scholarly journals The Applications and Complexity Analysis Based on Supply Chain Enterprises’ Green Behaviors under Evolutionary Game Framework

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10987
Author(s):  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Xin Su

Green behaviors adopted by supply chain companies are conducive to resource conservation and environmental protection and enhancing their core competitive advantages. By constructing a game model of green behavior of supply chain companies, this research deeply analyzes the main influencing factors of green behaviors adopted by supply chain companies. It uses dynamic evolution game analysis and simulation experiment methods to explore the path evolution direction and dynamic convergence process of green behavior strategy choices of these companies, so as to provide reference value for green behavior decision-making of supply chain enterprises. The research results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing green behavior strategies is related to factors such as enterprise green investment income and costs, co-benefits, spillover benefits, greenness and output of raw materials or products, government green subsidy coefficients, and fines. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the cost of green investment, maximize the profit of green investment, and increase the greenness of raw materials or products; the government should increase the coefficient of green subsidies and encourage supply chain enterprises to actively participate in the collaborative management of the green supply chain.

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiayang Xu ◽  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yunfei Wang ◽  
Xiangrong Shi ◽  
Jiayun Zeng

Sustainability issues have gained growing awareness in recent years. Governments play an important role in environment and resources problems since they can affect enterprises’ production activities by enacting policies and regulations. To promote green production in the long term associated with the consideration of financial intervention of governments, we establish a three-population model of suppliers, manufacturers and governments based on evolutionary game theory, and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of their unilateral and joint behaviors. Further, system dynamics (SD) is applied to empirical analysis for exploring the dynamic interaction of the populations’ strategy, and the key factors affecting ESS are also discussed in detail. The results show that: (1) the proportion of green suppliers and manufacturers in their groups determines whether the government implements regulation; (2) any party of the supplier and manufacturer that adopts green strategy could promote green behavior of the other; (3) the government is advised to supervise and implement reward and punishment mechanism under the low proportion of green supply chain; (4) government regulation could promote the corporations to adopt green behavior and should preferentially implements the mechanism on manufacturers. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Xin Su ◽  
Hui Zhang ◽  
Shubing Guo

In this paper, we use the dynamic mechanism of biological evolution to simulate the enterprises’ bounded rational game. We construct game models of network embedding behaviors of horizontal and vertical enterprises in supply chain, explain the repeated games of random pairs of enterprises by replication dynamic differential equations, study the characteristics and evolution trend of this flow, conduct simulation experiments, clarify the evolution direction and law of network embedding strategy selection of supply chain enterprises, and discuss the stable state of evolutionary game and its dynamic convergence process. The results show that the probability of supply chain enterprises choosing a network embedding strategy is related to the enterprises’ special assets investment cost, cooperation cost, network income, and cooperation benefits. Supply chain enterprises should reduce the special assets investment cost and cooperation cost, maximize network income and cooperation income, narrow the gap between the extra-cooperation profit and the current cooperation profit, and restrain them from violating cooperation contracts or taking opportunistic actions.


Significance Coal production and imports have fallen and prices have soared as the government implemented policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Now it is having to reverse course. Impacts Companies relying on components and raw materials from China will face longer delays. Wholesalers and retailers expecting household goods will also face delays. Higher energy prices and supply chain disruptions will exacerbate existing inflationary trends.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bunga Intan ◽  
M. Izman Herdiasyah ◽  
Diana Diana

The role of Green Suply Chain to a company or small and medium industries (IKM) such as the jump industry for environmental sustainability is very important especially in waste processing. One way that can be done is to make a model starting from raw materials obtained then processed to flow again to the user for the formation of an effective process flow called the process of Green Supply Chain Management. Model of Green Supply Chain Mangement waste processing industry waste cloth industry into clean water other than that with the model of Green Supply Chain Mangement can help the government in reducing the environmental damage caused by waste from the industrial waste jumputan. In this paper the research is in the area of ​​craftsmen Mr Palembang Potato. We analyze and develop a model to improve performance in waste disposal processing in the jump industry industry with the main objective of optimizing or minimizing total cost in waste disposal processing


Author(s):  
Yefni Widria ◽  
Wini Trilaksani ◽  
Eko Ruddy Cahyadi

Case study is conducted towards 12 SME milkfish processors in Bekasi, at which its raw materials are originated from Karawang Regency through a fresh milkfish supply chain. The potentcy of Karawang Regency as a milkfish producer does not guarantee continuous availability of the raw materials. The objectives of this study were: (1) To evaluate supply chain; and (2) To compile a priority strategy of fresh milkfish supply chain management in Bekasi, West Java. Data collection was conducted by purposive and snowball sampling techniques, starting from SME processors, retailers and collective traders in Bekasi, to milkfish farmers in Ciparage Jaya Village, Tempuran Sub-District, Karawang Regency. The study used descriptive analysis, evaluation by comparing the activities of the members of the supply chain with the existing standards, Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The evaluation result showed there was gap between the activities of each supply chain member with the Indonesian National Standard (SNI) namely (1) implementation of GMP and SSOP by SME processors, (2) means of transport and storage of fresh fish by collective trader and retailer, (3) good aquaculture practices by farmer and (4) supply chain management by all members along the supply chain. Based on the SWOT and AHP matrix analyses, the development strategies of supply chain by actor was (1) the formation of raw material procurement network and marketing network by SME processor (0.326); (2) the quality improvement of human resource by the government (0.249); (3) the formation of organizations by farmer (0.230), and (4) maintaining partnership in business procurement cost by collective trader (0.195).


Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yinghui Song

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.


2013 ◽  
Vol 422 ◽  
pp. 327-335
Author(s):  
Yu Lai ◽  
Yong Li

Collaborative competition between manufacturers and monopoly supplier is a game relationship, which is very complicated. It involves many factors, both collaborative management relations, and there is competition between non-cooperatives. The enterprise core ability in the relationship is the research variables of the analysis. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a negotiation model, but because the quantization of core competence has a certain degree of difficulty, to quantify and measure the bargaining power is very difficult. Quantification of core competence and bargaining power are to be further analyzed and researched.


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