The EU and Its Member States, Other States, and International Organizations – The Common European Security and Defence Policy after Nice

2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-372
Author(s):  

AbstractThe author discusses the changes made in the Treaty of Nice concerning the EU's external face as well as the influential French Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy, with a view to analyzing the relations between the EU and its member states as well as those between the EU and various other organizations active in the same field. She concludes that the institutional infrastructure is reasonably well developed.

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (68) ◽  
pp. 106-127
Author(s):  
Beatrica Šmaguc

Abstract After decades of reliance upon NATO in security matters, the EU ought to develop security assets of its own in order to protect its interests and citizens. The Common Foreign and Security Policy as an expression of EU readiness and willingness to play a more significant role in security matters on the international stage led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, thus putting at the EU’s disposal civilian and military capabilities for dealing with the crisis spots around the world. The EUBG concept originated with the first member states’ pledges in November 2004 which gave added value to the EU in the security and defence area, at least on paper, while so far no EUBG has been deployed in the theatre of operations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Brewer

In May 2011, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/276 to provide the European Union with an “enhanced observer status” to participate more extensively in the General Assembly. The EU needed to restructure its participation in international organizations following the Lisbon Treaty, and this resolution effected some of those changes. Numerous UN member states expressed concerns that the expanded participation rights might compromise the integrity of the General Assembly as an inter-state entity. Ultimately, the rights granted pose a minor speculative threat, but offer a considerable opportunity at increasing the ability of regional organizations to better represent the common positions of their member states in the General Assembly and to improve the efficiency of the General Assembly.


European View ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jolyon Howorth

The UK has traditionally played an ambivalent role in European security and defence policymaking. With Brexit, the EU loses one of its two serious military players. On the other hand, it has been liberated from the constraints imposed by London on the Common Security and Defence Policy, and this has created a new dynamism behind the defence project. There has been comparatively little commentary on the defence implications of Brexit, and the UK has been less than forthcoming in making concrete proposals for an ongoing UK-EU partnership. Both sides assert that they wish to maintain a strong cooperative relationship after Brexit, but the outlines of such an arrangement remain very unclear. This article suggests that the UK will have more to lose than the EU from any failure to reach agreement, and that UK ambivalence about links between the Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO will prove to be a major sticking point.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.


The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.


Author(s):  
M. S. Fedorov

The article deals with the system of EU's functional units responsible for conducting crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It analyses their structure and particular features. The author puts forward three main factors, which affected the shape of this system. First, it is the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the veto-power of EU member states in this field. Second, the EU-US and the EU-NATO relations have also influenced the shape of the CSDP organizational structures. On the one hand, the Alliance has served as an example of a successful security organization for the European integration strategists. On the other, Washington has always sought to embed the European security and defense integration into NATO and to control it. Third, the CSDP institutional system embodies a specific approach towards crisis management, elaborated by the EU - a combination of both military and civil instruments of peacemaking (the so-called "civil-military synergy"). Thus, there are two chains of units within the CSDP, designed for planning and conducting military operations and civil missions respectively. Having analyzed political and operational units of the CSDP the author concludes that, overall, the created institutional system is well-suited to the ambitions of the EU in the field of crisis management. However, the EU member states cannot use the potential of this system to the full because of the political differences that divide them.


Author(s):  
Tanja Klein

The objective of this paper is to identify sources of the challenges faced by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. Based on an actorness approach, the paper offers a systematic and theory-driven framework for the analysis of these challenges. Their investigation is based on publications of thirteen think tanks that were published in the context of the December summit of the European Council in 2013. The paper identifies two main sources at a national level. First, it shows that the significance of national sovereignty in the sensitive domain of security and defence policy is an obstacle to the development of the CSDP. Second, the analysis reveals that foreign policy role conceptions are a fundamental factor: different role conceptions of member states result in a lack of mutual understanding, in missing trust, and finally, in the unwillingness to transfer actorness to the EU level despite a common set of basic interests and values. Yet, the political will of member states will be decisive for the future development of the CSDP.


2006 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Sándor Richter

The order and modalities of cross-member state redistribution as well as the net financial position of the member states are one of the most widely discussed aspects of European integration. The paper addresses selected issues in the current debate on the EU budget for the period 2007 to 2013 and introduces four scenarios. The first is identical to the European Commission's proposal; the second is based on reducing the budget to 1% of the EU's GNI, as proposed by the six net-payer countries, while maintaining the expenditure structure of the Commission's proposal. The next two scenarios represent radical reforms: one of them also features a '1% EU GNI'; however, the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are left unchanged and it is envisaged that the requisite cuts will be made in the expenditures earmarked for cohesion. The other reform scenario is different from the former one in that the cohesion-related expenditures are left unchanged and the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are reduced. After the comparison of the various scenarios, the allocation of transfers to the new member states in terms of the conditions prevailing in the different scenarios is analysed.


Author(s):  
Violeta Moreno-Lax

Visas are specifically aimed at controlling admission at the stage of pre-departure and constitute one of the essential requirements for entry under the Schengen Borders Code. This chapter examines the common policy of the EU, conceptualizing them as pre-authorizations of entry granted before arrival in the territory of the Member States. Visa requirements, as introduced in the Visa Regulation, are perused at the outset, taking account of periodic revisions of the visa lists and the criteria for amendment considered relevant by the EU legislator. The key features of the uniform visa format and the Visa Information System (VIS) are briefly presented, highlighting their contribution to the securitisation of migration flows. Then, the visa issuing procedure, as governed by the Community Code on Visas (CCV), is examined. The final section is reserved to the analysis of the implications of the different components of the policy regarding access to asylum in the Member States.


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