Reparations for Genocide: Group Harm and the Limits of Liberal Individualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry C. Theriault

In recent years, there has been a handful of lawsuits billed as attempts to gain reparations for the Armenian Genocide. These suits, however, have concerned only ancillary wrongs done to individuals, not the culpable harm done to the Armenian group as a whole through genocide. As such, these suits do not actually pursue reparations for the Armenian Genocide. Not only do awarded or negotiated reparations not function to address the damage done by the Armenian Genocide as a force of group destruction – a force whose consequences remain debilitating today politically, economically, culturally, and socially – but the basis of the cases is not the genocide. In fact, misrepresented as genocide reparations cases, they displace genuine reparation claims. The focus on individual suits and exclusion of genuine group reparations are a function of the limits of the Western liberal individual intellectual and political system that grounds international law. Only through fundamental changes in the guiding assumptions of that system will adequate, that is, true group reparations become viable.

Author(s):  
Hermann Heller

This 1927 work addresses the paradox of sovereignty, that is, how the sovereign can be both the highest authority and subject to law. Unlike Kelsen and Schmitt who seek to dissolve the paradox, this text sees the tensions that the paradox highlights as an essential part of a society ruled by law. Sovereignty, in the sense of national sovereignty, is often perceived in liberal democracies today as being under threat, or at least “in transition,” as power devolves from nation states to international bodies. This threat to national sovereignty is at the same time considered a threat to a different idea of sovereignty, popular sovereignty—the sovereignty of “the people”—as important decisions seem increasingly to be made by institutions outside of a country’s political system or by elite-dominated institutions within. This text was written in 1927 amidst the very similar tensions of the Weimar Republic. In an exploration of history, constitutional and political theory, and international law, it shows that democrats must defend a legal idea of sovereignty suitable for a pluralistic world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Kadyrbek Umetov ◽  

The article reveals the concept of sovereignty as one of the key categories of political and legal science and international law, which has the character of a fundamental norm; various theories that have taken diametrically opposed positions on the issue of determining the legal nature of sovereignty, ranging from its origins to its modern understanding, are considered. The author studied the processes of creating preconditions and historical conditions that ensure the Kyrgyz Republic's active participation in the sovereignization of the former Soviet republics. He defined the specific directions, course and degree of transformation of the Political System of Kyrgyzstan on the basis of declarations of sovereignty and independence, as well as the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. Sovereignty is a property inherent in each subject in itself, and cannot be derived from the sovereignty of another entity, in which it sees the embodiment of the real sovereignty of the State.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 208-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jure Vidmar

In the 1990s, international legal scholarship was marked by democratic idealism and the belief that democracy had become the only legitimate political system. The more radical proposals even speculated about legality of pro-democratic intervention. Such re-conceptualizations of international law were met with determined criticism. However, even skeptical voices were willing to admit that democracy nevertheless did have some limited normative force in post-Cold War international law. While it would be an exaggeration to say that nondemocratic governments are illegitimate per se, a consensus started to emerge that international law prohibited at least a coup against a democratic government. In the absence of a workable definition of substantive democracy for international law purposes, a democratic government was understood as an authority which comes to power in an electoral process that is reasonably free and fair.


Author(s):  
Hafner Gerhard

This contribution discusses the intervention of five member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization under the leading role of the Soviet Union in the CSSR in August 1968, which terminated the “Prague Spring” in a forceful manner. After presenting the facts of this intervention and its reasons, it describes the legal positions of the protagonists of this intervention as well as that of the states condemning it, as presented in particular in the Security Council. It then examines the legality of this intervention against general international law and the particular views of the Soviet doctrine existing at that time, defending some sort of socialist (regional) international law. This case stresses the requirement of valid consent for the presence of foreign troops in a country and denies the legality of any justification solely based on the necessity to maintain the political system within a state.


Author(s):  
Olivier Corten ◽  
Pierre Klein

Can peace agreements concluded between a State and a non-State entity produce legal effects in the international sphere, as mentioned in Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? Could it be considered that, following the conclusion of such agreements, some areas that were traditionally conceived as pertaining to the national jurisdiction of States (such as the use of violence within national borders, or the choice of a political system) are as of now governed by international law? On the basis of numerous agreements reviewed in this study, a clearly affirmative answer would appear excessive. As far as the international legal effects of such instruments are concerned, much will depend on the specificities of each agreement and on the way it has been implemented. Most of these agreements prove to be rather ambiguous, a significant portion of their components evidencing their rooting in the domestic legal order. This ambiguity finds confirmation in the very pragmatic treatment of peace agreements by the Security Council and States when they call for compliance with these instruments. In the vast majority of cases, such demands are made in the name of the maintenance of international peace and security, without much attention being paid to the characterization in legal terms of the parties' undertakings under these agreements. It therefore appears difficult to reach clear-cut conclusions as to the legal effects of such peace agreements in the international sphere — and, as a consequence, as to their possible characterization as ‘treaties’ under international law.


Author(s):  
Chris Thornhill

This chapter presents an account of the constitutional law of transnational society from a distinctively political perspective. It uses a neoclassical definition of the constitution as the legal norms that frame the actions of a political system to examine and construct constitutional functions that reach beyond the legal systems of nation-states. It advances the thesis that the concept of transnational constitutional law can be applied to three separate legal-political domains in contemporary global society. This concept can be used to analyze constitutional aspects of international law, and it can be applied to national constitutional law, both of which have a strong transnational dimension and are supported by normative elements that are formed through transnational processes. This concept can also be applied to characterize and examine an emergent, conclusively transnational legal order, in which legal formation occurs in more spontaneous and contingent fashion. In each domain, constitutional norms produce an underlying inclusionary structure for distinct political functions in society, and transnational constitutional law is defined, most essentially, by its ability to support the relative autonomy of political exchanges and political interactions.


Prawo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 322 ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Joanna Siekiera

The British-French condominium — the colonial phenomenon on VanuatuOver the entire 20th century, there was a joint government of France and the Great Britain in what is now the Republic of Vanuatu. This specific form of governance, called condominium, is legitimatised by the virtue of international law, but it occurs indeed rarely. This political system pro­vides the equal distribution of rights and responsibilities in the colony, and also between the partner states. Nonetheless, the dual governments in Vanuatu deny this principle. The article presents the history of the Republic’s statehood as well as the implications of the joint British-French govern­ments on the current legal order.


Author(s):  
Ian Hurd

This chapter examines a classical area of international law: the use of force by states. The ban on war is often cited as the centerpiece of the modern international legal-political system and used to distinguish the contemporary age from earlier, less legalized periods. Liberal convention sees the ban on war as a legal constraint on states' political choices; states seeking to uphold the international rule of law are advised to refrain from using force against other states. However, this understanding is flawed. The UN Charter outlaws some kinds of war and permits others, such as those undertaken in self-defense. The chapter then demonstrates that the Charter is a mechanism by which law sorts the motivations for war into lawful (self-defense) and unlawful (all others) categories. It thereby creates a framework to legitimate wars and reduce their political costs. The Charter is not antiwar: it is explicitly permissive of war so long as the claimed motive is self-defense.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd S. Etheredge

Whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions has been a matter of considerable disagreement. A test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory shows such influences have probably been crucial in a number of cases in American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. In 49 cases of intraelite disagreement on force-related issues and 13 cases of intraelite disagreement on inclusionary issues the direction of disagreement could be predicted in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations. A four-fold speculative typology suggests fundamental personality-based differences in orientation towards America's preferred operating style and role in the international system (e.g., introverts are drawn toward impersonal principles and mechanisms like balance of power–or in an earlier period to international law).The evidence implies that one source of war and hard-line foreign policy is the structure of self-selection and recruitment to high office in the American political system. As well, the systematic tendency to self-expressive personalization in major foreign policy decisions probably increases the rate of error of American elites.


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