scholarly journals INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF THE EU IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
European Defence Agency ◽  
Legal Mechanism ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
The Eu

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

scholarly journals The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) – a successful story or a paper tiger?

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (68) ◽  
pp. 106-127
Author(s):  
Beatrica Šmaguc
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Added Value ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

Abstract After decades of reliance upon NATO in security matters, the EU ought to develop security assets of its own in order to protect its interests and citizens. The Common Foreign and Security Policy as an expression of EU readiness and willingness to play a more significant role in security matters on the international stage led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, thus putting at the EU’s disposal civilian and military capabilities for dealing with the crisis spots around the world. The EUBG concept originated with the first member states’ pledges in November 2004 which gave added value to the EU in the security and defence area, at least on paper, while so far no EUBG has been deployed in the theatre of operations.

Lessons from EU Peace Operations

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Political Support ◽  
The Political ◽  
Peace Operations ◽  
European Security ◽  
International Crises ◽  
The Us ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.

ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 178-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Asseburg ◽  
Ronja Kempin
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
European Security ◽  
Global Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
The Eu

In 2003, the EU declared its civilian and military crisis management instruments ready for deployment. Since then, EU member states have demonstrated their capability to act as a global security player. They have deployed civil missions and military operations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern neighbourhood, the Near and Middle East, and even to Asia. Th ese engagements have encompassed a variety of approaches and tools to crisis management and stabilisation, ranging from the training of security forces and the support for the rule of law, to the provision of a military or civilian presence, to safeguard elections or to monitor border arrangements and ceasefire agreements, to the fight against piracy or other forms of organised crime. Altogether, by the end of 2009, the EU had conducted 23 missions and operations under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU has made considerable progress on its way to becoming a global security actor. However, case studies show that many ESDP engagements face substantial shortcomings – chief among them the lack of long-term, strategic planning for future deployments, a binding and institutionalised “lessons learned” process as well as a consistent follow-up by member states and EU institutions involved.

scholarly journals Is the “show-the-flag” strategy relevant for Visegrad countries in securing the EU?

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.

The European Union security policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 80-86
Author(s):  
Ivanna Maryniv
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
The Eu

Problem setting. In spite of the presence of numerous conventions, treaties and organizations in the world today, the issue of security is still a very acute issue for the world community. There are many reasons for this: the presence of nuclear powers, serious disputes between countries that are justly considered world leaders, the existence of numerous local conflicts and wars of a more global nature across the globe. These and other factors are pushing states around the world to allocate budget funds to ensure effective security policies. Given today’s realities, one can trace the tendency of several countries to pool their own efforts and resources to pursue a common security policy. The European Union is one of the clearest examples of this behavior. This intergovernmental organization is committed to maintaining peace, diplomacy, trade and development around the world. The EU also promotes cooperation with neighboring countries through the European Neighborhood Policy. Target research. The aim of the research is to study the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. Analysis of recent research and publication. Many domestic and foreign scholars, including B. Tonro, T. Christiansen, S. Morsch, G. Mackenstein, and others. The institutional basis of foreign and security policy is analyzed in detail by J. Peterson, questions related to the European Union’s security policy. M. Shackleton. K. Gill, M. Smith and others study the general features of the development of a common EU security policy. Some contribution to the study of various problems related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been made by such national scientists as V. Govorukh, I. Gritsyak, G. Nemyrya, L. Prokopenko, O. Rudik, V. Streltsov, O. Tragniuk, I. Shumlyaeva, I. Yakovyuk and others. Article’s main body. The article examines the emergence and development of the European Union’s security policy from the date of the Brussels Covenant to the present. Particular attention is paid to the role of the European Union’s institutional mechanism in the exercise of its powers to ensure the defense and foreign policy cooperation of the Member States. A study of the officially adopted five-year global foreign and security policy of the EU is being done to improve stability in Europe and beyond, analyzing EU conflict resolution and crisis management activities. Conclusions and prospect of development. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the EU’s foreign and security policy institutional framework is an extensive system in which all the constituencies are endowed with a certain range of general and specific powers and are called upon to cooperate with one another to achieve a common goal. It cannot be said that such close cooperation puts pressure on Member States. Yes, a Member State has the right to refrain from voting for any decision that requires unanimity and such abstention will not prevent the above decision being taken. In this case, the mechanism of so-called “constructive retention” is triggered: the abstaining country is not obliged to comply with the decision, however, accepts the fact that it is binding on other Member States and takes this into account when concluding treaties, which should not contradict the said decision.

26. Common Foreign and Security Policy

2014 ◽  
pp. 494-513
Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
European Security ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From 1993 to 2009, external political relations formed the second pillar of the EU, on CFSP. Although CFSP was officially an intergovernmental pillar, the European Commission came to play an important role. There were serious attempts to strengthen the security and defence aspects of the CFSP in the face of the threats that faced the EU from instability in its neighbouring territories. However, the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and its status as a ‘power’ in international relations is debatable. The chapter first provides a historical background on the CFSP, focusing on the creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC), before discussing the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It concludes with an assessment of EU power and its impact on world politics.

25. Common Foreign and Security Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 476-494
Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Internal Dynamics ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
External Events ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the European Union’s (EU’s) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It tells the story of increasing co-operation between member states on foreign policy matters, first with European Political Co-operation (EPC) and, since the 1990s, with CFSP and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The chapter highlights the internal dynamics and external events that drove the member states towards such co-operation and considers the most recent example of such efforts: the 2017 attempt to create a system of permanent structured co-operation (PESCO). However, it is noted that the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and there remains a reluctance from member states to push much further integration, given states’ keen desire to remain sovereign in this area. Finally, the chapter considers the EU’s status as a ‘power’ in international relations, noting that it has diminished in important respects since 2003, but remains an important economic power.

The EU and Its Member States, Other States, and International Organizations – The Common European Security and Defence Policy after Nice

2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-372
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Infrastructure ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
External Face ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Made In

AbstractThe author discusses the changes made in the Treaty of Nice concerning the EU's external face as well as the influential French Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy, with a view to analyzing the relations between the EU and its member states as well as those between the EU and various other organizations active in the same field. She concludes that the institutional infrastructure is reasonably well developed.

scholarly journals THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS

2016 ◽  
pp. 190-198
Author(s):  
M. S. Fedorov
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Common ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

The article deals with the system of EU's functional units responsible for conducting crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It analyses their structure and particular features. The author puts forward three main factors, which affected the shape of this system. First, it is the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the veto-power of EU member states in this field. Second, the EU-US and the EU-NATO relations have also influenced the shape of the CSDP organizational structures. On the one hand, the Alliance has served as an example of a successful security organization for the European integration strategists. On the other, Washington has always sought to embed the European security and defense integration into NATO and to control it. Third, the CSDP institutional system embodies a specific approach towards crisis management, elaborated by the EU - a combination of both military and civil instruments of peacemaking (the so-called "civil-military synergy"). Thus, there are two chains of units within the CSDP, designed for planning and conducting military operations and civil missions respectively. Having analyzed political and operational units of the CSDP the author concludes that, overall, the created institutional system is well-suited to the ambitions of the EU in the field of crisis management. However, the EU member states cannot use the potential of this system to the full because of the political differences that divide them.

Towards a European Foreign Policy

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114
Author(s):  
Brian Crowe
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
European Security ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
Member States ◽  
Military Capability ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Eu Foreign Policy ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThe Balkans have been the crucible of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the 1990s the appointment of David (Lord) Owen as a strong representative to manage the EU's Bosnian policy, the sidelining of the EU itself by the Contact Group, and American dominance at Dayton (what price 'this is the hour of Europe'?) and over Kosovo were important precursors to the important European Council decisions in June 1999 to appoint a high-profile international statesman as High Representative for the CFSP and to create the EU's own military capability in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Constitutional Treaty's further provisions, notably replacing the Presidency in external relations, will be sorely missed and will need to be brought back.ESDP is developing well, if modestly, and making a genuine contribution, mostly with a strong civ-mil component, in several parts of the world. The CFSP itself seems to be managing quite well. But the EU is not yet set up for serious 'events' or crisis management. Experience shows, and greater recognition is needed, that the EU (probably even with an EU Foreign Minister) needs to be represented by member states that carry conviction to outside interlocutors: some member states are inevitably more equal and carry greater weight than others, even if all have an equal voice. Since EU foreign policy is in large measure inescapably a function of US foreign policy, member states need to have a better common understanding among themselves about the nature of the transatlantic relationship. It will take confidence in the efficacy of the CFSP, to which all must give greater priority, before those member states that have alternatives will accept being bound to conducting their foreign policy (or being represented in the UN Security Council) through Brussels. at will take time and effort.

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