The (ir)resistible temptation of privatizing security: A Dutch perspective

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-207
Author(s):  
Alfred van Staden
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Ethical Perspective ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Lack Of Information ◽  
Structural Capacity ◽  
Private Military Companies ◽  
Published Report ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

AbstractThe use of private contractors in peace support operations may involve a large variety of services. However, there is a conspicuous lack of information and transparency in general regarding the number of PMC personnel employed, the tasks they perform and the sums of money that are at stake. The employment of private military companies can be looked at from three different perspectives, the economic, the military-operational and the legal (as well as ethical) perspective. In the recently published report Employing Private Military Companies two recommendations are made. First, the Dutch government is advised to make the level of its political ambitions with regard to participation in peace support operations dependent on the structural capacity of the armed forces, including basic logistics. Second, the government is urged to provide as much information as possible concerning all relevant aspects of the employment of private companies that render services to the Dutch armed forces in operational areas. Finally, the government is urged to raise the whole issue in the ESDP discussions of the European Union.

Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Culture ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

scholarly journals “The British Soldier is no Bolshevik”: The British Army, Discipline, and the Demobilization Strikes of 1919

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butler
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
British Army ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
Civilian Life ◽  
Daily Mail ◽  
Winston Churchill ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Government ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilization at the end of the First World War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that the existing demobilization system was unjust, and men were soon organized by those more politically conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the flames of discontent, soldiers’ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were genuinely concerned that Bolshevism had ‘infected’ the army, or, at the very least, the army had been unionized, their fears were not realized. The article examines the government’s strategy regarding demobilization, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.

scholarly journals The anniversary of the military coup attempt in Turkey, July 15–16, 2016. The evolution of a political system

2017 ◽  
pp. 63-68
Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Coup Attempt

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Protests, a Destabilizing Factor of Economic Growth in Arab Republic of Egypt

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karim Naama ◽  
◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
Economic Situation ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Economic Growth Rate ◽  
Published Report ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
The Military

With the start of the revolution of January 2011 until 2013, many indicators and economic research confirms the entry of the Egyptian economy to a stage of deterioration. With the military council headed by Marshal Tantawi taking over the country, the growth of the economy fell remarkably to less than 2% Unemployment reached over 10%, and the fiscal deficit increased to 8.6% of GDP, which was accompanied by inflation of 11%. That one of the biggest economic mistakes committed by the government system is to keep the exchange rate of the pound fixed, which led to the depletion of about $ 20 billion of cash reserves between December 2010 to May 2012, which has negatively affected the rating of Egyptian Institutions International Finance. After that, Egypt’s economic situation during the rule of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, which can be described as lacking in experience in the management of the state. The political challenges and obstacles, as well as the absence of any economic plan, contributed to the increasing complexity of the economic situation of Egypt, Resulting in a rise in the unemployment rate to 12.5%. The Brotherhood’s government failed to provide resources to cope with the crisis, relying only on the collection of aid and subsidies from some regimes in the Middle East, resulting in worsening conditions until the army intervened and President Mohamed Morsi was removed on 3 July 2013. With the arrival of interim President Adli Mansour to power in August 2013, we note that the Egyptian economy witnessed a slight improvement, which was reflected according to the published report that Egypt received about 12 billion dollars in foreign aid from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, However, the economic growth rate remained below 2% as unemployment and inflation continued to spread.

What Changed?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Necati Polat
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
European Union ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Identity Politics ◽  
The European Union ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Turkish Politics ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

This chapter provides an outline of the change that took place in Turkey between 2007 and 2011, signalling a historic shift in the use of power in the country, long controlled by a staunch and virtually autonomous bureaucracy, both military and civilian, and known as ‘the state’, in the face of the chronically fragile democratic politics, forming ‘the government’. The time-honoured identity politics of the very bureaucracy, centred on ‘Westernisation’ as a policy incentive, was deftly appropriated by the ruling AKP via newly tightened links with the European Union to transform the settled centre-periphery relations often considered to be pivotal to Turkish politics, and reconfigure access to power. The chapter details the gradual fall of the bureaucracy—that is, the military, the higher education, and the system of high courts—and recounts the basic developments in foreign policy and on the domestic scene during and immediately after the change.

Presidential Term Limits as a Credible-Commitment Mechanism

2019 ◽  
pp. 123-140
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Igor P. Acácio
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.

Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.

Iran's military set for more aggressive stance in Gulf

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Staff ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
Intelligence Collection ◽  
Gulf States ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Major General

Significance Tensions between the Gulf states and Iran have escalated significantly in 2016, in the wake of Iran's signing of a landmark deal in 2015 that brought to an end the decade-long dispute over its nuclear programme. The response of Iran's military to the heightened tensions will be partly influenced by the new chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the country's top military body, Major General Mohamad Hossein Bagheri. Impacts A more assertive and non-compromising IRGC will increase pressure on President Hassan Rouhani as he seeks re-election in 2017. Improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination are likely in Syria, aimed at reducing Iranian casualties. The military and government are likely to clash soon over the defence budget and its allocation. The government will try to keep the IRGC in check by tipping the media off about alleged financial wrongdoings. With the next US president expected to adopt a harder-line stance on Iran, the diplomatic rapprochement may be reversed partially.

Persistent insecurity will test Burkinabe government

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Burkina Faso ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Community Support ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Subject Counterterrorism in Burkina Faso. Significance Despite recent gains against jihadist groups, in recent months attacks have moved beyond the more insecure north and started to occur more frequently in the east and parts of the centre. Separately, authorities are growing increasingly intolerant of public dissent and protest, while revelations of abuses by the military risk scuppering crucial local community support necessary for counterinsurgency operations. Impacts The government will face growing political and public pressure to end persistent strikes. Patriotic support for the armed forces remains widespread, but growing revelations of abuse will tarnish its image. Opposition criticisms of the government’s counterterrorism strategy will increase but avoid directly blaming the military. Public dissatisfaction may grow with the Sahel Group of Five (G5) regional force if the slow pace of its operations persists. The prosecution of alleged coup plotter Gilbert Diendere will enjoy public backing amid calls for justice for victims of the old regime.

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