scholarly journals China’s Soft Power in Tanzania: Opportunities and Challenges

2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 79-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhidin J. Shangwe

In recent years, China has embraced the idea of soft power with ever more keen interest. Today, soft power is Beijing’s key strategy in international politics, albeit not in the way the concept is understood and applied in the West. However, this strategy can hardly be said to have yielded fruit in Africa despite China’s growing visibility and presence over the last two decades. This article aims at probing this issue by examining how China’s soft power is manifested in Tanzania. In an attempt to show that soft power is not entirely a new practice in international politics, the article first applies a historical perspective to illustrate that it has been part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy, long before the term was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. The article then analyzes Chinese activities in Tanzania and how they have shaped perceptions of Tanzanians of China in the era of globalization. These activities are structured in line with three traditional sources of soft power as postulated by Nye, namely culture, political values and foreign policy. As a supplement to Nye’s definition, however, elements of hard power are also included in the article, such as the use of economic inducements to produce, bolster and wield soft power. In general, China has made headway in its soft power ambitions by gaining positive reviews in Tanzania. While the current achievement is crucial as an initial step, there is still a long way to go for China in consolidating its soft power. Although China has earned admiration in some quarters of Tanzanian society, it is still premature to assume that in the long run Beijing will continue to enjoy increasing soft power in the country. Indeed, in some cases, such admiration only exists in verbal recognition. In the meantime, activities that damage China’s image have further complicated matters and undermined China’s soft power in Tanzania.

Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
David Bakradze

The article views the geographical area between the EU and Russian borders as a battle space of two, drastically different foreign policy and ideological approaches. The authors argue that in the years since the end of the Cold War, a unique surrogate of former clash of liberal and communist worlds emerged, leading to and underpinning current Hybrid Warfare, underway from Ukraine to Georgia. Its roots lay in the Russian interpretation of the Western attitude towards the East as Neo-colonialist. Relying on the income from its vast energy resources, Russia also tries to develop its version of so called “Soft Power”, used by the West in this region. Though in Russian hands, it is coupled with Moscow’s imperial experiences and resentments, and is becoming a mere element in Hybrid or “non-linear” war. Speaking retrospectively, the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union can be seen as a response to Hybrid threats, posed by Russia against its Western and Southern neighbors. But the question is, whether EU foreign policy initiatives towards this area can and will be efficient and sufficient, if continued to be mostly defensive and limited within Soft Power mechanisms and philosophy, while Russia successfully combines those with traditional Hard Power know-how? The authors argue that in the long run, European or Euro-Atlantic Soft Power tool-kits, spreading Human Rightsbased culture farther in the East, will remain unmatched. But in order to prevail over the Russian revisionist policy here and now, the West, and, particularly, the EU need to re-evaluate traditional foreign policy options and come up with a more drastic combination of Soft/Hard Powers by itself. As the Georgian case shows, the European community should more efficiently use Conditionality and Coercive Diplomacy, combined with clearer messages about partners’ membership perspectives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linus Hagström ◽  
Astrid H M Nordin

Abstract This article engages with China's “politics of harmony” to investigate the dangers and possibilities of soft power as a concept and practice. Chinese sources claim that China will be able to exercise soft power due to its tradition of thinking about harmony. Indeed, the concept of harmony looms large in Chinese soft power campaigns, which differentiate China's own harmonious soft power from the allegedly disharmonious hard power of other great powers—in particular Western powers and Japan. Yet, similarly dichotomizing harmony discourses have been employed precisely in the West and Japan. In all three cases, such harmony discourses set a rhetorical trap, forcing audiences to empathize and identify with the “harmonious” self or risk being violently “harmonized.” There is no doubt that the soft power of harmony is coercive. More importantly, the present article argues that it has legitimized and enabled oppressive, homogenizing, and bellicose expansionism and rule in the West and Japan. A similarly structured exercise of soft power may enable violence in and beyond China, too. Ultimately, however, we argue that China's own tradition of thinking about harmony may help us to theorize how soft power might be exercised in less antagonistic and violent ways.


2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Binod Khanda Timilsana

Soft power, according to Nye, is a particular power of attraction to a state based on the appeal of its culture, political values, and foreign policies (Nye Jr. 2004, p. 11, 2008, p. 96). In the changing paradigms of state powers from military strength, economic might, political power, technological competency to soft power endeavors, identification of own soft power is the process of measuring own strength. Hard power measures can be observed from out sides as well but soft power potentialities will not appear easily without systematic attempt to expose them in front of international actors. Hard power measurement is easy and more exact than soft power qualities. There are very limited academic attempts visible in identification of Nepal’s soft power. Great soft powers of the world are visible and measurable through soft power indices developed by different think tanks and research agencies. The soft power 30 and Global Soft Power Index are exemplary forums engaged in ranking states in terms of soft powers. Reputation, influence, political values, culture, foreign policies, enterprise, culture, digital, governance, engagements and education are the indicators of soft power. The newly explained taxonomy of soft power includes four subunits of soft power namely resources, instruments, receptions and outcomes. Buddhism is a powerful soft power resource of Nepal. Conflict resolution and peace process model of Nepal is another potential soft power. Culture, engagement in multilateral global and regional forum, natural beauty with the world is highest Mt. Everest, diasporic community of Nepal, social networks, public diplomacy and personal diplomacy are remarkable soft power properties of Nepal. Nonetheless, identification of Nepal’s soft power is in very preliminary phase.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Imelda Masni Juniaty Sianipar

On October 20, 2014, Joko Widodo or familiarly known as Jokowi was sworn in as the Seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian society supports Jokowi because He is simple, honest and populist. The presence of populist leaders in international politics often attracts the attention of Western countries, particularly the United States. Populist leaders are often considered as the authoritarian leaders, anti-democratic, anti-Western, anti-foreign and anti-market. Hugo Chavez from Venezuela and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from Iran are the examples. Chavez and Ahmadinejad are considered as threats by the United States because they challenge the United States led regional and global order. This article will examine the direction of Jokowi’s foreign policy. This article argues that Jokowi is a moderate populist leader. Jokowi is friendly to other countries including the West but still prioritize the national interests. Thus, Indonesia under Jokowi is not a threat to other countries and the West. In fact, they can work together to achieve their common national interests. Keywords: populism, foreign policy, Indonesia, jokowi, moderate populism


Author(s):  
Mohamad Zreik

China has a large and professional diplomatic team spread all over the world. Chinese diplomacy mainly relies on soft power in its relations with international partners. Despite the unified outlines, Chinese foreign policy differs from one country to another, depending on the geographical location, the political system and the volume of trade exchange. Chinese foreign policy has gone through many stages, most notably the period of Mao Zedong who strictly applied the rules of socialism, and the period of Deng Xiaoping, known for its reform and openness policy, thus establishing a modern and more flexible Chinese system. President Xi Jinping's term is an extension of Deng Xiaoping's rule of thumb, but with more openness to international partners and economic expansion, especially with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. This paper deals with China's foreign policy towards Myanmar, and refers to the development of bilateral relations and China's interest in a distinguished relationship with Myanmar. The research indicates the strategic factors that make China interested in developing the relationship with Myanmar.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-323
Author(s):  
Birgül Demirtaş

The perception of Turkey as a model of attractive country in the region has started to change in the recent years. In the first decade of the JDP rule Turkey was seen as an emerging power with its strong economy, improving democracy and inspiring foreign policy. However, the developments since the Arab Uprisings in the neighbourhood, Gezi movement at home, end of the Kurdish peace process, as well as coup attempt and subsequent de-democratisation harmed the soft power of Turkey. This study argues that the JDP’s understanding of democracy and democratisation has been full of flaws from the very beginning of its rule. The Turkish example shows that countries can experience subsequent processes of de-democratisation and de-democratisation if governing parties did not endogenise the basic norms of democracy. Therefore, it is argued that the reverse wave of de-democratisation characterises Turkey more than the “selective” processes of democratisation. It is also argued that JDP elite via its discourse has been constructing the West as the ‘Other’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-114
Author(s):  
Sandra Baniak

Serbia inherited Yugoslavia’s tendency to pursue its foreign policy in terms of “multi-vector” policy and balancing between the West and the East to achieve its own political goals and maintain the attention of other countries. Despite the desire to join the European Union, as officially declared by the state authorities, Serbia also strives to maintain a “strategic partnership” with Russia. This paper presents Russia’s interests in the policy towards Serbia in the economic sphere over the years, starting from 1999. It points to the complexity of Serbian-Russian economic relations and their relationship with political issues. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can significantly affect Serbia’s internal and foreign policy, making it dependent on guarding Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and through the lack of recognition of Kosovo’s independence by pursuing its own interests, manifested by an increasing Russian presence in the energy sector.


2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carola M. Lustig

AbstractThis article analyzes the discourse of Brazil's foreign policy toward South America from 1995 to 2010 by means of quantifying, codifying, and weighting all speeches registered in the homogeneous and periodic official documentation of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs using a discourse analysis approach. The aim is to investigate discourse patterns in order to qualify Brazil's foreign policy as either hard power or soft power and to identify the orientation and differences in its discourse of foreign policy regarding each country of South America during the presidential terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010).


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomoko Akami

AbstractThis article argues that what we now call public diplomacy emerged in the mid- to late 1930s in the case of Japan. It questions the notion that public diplomacy is new in contrast to 'traditional' diplomacy. It also questions the conventional understanding of Japan's diplomatic isolationism of the 1930s. The article argues that as a result of greater mass political participation, the idea of 'international public opinion' emerged as a new norm in inter-war international politics. States increasingly regarded news and cultural activities as crucial resources of their soft power for winning this international public opinion. Responding to technological developments in communications, they developed a more systematic approach to propaganda in order to utilize these resources in mainstream foreign policy. Even in the age of the socalled rise of nationalism and diplomatic isolationism, Japan could neither afford not to respond to other states' actions nor to ignore international public opinion. In the diplomatic crises of the 1930s, Japan began to coordinate news and cultural propaganda activities, and integrated them into a broader propaganda scheme. Here we see the origin of what is now called public diplomacy. This modern and internationalist thinking then prepared the institutional base for wartime propaganda.


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