scholarly journals Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chaoyu Zheng ◽  
Benhong Peng ◽  
XinSheng ◽  
Ehsan Elahi ◽  
Anxia Wan
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Pollution Reduction ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Willingness To Participate ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Penalty Coefficient ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Reduction Effect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Pollutant Discharge

Although haze risk management is mainly under government control, willingness of stakeholders is compulsory to determine. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite game model of government, public, and enterprises and determines the haze risk evolution model considering the initial willingness of stakeholders. Moreover, numerical simulation analysis was also conducted. The results revealed that stakeholders were affected by the change due to initial willingness to participate in and reach the equilibrium at different speeds. It is found that if subsidy coefficient of the government is big, it will reach equilibrium faster. The bigger the penalty coefficient is, the better the pollution reduction effect of pollutant discharge enterprises. It is found that, at the final equilibrium stage, the government will eventually choose to withdraw from supervision, but the speed of withdrawing varies with different regulatory intentions. Study results stress that the government should actively participate in supervision to reduce environmental pollution.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

Optimisation of government subsidies in infrastructure public-private partnerships

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wang ◽  
Xueqing Wang ◽  
Lu Wang ◽  
Henry Liu ◽  
Michael Sing ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Underlying Mechanism ◽  
Project Performance ◽  
Public Private Partnerships ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Willingness To Participate ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Government

Purpose This study aims to develop a Stackelberg Game Model for seeking the optimal subsidy plans with varying levels of government financial capability (GFC). Furthermore, the scenario-based analysis is conducted and will enable governments to identify a comprehensive subsidy plan as follows: improve project performance and optimise social welfare. Design/methodology/approach A Stackelberg Game Model is developed to optimise the effectiveness of subsidies on the performance of public-private partnerships (PPPs). Findings According to the scenarios that are generated from the model, governments that are confronting with limited public budgets could reduce the intensity of performance incentives and increase the participation-oriented subsidy. Whilst a participation-oriented subsidy can stimulate private organisations’ willingness to participate in infrastructure PPPs, a performance-oriented subsidy is capable of facilitating the projects’ performances. Intuitively, the performance-oriented subsidy enables the private entities of PPPs to improve their efforts on the projects to realise higher profits. However, the participation-oriented subsidy is unable to affect the level of their effort spent on the projects. To satisfy both parties’ expectations in a PPP, the performance-oriented subsidy needs to be prioritised for a purpose of enabling higher quality outputs. Practical implications The game model developed in this study contributes to the literature by offering new insight into the underlying mechanism of governments and private entities, in terms of their decision-making for subsidy planning and contributions (i.e. resource allocation and spending) during the life-cycle of PPPs. This research enriches the government subsidy model by revealing the effects of the GFC and clarifies the impacts of two different schemes of subsidy on the performance of PPPs. Originality/value The government has been conventionally viewed as being omnipotent to provide PPPs with a wide range of subsidies. However, the subsidies are not unlimited, due to GFC. In addressing this void, this study has modelled the impacts of government subsidy plans with a consideration of GFC-related constraints. The combined effects of the participation- and performance-oriented subsidies on the project performance of PPPs have been examined.

Biotower Pilot Study Results for a Photographic and Specialty Paper Manufacturer

1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (9-11) ◽  
pp. 2109-2112
Author(s):  
J. G. Cleary ◽  
T. J. Boehm ◽  
R. J. Geary
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Pilot Study ◽  
New York State ◽  
Cross Flow ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Treatment System ◽  
Salmon River ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Comparable Performance ◽  
Pollutant Discharge

Schoeller Technical Papers, Inc. (Schoeller), which manufactures photographic and other specialty papers, is located in Pulaski, New York. The wastewater treatment system consists of a primary clarifier and two settling lagoons. Secondary treatment using a biotower was proposed to meet the new New York State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) discharge limits for BOD and TSS. The effluent from each basin is discharged directly to the Salmon River, at an approximate average flow of 1.6 million gallons/day (mgd). A biotower pilot study was performed to evaluate the suitability of a biotower treatment process for treating the total effluent from Schoeller's facility. The pilot study was used to select the media for the full-scale biotower and to confirm the design loading for the full-scale biotower, which proceeded in parallel with the pilot study due to the schedule constraints. Two pilot systems were operated to compare a conventional cross-flow and vertical media. Test data were collected to evaluate the performance of each pilot treatment system at a range of loading conditions and to develop the design loading information for the full-scale plant. The pilot units were operated for a period of 10 months. BOD concentrations to the pilot units averaged 58 mg/l with a peak of 210 mg/l. Approximately 80% of the BOD was soluble. BOD loadings averaged 21 lb BOD/day/1,000 cubic feet with a peak of 77 lb BOD/day/1,000 cubic feet. Both pilot units achieved excellent BOD removals exceeding 75%, with average effluent soluble BOD concentration less than 10 mg/l and average effluent TSS concentrations of 12 mg/l. The two media achieved comparable performance throughout most of the pilot study.

Poetics of the Pillory

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Keymer
Keyword(s):  
English Literature ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Government Control ◽  
History And Criticism ◽  
Romantic Period ◽  
Restoration Measure ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
Prior Restraint

On the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695, Thomas Macaulay wrote in his History of England, ‘English literature was emancipated, and emancipated for ever, from the control of the government’. It’s certainly true that the system of prior restraint enshrined in this Restoration measure was now at an end, at least for print. Yet the same cannot be said of government control, which came to operate instead by means of post-publication retribution, not pre-publication licensing, notably for the common-law offence of seditious libel. For many of the authors affected, from Defoe to Cobbett, this new regime was a greater constraint on expression than the old, not least for its alarming unpredictability, and for the spectacular punishment—the pillory—that was sometimes entailed. Yet we may also see the constraint as an energizing force. Throughout the eighteenth century and into the Romantic period, writers developed and refined ingenious techniques for communicating dissident or otherwise contentious meanings while rendering the meanings deniable. As a work of both history and criticism, this book traces the rise and fall of seditious libel prosecution, and with it the theatre of the pillory, while arguing that the period’s characteristic forms of literary complexity—ambiguity, ellipsis, indirection, irony—may be traced to the persistence of censorship in the post-licensing world. The argument proceeds through case studies of major poets and prose writers including Dryden, Defoe, Pope, Fielding, Johnson, and Southey, and also calls attention to numerous little-known satires and libels across the extended period.

scholarly journals The Impact of Environmental Regulation on the Location of Pollution-Intensive Industries in China under Agglomeration Effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (8) ◽  
pp. 4045
Author(s):  
Yinhao Wu ◽  
Shumin Yu ◽  
Xiangdong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Local Economic Development ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Agglomeration Effect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Pollutant Discharge ◽  
The Impact

Pollution-intensive industries (PIIs) have both scale effect and environmental sensitivity. Therefore, this paper studies how environmental regulation (ER) affects the location dynamics of PIIs under the agglomeration effect. Our results show that, ER can increase the production costs of pollution-intensive firms (PIFs) by internalizing the negative impact of pollutant discharge in a region, and thus, directly reduces the region’s attractiveness to PIFs. Meanwhile, ER can indirectly reduce the attractiveness of a region to PIFs by reducing the externality of the regional agglomeration effect. Moreover, these influences are regulated by the level of local economic development. Based on the moderated mediating effect model, we find evidence from the site selection activities of newly built chemical firms in cities across China. The empirical test shows that compared with 2014, the proportion of the direct effect of ER to the total effects significantly decreased in 2018, while the proportion of indirect effects under the agglomeration effect increased significantly. Our findings provide reference for the government to design effective environmental policies to guide the location choice of new PIFs.

Taxpayer behavioural factors influencing entrenched tax gaps

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Divakaran Reddy
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Public Trust ◽  
Accurate Estimate ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
International Studies ◽  
Tax Revenues ◽  
Study Results ◽  
The Government ◽  
Tax Noncompliance

Tax compliance is the willingness of taxpayers to obey tax rules of a nation, whilst tax noncompliance is the unwilling behaviour of citizens to act under tax regulations. Taxpayer compliance enables the government to collect tax revenues, which is one of the most important sources of government income. Altering the non-compliant behaviour of citizens is an important barometer for increasing tax revenues that contribute to the socio-economic development of a nation. Numerous quondam studies have been conducted strikingly in the past few decades on taxpayer compliance. However, there is a dearth of sufficient research currently on tax noncompliance behaviour. Moreover, the phenomenon of tax noncompliance has limited exploration from the vantage point of meta-analysis of primary research studies conducted, focussing on interrogating, and systematically categorising their results. Resultantly, the purpose of this study was to examine the previously related primary studies to determine those factors that have been judged to have influenced the tax compliance behaviour of citizens. This study has adopted the quantitative research approach and followed the preferred reporting items for systematic review (PRISMA) method and meta-analysis to provide an accurate estimate of the relationship that exists in a population of relevant tax noncompliance behavioural studies. The population comprised of 45 international studies conducted between the period 2015 to 2020 is selected for analysis. The study results indicate that the quality of tax administration systems and public trust in institutional governance are factors that have influenced taxpayer compliance positively. Poor government accountability mechanisms entrenched tax gaps, and developing public trust in government institutions were found to be universal to promote voluntary taxpayer compliance. This study has contributed significantly to the open discussion on tax compliance among researchers, governments, and businesses.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Dynamics Game Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Xigang Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Recovery Ratio ◽  
Sale Price ◽  
Product Sale ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

The paper discusses the government reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) between two competing manufacturers and a recycler in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under asymmetric information. According to the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three decision-making models are built: (1) decentralized dynamics game model without RPM, (2) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM, and (3) decentralized dynamics game model with carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases product sale price, while it decreases the WEEE buy-back price and the WEEE recovery ratio, besides the profit of recycler. To some extent, it cannot motivate WEEE recycling. (2) Recovery ratio RPM improves the WEEE recovery ratio and lowers the product sale price; it also benefits manufacturer-1’s and recycler’s profits and consumers’ surplus. So it strongly proved effectiveness in guiding WEEE recycling. (3) In any case, the product sale price of manufacture-1 is lower than that of manufacturer-2. Similarly, the WEEE buy-back price and WEEE recovery ratio with H type are higher than those of L type, respectively. Apparently, it is suggested that the manufacturer participating in WEEE recycling and remanufacturing can gain competitive advantages; meanwhile, the recycler with high fixed cost has the scale advantages. (4) The competition can benefit improving WEEE recovery ratio. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results. According to the main conclusions, we propose that taking active part in recycling and remanufacturing WEEE and choosing the recycler with high fixed cost to cooperate are the wise choices for manufacturers. The recycler should expand fixed recovery cost investment, which will contribute to getting the scale effect; the government needs to balance the carbon emission RPM and recovery ratio RPM so as to cut down environmental pollution and guide the CLSC into WEEE recycling and remanufacturing. The most important carbon emission reward-penalty intensity should be set appropriately in case of discouraging members of CLSC recycling WEEE.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

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