The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-77
Author(s):  
J. Peter Scoblic

Despite the radical changes in the global political and military situation in the past ten years, U.S. nuclear forces retain the same mission and the same basic structure they had when Moscow was the seat of the “Evil Empire.” As it has for decades, the United States maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on a variety of land-, sea- and air-based platforms. These forces are on a level of high alert, ready to launch within minutes of an attack warning. It is a distinctly Cold War footing in a world that has long since come in from the cold of U.S.–Soviet antagonism.


Horizons ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Richard B. Miller ◽  
◽  
◽  
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AbstractThis essay critically assays four recent attempts to furnish a moral justification for nuclear deterrence: the success thesis, the just war thesis, the argument from the “supreme emergency,” and the exceptionalist thesis. By entering into critical dialogue with representatives of these arguments I hope to show that the current confidence in the morality of nuclear deterrence is ill-conceived. Chief among the logical and practical difficulties plaguing these arguments are the following. (1) The success thesis rests on the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning. Nor does the assertion of the past success of deterrence furnish guarantees of future effectiveness. (2) Representatives of the just war thesis either establish conditions for accepting deterrence that are incoherent with their judgments about use (e.g., U.S. Catholic bishops) or develop a theory of deterrence that cannot be morally institutionalized (e.g., David Hollenbach). (3) The argument for the supreme emergency eclipses moral convention in the nuclear age. (4) The attempt to salvage the supreme emergency according to a classical theory of community rests on a fundamental disanalogy between the Aristotelian polis and modern nation-states. Moreover, it opens the door for a double standard to evaluate the methods of war.


1989 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desmond Ball

Over the past decade, both official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. In particular, specific consideration has been given to such critical issues as the extent to which current strategic C3I systems enhance crisis stability or instability, and whether or not they would serve to control escalation in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange or, because of their vulnerabilities, would in fact contribute to the dynamics of the escalation process.


Author(s):  
Malina Kaszuba

The transformation of the Russian foreign and security policy based on a more courageous use of military potential is a fact. Over the past several years, Russia has moved from articulating its interests to their enforcement with the use of military force. This article focuses on analyzing this process and identifying its potential consequences for global security. The conclusions drawn by the author, based on the conducted research, allow to state that the armed forces are and will be an important instrument of the Russian foreign and security policy. This does not mean, however, that the Russian Federation will strive for an armed conflict posing a threat to international security.


Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Kumar

In recent years, there has been a rise in China’s profile in South Asia. It is no surprise that Chinese experts have used terms, such as ‘new springtime’ in China–South Asia relations, ‘rediscovery of the strategic status of South Asia’ and ‘most relevant region with regard to the rise of China’.    The objective of this article is to examine the nature and drivers of China’s South Asia policy, especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping vis-à-vis China’s policy towards the region in the past. It is not sufficient to only examine international factors or foreign and security policy in the context of the neighbouring region, such as South Asia. China’s ‘domestic periphery’ presents a significant threat to its national security. These areas are linked to neighbouring countries of South Asia and Central Asia. The announcement by Chinese President Xi Jinping of a ‘New Era’ or ‘third era’ in the history of Communist Party of China (CPC) represents a China which is known for its dictum ‘striving for achievement’ ( fenfa youwei). This is different from the second era’s policy of ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping. Of course, the name of Mao Zedong is synonymous with the first era beginning from 1949.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Els Weinans ◽  
Rick Quax ◽  
Egbert H. van Nes ◽  
Ingrid A. van de Leemput

AbstractVarious complex systems, such as the climate, ecosystems, and physical and mental health can show large shifts in response to small changes in their environment. These ‘tipping points’ are notoriously hard to predict based on trends. However, in the past 20 years several indicators pointing to a loss of resilience have been developed. These indicators use fluctuations in time series to detect critical slowing down preceding a tipping point. Most of the existing indicators are based on models of one-dimensional systems. However, complex systems generally consist of multiple interacting entities. Moreover, because of technological developments and wearables, multivariate time series are becoming increasingly available in different fields of science. In order to apply the framework of resilience indicators to multivariate time series, various extensions have been proposed. Not all multivariate indicators have been tested for the same types of systems and therefore a systematic comparison between the methods is lacking. Here, we evaluate the performance of the different multivariate indicators of resilience loss in different scenarios. We show that there is not one method outperforming the others. Instead, which method is best to use depends on the type of scenario the system is subject to. We propose a set of guidelines to help future users choose which multivariate indicator of resilience is best to use for their particular system.


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