scholarly journals Montenegrin Miracle: Dismantling of the M. Djukanovic’s Regime

2021 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-51
Author(s):  
Pavel Kandel ◽  

Theme of the paper: the confrontation between the government and opposition forces with regard to the parliamentary elections of August 30, 2020. The paper analyzes the factors behind the opposition's first victory through the prism of the thirty year-long period. The author gives credit to the MontenegrinPrimorye Metropolia of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the incumbent authorities, i.e. the politically disoriented President and the government who entered into conflict with the hierarchs through their arrogant and short-sighted monopoly rule. It was precisely the Church circles led by the late Metropolitan Amphilochius who managed to consolidate the ever-quarreling opposition, give them a new promising leader and offer an effective political platform that made the unification of the proEuropean and Pro-Serbian parts of the opposition possible. The paper examines the international reaction to the transfer of power and its internal and foreign policy consequences. Chances of the new Cabinet of experts summoned by Zdravko Krivokapic to complete a full time are not too high. The trouble of the present coalition is not only its slim – by only one Assembly mandate – majority. The majority itself is extremely fragile, since the leaders of the Democratic Front, which forms the core of its pro-Serbian part, do not hide their feeling of being deceived and deprived of the division of trophies. Thereby they consider holding a snap parliamentary election almost a single task of the Cabinet. However, the government is already able to start dismantling the existing authoritarian regime of Milo Djukanovic. As far as its foreign policy is concerned it can be assumed that the new authorities would try to normalize relations with Serbia and Russia, deliberately damaged by Milo Djukanovic, but the fundamentals of the priority relations with the EU and NATO will remain unchanged.

Significance The February 29 parliamentary elections resulted in the defeat of ruling left-nationalist Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), which has led Slovakia’s government for 12 (3 4-year terms) of the 16 years that Slovakia has been a member of the EU. The incoming four-party centre-right government of Igor Matovic, while generally conservative on social issues, will be reformist and pro-EU on economic and foreign policy. Impacts While populist, the new Slovak government will diverge from its Central European neighbours in not promoting ‘illiberalism’. There should be continuity in Slovakia’s foreign policy, with a professional diplomat as foreign minister. The government supports EU membership, despite some parties demonstrating soft Euroscepticism.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


Significance This is expected to be followed by the first parliamentary election since 2014, at some point in early 2022. It now looks increasingly likely that both elections will be delayed. The electoral process lacks the elements it would need to be truly transformative, but it is prompting shifts in the political elite which will dictate developments for at least the next year. Impacts Khalifa Haftar will keep pushing for his armed group to form the core of Libya’s future army Seif al-Islam Qadhafi’s candidacy in the elections is unlikely to result in him becoming president. Aguileh Saleh looks set to stay on as House of Representatives speaker with no clear date for parliamentary elections.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-348
Author(s):  
Sam E. Morton ◽  
Judyannet Muchiri ◽  
Liam Swiss

The Government of Canada introduced its new Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) to guide its foreign aid programming in June 2017. This feminist turn mirrors earlier adoptions of feminist aid and foreign policy by Sweden and echoes the current Canadian government’s feminist rhetoric. This paper examines the FIAP and its Action Areas Policies to ask what kind(s) of feminism are reflected in the policy and what groups of people it prioritizes. The paper examines the values, goals, and gaps of the policy in order to understand what feminist values and goals are being operationalized and pursued and what gaps and contradictions exist. By examining the FIAP’s Action Area Policies using a discourse network analysis of the groups represented in the policies, we demonstrate the failings of the FIAP to incorporate an intersectional approach. Our results show that the FIAP adopts a mainstream liberal feminism that excludes many peoples and groups from the core of Canada’s aid efforts.


Author(s):  
Viktor LISYUNIN

The analysis of participation of Orthodox clergy in the election process and State Duma activity of 1–4 convocations (1906–1917), and also attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to carried out state reforms are presented. On a reasonable basis it is proved that general strategy of participation of clergy in parliamentary activities was planned at Tambov clergy congress in January of 1905 and it was resolved into following statements: peaceful progress, reforms without violence, preservation of dominating role of Orthodox Church with simultaneous liberation from state patronage, economic protection of poor people and laboring classes, development of education in Orthodox direction. The clergy had certain expectations towards activity of State Duma of 1 and 2 convocations, while during 3 and 4 convocations the voice of Tambov Eparchy representatives was unnoticed. Two deputies from Tambov clergy, priests P.F. Vozdvizhenskiy and M.F. Lachinov supported the authorities. Their inactivity is explained as the political inertia, and also it stood for objective reasons: village priest could not leave his parish for a long time. Among deputies there were representatives of Tambov clergy: metropolite of St. Petersburg and Ladoga Vladimir (Bogoyavlenskiy), synodical curator of missionary fellowships of the Tambov Eparchy I.G. Ayvazov, editor of the journal “The Voice of the Church” A.M. Spasskiy, former lecturer of Tambov Seminary. The evaluation is given to complicated relations between the church and the state, the result of which was the change of the Holy Synod body due to the initiative of chief procurator V.N. Lvov and Local Council of 1917–1918, in the work of which representatives of the Tambov Eparchy took part actively.


Subject France’s foreign policy. Significance Following several speeches by President Emmanuel Macron on France’s international ambitions and priorities, a new strategic review was published on October 11, updating the 2013 White Book on defence and security. Nonetheless, many questions remain around the implications of Macron’s new foreign policy agenda. Impacts Strategic bilateral relationships will be marked by toughness and pragmatism, as is the case in Macron’s personal relations with Trump. France’s position in the EU -- ambitious but often lonely -- and the Brexit negotiations will be a priority for the government. The 2019-24 military procurement programming law will allocate financial means and indicate which of Macron’s ambitions may be realistic. The modernisation of France's nuclear forces will put additional pressure on the defence budget.


Significance The minority Socialist Party (PSOE) - Unidas Podemos (UP) government needed the support of several left-wing and pro-independence parties to get the budget through. Its approval makes early elections unlikely and gives the government a better chance to shape the COVID-19 economic recovery and implement some of its 2019 electoral pledges. Impacts Spain’s poor record in absorbing EU funds suggests it will struggle to make the most of the EU recovery fund. The weakening of the UK currency will hurt Spanish exports to the United Kingdom, especially with fewer UK tourists coming to Spain. Greater political stability will enable Spain to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.


2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradford L. Dillman

HAVE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S bolstered prospects for democratization and greater pluralism? This study argues that, with the possible exception of Algeria's 1991 elections, they have not been harbingers of democracy in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The elections can be viewed as public displays by the state or limited political barometers, rather than processes which create obligations for the government. They have been means through which regimes have sought to dampen reactions to political immobilism, structural adjustment and the death of a social contract. Some elections have been manipulative, exclusionary exercises of elites trying to roll back the liberalizations of the 1980s, while others have been pseudo-competitive instruments of regime maintenance. Most of the elections can be seen as mechanisms for a top-down ‘artificializing’ of pluralism in order to preserve the core of regime control. In Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, there seems to be no contradiction between fostering a selectively pluralistic atmosphere and simultaneously undermining the transition to democracy. In Morocco, pluralism and alternance seem to remain quite compatible with continued political domination by the Makhzen. Mona Makram-Ebeid's characterization of Egypt's 1995 elections could equally be applied to others in the region: ‘What has occurred is a pluralization of the political sphere, yet it has been liberal neither in intent nor outcome.’


Author(s):  
Ananieva Elena

Prime Minister T. May has put forward the concept of "Global Britain". After the United Kingdom had left the EU, the concept was formalized under the government of Boris Johnson in the document “Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy "Global Britain in a Competitive Age"”. The article presents an analysis of its goals, methods and practical implementation. Britain, realizing itself as a "middle power", intends to build a system of alliances to counter China and Russia, the latter designated as an ”acute direct threat” to the UK.


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