provides strong evidence that ASEAN’s cooperation norms continue to differ from the EU. Highlighting the normative agency of Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders, the study contributes to the project of a Global IR, which more than hitherto takes into account events and processes in the Global South.

Author(s):  
Jürgen Rüland

This book challenges the proposition that regional organizations across the world exhibit increasing similarities with the European Union as a result of norm diffusion. It examines how and to what extent Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders—the government, civil society, legislators, the academe, the press and business representatives—sought to influence reforms of Southeast Asian regionalism by adopting ideas and norms of regional integration championed by the EU. Triggering the Indonesian debate on regionalism was the decision of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia is a founding member, to draft an ASEAN Charter, a quasi-constitutional document adjusting the grouping’s repository of cooperation norms to a changing international environment. Applying and developing further Amitav Acharya’s theory of “constitutive localization,” the analysis of the ASEAN Charter debate shows that—to varying degrees—Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders transfer the terminology of European integration to ASEAN’s organizational structure, but that they adopt only partially, if at all, the normative substance of the EU model for regional integration. Instead, they skillfully reconcile alien norms with local norms, with the effect of retaining what could be called an Indonesian way of foreign policy-making.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.


Subject France’s foreign policy. Significance Following several speeches by President Emmanuel Macron on France’s international ambitions and priorities, a new strategic review was published on October 11, updating the 2013 White Book on defence and security. Nonetheless, many questions remain around the implications of Macron’s new foreign policy agenda. Impacts Strategic bilateral relationships will be marked by toughness and pragmatism, as is the case in Macron’s personal relations with Trump. France’s position in the EU -- ambitious but often lonely -- and the Brexit negotiations will be a priority for the government. The 2019-24 military procurement programming law will allocate financial means and indicate which of Macron’s ambitions may be realistic. The modernisation of France's nuclear forces will put additional pressure on the defence budget.


Significance The minority Socialist Party (PSOE) - Unidas Podemos (UP) government needed the support of several left-wing and pro-independence parties to get the budget through. Its approval makes early elections unlikely and gives the government a better chance to shape the COVID-19 economic recovery and implement some of its 2019 electoral pledges. Impacts Spain’s poor record in absorbing EU funds suggests it will struggle to make the most of the EU recovery fund. The weakening of the UK currency will hurt Spanish exports to the United Kingdom, especially with fewer UK tourists coming to Spain. Greater political stability will enable Spain to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 36-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Holland

As a wealthy American businessman and former ambassador, William Pawley was a key actor in PBSUCCESS, the covert operation that brought down the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala in 1954.The anti-Arbenz rebels, led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, could not have defeated the Guatemalan army on their own. The key to a successful coup was getting the army to act on their behalf, and in this regard, control of the air was vital. Pawley, owing to his knowledge of Latin America and experience in aviation, played a central role in ensuring that the rebels enjoyed air superiority during their move against the president. At a more abstract level, Pawley exempli fied the role non-governmental actors played in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The “state-private network,” as it has been dubbed, remains a rich vein for scholarly investigation.


Author(s):  
Ananieva Elena

Prime Minister T. May has put forward the concept of "Global Britain". After the United Kingdom had left the EU, the concept was formalized under the government of Boris Johnson in the document “Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy "Global Britain in a Competitive Age"”. The article presents an analysis of its goals, methods and practical implementation. Britain, realizing itself as a "middle power", intends to build a system of alliances to counter China and Russia, the latter designated as an ”acute direct threat” to the UK.


2021 ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Anatoly Borovkov

The book examines the main trends in Mexico's international activities in the first two decades of the XXI century, as well as the leading trends in its socio-political development. The author tried to show that Mexico is more and more actively involved in solving the main problems of world politics, where it emphatically takes independent positions. Mexico's relations with the United States, with the countries of Latin America, with China and Spain, as well as the prospects for expanding ties with Russia are analyzed, Mexico's position in the UN is shown and the prospects for the development of its foreign policy under the government of Lopez Obrador.


Author(s):  
Erhan Büyükakıncı

In this paper, we try how the idea of economic regionalism has developed within the framework of the interests of the Russian foreign policy, which adopted a Eurasianist rhetoric for nearly fifteen years. As the trends of globalisation spread over the world after the end of the Cold War period, the regional integration movements also gained speed with different forms and contents. Meanwhile the countries in the post-Soviet geography adopted different political approaches towards regionalisation and globalisation by taking into consideration their own capabilities and interests. At its own side, Russia was in search of integration within the world economy by trying to implement its own regionalist policies both at the level of the CIS area and with the neighbouring countries like China and the EU. The Eurasianist discourse has no doubt such impact on Russian leadership’s choices of partners and orientations for economic regionalisation. At this point, we want to discuss if it is possible to talk about some “Eurasianist model of regional integration” as a new idea which can combine, at one side, the institutional integration process within the CIS area and, at the other, the strong regional cooperation with the Asian economic partners like China. This model can be also Russia’s answer to embrace both globalism and regionalism by preserving its own hegemonic expectations after the Soviet legacy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-51
Author(s):  
Pavel Kandel ◽  

Theme of the paper: the confrontation between the government and opposition forces with regard to the parliamentary elections of August 30, 2020. The paper analyzes the factors behind the opposition's first victory through the prism of the thirty year-long period. The author gives credit to the MontenegrinPrimorye Metropolia of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the incumbent authorities, i.e. the politically disoriented President and the government who entered into conflict with the hierarchs through their arrogant and short-sighted monopoly rule. It was precisely the Church circles led by the late Metropolitan Amphilochius who managed to consolidate the ever-quarreling opposition, give them a new promising leader and offer an effective political platform that made the unification of the proEuropean and Pro-Serbian parts of the opposition possible. The paper examines the international reaction to the transfer of power and its internal and foreign policy consequences. Chances of the new Cabinet of experts summoned by Zdravko Krivokapic to complete a full time are not too high. The trouble of the present coalition is not only its slim – by only one Assembly mandate – majority. The majority itself is extremely fragile, since the leaders of the Democratic Front, which forms the core of its pro-Serbian part, do not hide their feeling of being deceived and deprived of the division of trophies. Thereby they consider holding a snap parliamentary election almost a single task of the Cabinet. However, the government is already able to start dismantling the existing authoritarian regime of Milo Djukanovic. As far as its foreign policy is concerned it can be assumed that the new authorities would try to normalize relations with Serbia and Russia, deliberately damaged by Milo Djukanovic, but the fundamentals of the priority relations with the EU and NATO will remain unchanged.


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