Leading the Band or Just Playing the Tune? Reassessing the Agenda-Setting Powers of the European Commission

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (8) ◽  
pp. 1118-1150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amie Kreppel ◽  
Buket Oztas

Setting the political agenda is a critical and usually powerful aspect of policy making. However, the ability to set the agenda, without any significant decision-making powers, can undermine this influence, leaving a technical agenda setter without substantive political influence. This research examines the difference between technical and political agenda setting through an analysis of the policy impact of the Commission of the European Union (EU). Using two newly developed databases on Commission policy priorities and all adopted EU legislation, as well as the Decision Making in the European Union (DEU II) dataset, we investigate the ability of the Commission to shape EU legislative outcomes to reflect its policy preferences between 2000 and 2011. Our analyses highlight the comparative weakness of the Commission’s policy influence, despite its formal monopoly of legislative initiation. In this way, we argue for a need to carefully differentiate between technical and political agenda setters when evaluating the policy influence of different political actors.

Author(s):  
Marcus Maurer

Political agenda setting is the part of agenda-setting research that refers to the influence of the media agenda on the agenda of political actors. More precisely, the central question of political agenda-setting research is whether political actors adopt the issue agenda of the news media in various aspects ranging from communicating about issues that are prominently discussed in the news media to prioritizing issues from the news media agenda in political decision making. Although such effects have been studied under different labels (agenda building, policy agenda setting) for several decades, research in this field has recently increased significantly based on a new theoretical model introducing the term political agenda setting. Studies based on that model usually find effects of media coverage on the attention political actors pay to various issues, but at the same time point to a number of contingent conditions. First, as found in research on public agenda setting, there is an influence of characteristics of news media (e.g., television news vs. print media) and issues (e.g., obtrusive vs. unobtrusive issues). Second, there is an influence of characteristics of the political context (e.g., government vs. oppositional parties) and characteristics of individual politicians (e.g., generalists vs. specialists). Third, the findings of studies on the political agenda-setting effect differ, depending on which aspects of the political agenda are under examination (e.g., social media messages vs. political decision making).


Author(s):  
Henry E. Hale ◽  
Robert Orttung

The concluding chapter by Henry Hale and Robert Orttung identifies several common threads running through the chapters in the volume. Among these are the importance of taking into account that formal institutions will not work the same way they do in Western countries thanks to local informal practices, the difference between deeply embedded obstacles to reform and those that are more contingent, the need to focus on long-term solutions, how realistic various reform proposals are in light of the incentives of political actors who have the power to enact them, and the notion that many of the reforms discussed in the volume can reinforce each other. Ultimately, perhaps the single most important driver for change in Ukraine is the European Union.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narisong Huhe ◽  
Daniel Naurin ◽  
Robert Thomson

We test two of the main explanations of the formation of political ties. The first states that political actors are more likely to form a relationship if they have similar policy preferences. The second explanation, from network theory, predicts that the likelihood of a tie between two actors depends on the presence of certain relationships with other actors. Our data consist of a unique combination of actors' policy positions and their network relations over time in the Council of the European Union. We find evidence that both types of explanations matter, although there seems to be variation in the extent to which preference similarity affects network evolution. We consider the implications of these findings for understanding the decision-making in the Council.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. e57620
Author(s):  
Alexsandro Eugenio Pereira ◽  
Danniele Varella Rios

Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar em que medida a política comercial brasileira esteve permeável às pressões domésticas exercidas pela Coalizão Empresarial Brasileira - CEB ao longo das negociações comerciais entre o Mercosul e a União Europeia. Sustenta-se a hipótese de que a participação desse grupo esteve condicionada à sua contribuição técnica, enquanto sua influência política foi limitada pela autonomia decisória do Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Para testar essa hipótese, foram analisadas 83 propostas presentes em documento publicado pela CEB, classificadas em técnicas ou “posicionais” e comparadas com o resultado do acordo, disponibilizado pelo Itamaraty. Os resultados apontam para alto grau de permeabilidade de propostas técnicas (X=0,75), frente ao baixo grau de permeabilidade de propostas “posicionais” (X=0,38). No entanto, para inferir sobre a relação desse resultado com a autonomia decisória do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, seria necessário um aprofundamento da investigação por meio de métodos qualitativos como o process tracing. Palavras-chave: Participação empresarial; permeabilidade; política comercial.ABSTRACT This article aims to investigate the extent to which Brazilian trade policy was permeable to domestic pressures conducted by the Brazilian Business Coalition - CEB during trade negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union. The hypothesis holds that this group's participation was conditioned to its technical contribution, while its political influence was limited by the decision-making autonomy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To test this hypothesis, 83 proposals present in a document published by CEB were classified as technical or “positional” and compared with the result of the agreement, published by Itamaraty. The results point to a high degree of permeability of technical proposals (X = 0.75), compared to the low degree of “positional” proposals (X = 0.38). However, to infer about the linkage between this result and decision-making autonomy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it would be necessary to deepen the investigation through qualitative methods such as process tracing.Keywords: Business participation; permeability; trade policy. Recebido em 07 fev. 2021 | Aceito em 30 ago. 2021 


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
Liridon Dalipi ◽  
Mejdi Bektashi ◽  
Arben Sahiti

This paper addresses the issue of independent institutions in Kosovo that are constitutional category, their operation and role within the state, problems and challenges that arise especially in those areas that the issue of regulation is very sensitive. The key focus in this study is IMC. This paper contains analysis of political influence on financing and appointment in decision making bodies. Furthermore, it includes analysis of the political independence from industry. These issues will be addressed according to the guidelines and recommendations of the European Union compared with domestic legislation and various European practices. This study has been done using secondary data, and it concludes that Independent Institutions in Kosova are not immune from the political and industry influences, and it provides some recommendations on how to avoid such influences.


2020 ◽  
pp. 146511652096146
Author(s):  
Christian Rauh

Analyses of strategic agenda-setting in the European Union treat the European Commission as a unitary actor with perfect information. Yet, the constraints for correctly anticipating acceptable policies vary heavily across its individual Directorates-General. Do these internal rifts affect the Commission’s agenda-setting ability? This article tests corresponding expectations on the edit distances between 2237 Commission proposals and the adopted laws across 23 years. The quality of legislative anticipation indeed varies with the responsible Directorate-General. Legislative proposals are more likely to remain unchanged if they face less parliamentary involvement, are less complex, were drafted by an experienced Directorate-General, and were coordinated more seamlessly within the Commission. However, the uncovered variation also calls for more systematic research on the distribution of legislative capacities inside the Commission.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Petr Jeřábek

The paper focuses on the decision-making process in the European Union since approval of the Treaty of Maastricht. Special consideration is dedicated to pillars two and three. The second pillar is connected with Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the third pillar contributes with Justice and Home Affairs. The first part of this paper introduces the major tools which are commonly used and describes how pillars system works. The difference between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is also addressed. In the second part the paper deals with some important changes under the Treaty of Nice and Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon will cancel the pillars system, being replaced by one legal personality for the European Union. While the former treaties were partly based on intergovernmentalism, the Treaty of Lisbon is mostly oriented on supranationalism.


Author(s):  
Rainer Eising

This chapter examines the role of interest groups in European Union politics. The formation and behaviour of interest groups are influenced by the political opportunity structure formed by the EU and other political institutions. The EU's institutional setting (its dynamic political agenda, its complexity and multilevel character, and its reliance on consensus) shapes the interest group system and interest mediation within the EU. After providing an overview of the relationship between EU institutions and interest groups, the chapter considers how the EU institutions influence interest group structures and activities. In particular, it describes the difference between national and EU organizations, and between business and diffuse interests. It also discusses the Europeanization of interest mediation and how EU membership may have altered the structures and activities of domestic interest groups.


Res Publica ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-548
Author(s):  
Peter Bursens

This article argues that both hard and soft institutions shape the strategies and - to a lesser extent - the preferences of political actors in the European Union.  First of all, it discusses the institutional perspective in political science and presents an institutional model of decision-making. Secondly the institutional argument is illustrated by a detailed account of the decision-makingprocess with respect to the Packaging Directive. An analysis of the actor configuration, the interactions between the involved actors and an overview of the decision-making process itself, all show to what extent actor's strategies and preferences are constrained and empowerd by the European institutional context.


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