China’s Communist Party: From Mass to Elite Party

China Report ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard

The Communist Party of China (CPC) is not withering away as predicted by some Western scholars. On the contrary, in recent years, the party has centralised and strengthened its rule over China. At the same time, party membership has changed. Today, workers and farmers only account for only one-third of the total party membership compared to two-thirds when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. Instead, new strata and groups such as technical and management personnel have evolved. The composition of the party’s cadre corps has changed accordingly, and cadres today are younger and much better educated than during Mao’s time. The leading cadres form an elite which is at the heart of a ranking-stratified political and social system. This article discusses how the CPC has evolved from a mass to an elite party. It argues that in this process, the party has taken over the state resulting in a merger and overlap of party and government positions and functions, thereby abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s ambidextrous policy goals of separating party and government. Centralisation and reassertion of ranking-stratified party rule is Xi Jinping’s answer to the huge challenges caused by the economic and social transformation of Chinese society—not a return to Mao’s mass party.

MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Aldendorff

In 2014, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China released a document that called for the construction of a nationwide Social Credit System (SCS) with the goal to encourage sincerity and punish insincerity. The system uses blacklists that citizens land on for various cases of misbehavior, ranging from failing to pay a fine to being caught Jaywalking. This research explains the design process behind the SCS and in particular why many Chinese citizens are embracing this form of surveillance. It focuses on three topics to answer this question: the historical roots underlying the system, the perceived lack of trust in Chinese society and the comparison with concepts from surveillance theories developed in the West. From the analysis, following conclusions could be drawn: Historically, the state has often acted as a promoter and enforcer of moral virtue. The SCS fits perfectly into this tradition. The most prominent reason for the positive Chinese reaction is the lack of institutions in China that promote trust between citizens and businesses. There is a severe trust deficit which the government had to find a solution for. Regarding surveillance theory, Foucault’s concept of ‘panopticism’ shows similarities with the SCS and underlines its effectiveness in changing and steering people’s behavior while Lyon’s notion of ‘social sorting’ is used to demonstrate the potential dangers of the Chinese system.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Huwy-Min Lucia Liu

This article discusses how the Chinese Communist Party governed death in Shanghai during the first half of the People's Republic of China. It examines how officials nationalized funeral institutions, promoted cremation, and transformed what they believed to be the unproductivity of the funeral industry into productivity (by raising pigs in cemeteries, for instance). I show how each of these policies eliminated possible sources of identity that were prevalent in conceptualizing who the dead were and what their relationships with the living could be. Specifically, in addition to the construction of socialist workers, the state worked to remove cosmopolitan, associational, religious, and relational ideas of self. By modifying funerary rituals and ways of interment, the Chinese state aimed to produce individualized and undifferentiated political subjects directly tied to the party-state. The civil governance of death aimed to produce citizen-subjects at the end of life.


1978 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 873-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Friedman

What was the role of Tachai, Mao Tse-tung's model village meant for emulation in agriculture, in the 1975–76 struggle towards national power of the Chiang Ch'ing group? In getting the facts straight on this matter, I will throw light on some facets of local and national political power in China. I will especially highlight the question of the extent to which ruling groups at the state centre have a somewhat independent basis for more or less autonomous action.


MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Aldendorff

In 2014, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China released a document that called for the construction of a nationwide Social Credit System (SCS) with the goal to encourage sincerity and punish insincerity. The system uses blacklists that citizens land on for various cases of misbehavior, ranging from failing to pay a fine to being caught Jaywalking. This research explains the design process behind the SCS and in particular why many Chinese citizens are embracing this form of surveillance. It focuses on three topics to answer this question: the historical roots underlying the system, the perceived lack of trust in Chinese society and the comparison with concepts from surveillance theories developed in the West. From the analysis, following conclusions could be drawn: Historically, the state has often acted as a promoter and enforcer of moral virtue. The SCS fits perfectly into this tradition. The most prominent reason for the positive Chinese reaction is the lack of institutions in China that promote trust between citizens and businesses. There is a severe trust deficit which the government had to find a solution for. Regarding surveillance theory, Foucault’s concept of ‘panopticism’ shows similarities with the SCS and underlines its effectiveness in changing and steering people’s behavior while Lyon’s notion of ‘social sorting’ is used to demonstrate the potential dangers of the Chinese system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Zhu ◽  
Tony Tam

Communist Party membership is often associated with higher incomes in socialist regimes because it is an important credential for obtaining state-sector jobs and cadre positions. During the first two decades of marketization in China, the income returns to Communist Party membership (the party premium) clearly persisted. However, recent studies have documented an insignificant party premium in post-2000 China. Considering the persistent role of the state in resource allocation, this phenomenon is puzzling and lacks clear interpretation. Drawing on the knowledge of collider conditioning, we hypothesize that this phenomenon stems from a negative ability bias generated by conditioning on endogenous job positions. Using the China General Social Survey 2008, we re-examine the post-2000 party premiums. The results support this hypothesis and demonstrate that this negative ability bias overwhelms the usual positive ability bias and any residual party premiums. Party premiums persist after 2000 and are reflected in positions where the negative ability bias is less influential.


Napredak ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-40
Author(s):  
Shi Xiaohu

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Communist Party of China has found itself in a complicated international situation and arduous development tasks. The CPC has steadily promoted its foreign exchanges in the process of inheritance and development. It has achieved leaps in practice of the theoretical innovations in party to party diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, which contributed significantly to the central missions of the Party and the nation, as well as the overall strategy of the state diplomacy. Starting at a new historical phase, it is crucial to summarize the experience of the practical and theoretical innovations in party to party diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. It is also of great importance to discover the basic logic and principles therein. All of which would provide practical significance for promoting a benign interaction between the practice and theory of party to party diplomacy, and make greater contribution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 56-60
Author(s):  
Petr N. Kobets ◽  

One of the primary roles in China’s public administration system is assigned to the state Council of the country. Currently, many researchers have an increased interest in this state body, which performs the functions of the country’s government and is the highest Executive authority. In this regard, the author set a task to study the features of the formation, functioning and reform of this public authority, which performs the function of the country’s government. As a result of the research, the author notes that the formation of the Chinese State Council has a long way to go, from the creation of rural administrations in the 1930s, to the formation of the Central people’s government in the 1950s and its regular reform until now. And if in the early period of the people’s Republic of China, the country’s Communist party together with the government were a single entity, then in the late 1970s, their functions were gradually distributed, and the government smoothly moved to independent day-to-day management of the state. Therefore, today the Communist party makes strategic decisions that determine the state’s policy, and government structures implement this policy, focusing on solving economic problems, leaving the issues of ideology, personnel and security to the Communist party. Special attention was paid to the modern features of the reform of the State Council, which is taking place within the framework of structural transformations carried out in the form of in-depth reforms of public administration institutions initiated in 2017 by the XIX Congress of the Chinese Communist party.


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