Condicio supervacua and related conditions 
in Roman law

Author(s):  
Veronika Kleňová ◽  
Zdenko Takáč

The article deals with the conditions that did not have the legal effect of a ‘proper condition’. The authors distinguish these conditions from a ‘proper condition’ pointing out that the distinguishing feature is an ‘uncertainty’ carried by the condition. Firstly, the authors focus their attention on the condicio supervacua – the term is explicitly used only by Pomponius in the case of legacies. It did not have the effect of a ‘proper condition’, because the uncertainty expressed by the condition already resulted from the legal norm itself. It was an explicitly expressed condicio iuris pursuant to the modern definitions of the term. The authors analyze and compare various cases that seemingly deal with condiciones iuris too. The analysis makes it clear that they were regarded as supervacuae, unless the testator changed the legal situation in some way through their expression. He had to insert some new uncertainty that did not result from the legal norm itself. The other kind of condition that the article deals with is condicio institutionis/substitutionis expressly re-applied to a legatum. This condition is different from condicio supervacua, because in this case the new uncertainty was added by the testator himself. Despite some doubts, the legal opinion which prevailed in Roman law was that such a condition did not have the effect of a ‘proper condition’ in relation to a legacy. The reason is that even if the testator re-applied the condition of institution also to a legacy, he extended only the uncertainty of aditio hereditatis and did not insert any new uncertainty into the legacy itself.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Loska

A LEGACY IN THE ROMAN LAWSummary A notion of a legacy did not exist in the archaic Roman law as a homogenous concept of law and it developed as late as in the pre-classical Roman law. Even then, however, only particular types of legacies, rather than their general concept, were defined. Nevertheless, one may say that a legacy was a civil law instrument by means of which a testator left a certain economic benefit to a particular person, not making him\her an inheritor.At the beginning there were four basic types of legacy in the Roman law: legatum per vindicationem, legatum per praeceptionem, legatum per damnationem and legatum sinendi modo. The first two types had an effect of a disposition while the two latter ones of an obligation only. In sources there also exist two other types: legatum optionis and legatum partitionis. This last mentioned is similar to a later established concept of a fideicommissum, an informal legacy, which became actionable in the times of the Emperor August.Already in the ancient times one may observe a decrease in the significance of these types of legacy, the effects of which directly related to the ownership of objects (legatum per vindicationem and legatum per praeceptioneni).They were connected with the notion o f an ownership according to ius civile and formal means of transferring the ownership. They lost its significance when - beside the oldest civil law - praetorian law and emperors’ constitutions appeared and when the ownership was standardised. After the issuance of senatusconsultum Neronianum in the 1st century AD it became possible to retain the legal effectiveness of the legacies which until then were considered invalid due to a failure to preserve an appropriate form; an ex /^ con version took place. It resulted most probably in converting invalid legacies into legatum per damnationem.In the subsequent centuries, emperors’ constitutions led to a harmonisation o f the concept of legacy (while the division between the legacy having an effect of a disposition and an obligation was still preserved), and later on to equalisation in the legal effect of formal and informal legacies. The most important regulations were: the constitution of the Emperor Constantinus dated 339 AD, which abolished the requirement of solemnitas verbum and two constitutions of the Emperor Iustinianus - the first - dated 529 AD - introduced an identical legal nature of all legacies, the other - dated 531 AD - completely equalised legacies with fideicommissa. 


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 870-870
Author(s):  
T. E. Cone

infant-from Latin infans; in (neg.) + fans speaking (fans is the participle). In Roman law infant means a child not old enough to talk... Cretin-Old French-chretien, a Christian. Perhaps used first as a perjorative term by the ancient Romans because to them the first Christians were stupid enough to "turn the other cheek" when attacked by mobs or by the lions in the Roman amphitheater. Meconium-from Greek mekonion meaning the poppy juice obtained from pressing the whole plant which gives a thick Juice of black, greenish-brown color. The intestinal content of the newborn infant has a similar consistency and appearance and so Galenadopted the term for the content of the bowels of newborn infants. (Meconism means the opium habit). lcterus-from Greek ikteros, a yellow bird, probably the golden thrush or a species of oriole. Pliny relates that if a person suffering from jaundice looks at a yellow bird, the bird will die and the patient recovers. Icterus was first used in pediatrics by Ludwig von Buhl (1816-1880) when he described icterus neonatorum.


Author(s):  
Donald R. Kelley

Centuries of Roman jurisprudence were assembled in the great Byzantine collection, the Digest, by Tribonian and the other editors. Roman law became more formal when during the Renaissance of the twelfth century it came to be taught in the first universities, starting with Bologna and the teaching of Irnerius. The main channels of expansion were through the Glossators and post-Glossators, who commented on the main texts and on later legislation by the Holy Roman Emperors, which included “feudal law,” but also by notaries and other proto-lawyers. Christian doctrine also became part of the “Roman” tradition, and canon and civil law were taught together in the universities as “civil science.” According to the ancient Roman jurist Gaius, “all the law which we use pertains either to persons or to things or to actions,” three categories that exhaust the external human condition—personality, reality, and action. In the nineteenth century, the study of Roman law lost its ideological power and became part of philology and history, at least so concludes James Whitman.


2019 ◽  
pp. 15-31
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Benincasa

For persons who wanted to invest their resources in international commerce, the necessity of a sea voyage significantly increased the risk connected to this venture. Thus the contracts, which took into account the risk related to navigation, constituted under Roman law a special category of contracts, as they modified standard contracts such as a loan or a partnership contract. In the contract of maritime loan the fact that the creditor assumed the risk of losing money in case the condition si salva navis pervenerit was not fulfilled and in exchange could claim high interest to compensate him for such risk transforms this contract into an instrument used for the joint gain of profits. The classical scheme, in which all partners were obliged to share both profits and losses was modified by a partnership contract, in which a partner whose contribution involved exclusively undertaking risky sea voyages was exempt from bearing losses. This pactum made it possible to treat pecuniary contributions and in-kind contributions as equivalent in value. This prevented a situation in which the partner whose sole contribution involved services, in spite of due performance of his obligations, would be liable to repay a part of the loss to the partner who brought capital, if the activity of the partnership resulted in the loss. A typical example, referred to by jurists, of a situation in which services performed by a partner justified discharging him from participating in the loss, was the case in which one of the socii financed the purchase of goods to be subsequently sold with profit in another port, while the other one carried out this venture risking his life during the sea voyage. Therefore, undoubtedly, services entailing a dangerous sea voyage constituted a good example of a partnership, in which the value of a contribution of opera was even greater than the value of the capital invested, and this justified releasing one of the partners from participation in the loss. Therefore, the risk related to navigation, and more specifically the willingness to assume it, starts to be considered as having a certain economic and market value. This value constitutes a special periculi pretium, that is to be taken into consideration in a contract relationship. The acknowledgement by Roman jurists that the willingness to assume the risk connected with certain types of business constituted an economic value, means that the importance of such factors as the partner’s efficiency, resourcefulness, or willingness to embark on a risky activity (in most cases crucial for a success of an enterprise) – was fully appreciated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Zuzanna Służewska

THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP AS A BASE OF IN SOLIDUM LIABILITY IN ROMAN LAWSummary In the modern civil law joint and several liability of partners in a partnership is a rule rather than an exception. According to the common opinion this concept did not originate in the Roman law but was first invented in the medieval times by glossators and commentators. The Roman partnership created only a private relation between partners (who, due to a conclusion of that contract were reciprocally obliged to act together in accordance with a good faith in order to conduct common business and to divide profits and bear losses in proportion to their respective shares) and its conclusion did not affect their liability against third parties. The partners had no right to bind themselves contractually to any third parties, unless they all acted jointly (in this case, however, their joint representation was derived from their expressed declarations and not the existence of a contract o f partnership). Thus, any commitment made by an individual partner, even if made within the scope of a partnership having obtained other partners’ consent, was treated as a personal debt of this partner and the remaining partners were not liable against his contractor. Then, of course, the partner who made a commitment (acting within the partnership’s business) could claim a part of what he had paid to a third party from other partners in proportion to their respective shares in the common enterprise.Such a solution was necessary because of the purely consensual character o f the Roman partnership and the lack of any formal procedure of its conclusion and dissolution. The existence of that contract could not affect the model of the external liability of partners, because it would be too risky for third parties, which had no possibility to make sure if a contract of partnership between some persons had been actually concluded or not. Thus, the role of a contract of partnership in the Roman law was only limited to determine a mutual liability o f partners, to specify their respective rights and obligations and to define the scope of their liability against other partners.There are only a few written sources concerning so called specific kinds of partnership characterized by untypical joint and several responsibility of partners. Moreover these texts are not very clear and are difficult to interpret, so the issue of specific kinds of a partnership is a matter of doubts among Romanists. Some authors even believe that the specific types of partnership did not exist in the Roman law at all.It should be firstly observed that the texts regarding a contract of partnership itself (the texts included in the title pro socio of Justinian’ Digest) did not raise the question of the external liability of partners because they were devoted to internal settlement o f accounts within sociu Thus, taking into account only these texts one cannot ascertain that a conclusion of a contract of partnership could not affect in any way the model of the partners’ liability against third parties.Secondly, the other texts concerning the regulation of conducting an economic activity in the Roman law (actio institoria, actio exercitoria and actio de peculio) present some regularity in an introduction of joint and several liability of debtors.On the one hand that model of the liability was introduced in situations in which protecting safety of trade required that the creditor be able to claim a whole amount o f the debt from one person only.On the other hand this model of liability could be introduced only in these cases in which some internal relation existed between several debtors. On the grounds of such relations the debtor who satisfied in full the creditor’s claim could sue other debtors in order to recover their respective parts in the debt. In the Roman law that internal relation that guaranteed the possibility of a recourse could be either a joint-ownership or a partnership.Having considered that, one may say that the texts concerning specific kinds o f partnership do not prove existence of any special type of societas. These sources regard only the situations when a joint and several liability between several debtors was introduced because it was justified by the circumstances: that is the necessity to protect the safety of trade on one hand and the existence of the contract of partnership that guaranteed a possibility to realize the recourse, on the other.In conclusion one may say that although a closing of a contract of partnership did not create a joint and several liability of partners, in some cases its existence was decisive for introducing this model of liability since it guaranteed to every party a possibility to act against the others to obtain the recourse. Thus, Roman jurisprudence made an important step towards the future introduction o f joint and several liability of partners as a rule of a civil law.


Author(s):  
Maristela Basso

Bearing in mind the absence of specific legal norm on “fashion design” and the lack of expertise of ourjudges, Brazilian courts have recognized some degree of protection for designs granted by the fashion industry.They do not deny protection, as the North Americans who exclude the utilitarian aspects, nor even declarerights as vast as in French law. The trend of the judged in Brazil is in an intermediate position. That is, they aimto encourage innovation, on the one hand, and on the other, limit copying, requiring incremental elements toprovide protection.


2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Wiesław Dyk

The discussion about the rights of animals is always up-to-date. The dichotomy division into philoanimalists and philohominists, although reasonable, is not satisfactory to everyone. It is too strongly associated with the division into people and things in Roman law. To avoid this association in the context of biocentric trends in ecological ethics, accomplishments of evolutionary psychology and the concept of animal welfare, it is suggested that a third moral dimension dealing with creatures with highly developed nervous system be introduced between moral objectivity of creatures with high perception and moral subjectivity of people - creatures characterized by self-awareness and reflexive awareness. Human beings on the one hand are responsible for recognizing their rights given by nature and on the other hand, they are obliged to create a law to protect themselves.


2020 ◽  
pp. 379-393
Author(s):  
Haym Soloveitchik

This chapter discusses the laws regulating usury (ribbit). In the course of studying ribbit, more specifically, the problem of personal surety in usury contracts, certain peculiar developments in Provençal halakhic thought came to the author's attention which were not explainable by indigenous forces. The geographical distribution of the discussion seemed oddly disproportionate, the fictions too blatant, the types of problem that were raised seemed inappropriate for the period, and the terminology was occasionally alien. The author was compelled to look outside Jewish law for possible stimuli. Placing the Jewish developments within the context of twelfth-century Provençal law shed light on a number of seemingly inexplicable points. The Jewish literature, on the other hand, provided new information about the Gentile law of the time and yielded fresh corroboration for theories of the penetration of Roman law in Provence. However, at the same time this material seemed to point to an earlier date for certain legal developments than is generally accepted. It is these findings that the author wishes to bring to the attention of the scholars of Provençal law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-482
Author(s):  
Ivan Milotić

The protocol of Petar Lazarić, who was simultaneously a domestic priest, prebendary and a notary of Mošćenice, dates back to 1621. It originated in Mošćenice and records in glagolithic script a resolution of a private dispute concerning the property division which was achieved in arbitration. Although the wording of the documents reveals the glagolithic script and is fully made in the Croatian language, if we go beyond that and explore the origins of the essential terms and expressions, we may reach a conclusion that the document substantially records Latin (or Italian) legal technical language which was slightly Croatised in the process of its adoption into the legal system of the commune of Mošćenice. Moreover, the content of the document puts forth legal principles, concepts and institutes of the extrajudicial dispute resolution which were consistently applied in Mošćenice following the model of arbitration in Roman law. All the essentials of the document at hand reflect the strong influences of the Roman legal tradition and the ius commune. The author provides an analysis in this paper which addresses all the relevant institutes that were applied in the arbitration dispute at hand referring to the procedural and substantive law at the same time. The author searches for the Roman model of these institutes, evaluates them from perspective of Roman and canon law of the Middle and New Ages and, finally, he brings this particular legal source in relation to the other two which originated in Mošćenice in the first half of the 17th century that both record significant influences of the Roman legal tradition of the time: The Statute of Mošćenice of 1637 and the boundary dispute between Lovran and Mošćenice of 1646.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 376-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunther Teubner

The Talmud tells us how once during a heated halachic discussion, when no agreement could be reached, Rabbi Eliezer, whose detailed, elegantly justified legal opinion was not shared by the majority, said that if he were right, a carob tree outside would move to prove it. When it did move, the other rabbis remained unimpressed. Eliezer claimed that if he were right, a nearby stream would flow backwards - and it did; he claimed that the schoolhouse walls would bend - and they did. But the rabbis were not impressed by these wonders either. Finally he said heaven itself would prove him right. Thereupon a Heavenly Voice confirmed Eliezer's position. Yet the rabbis disagreed even with this voice, saying: “We pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, after the majority must one incline”. And God laughed, saying “My sons have defeated Me, My sons have defeated Me.”


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