scholarly journals Objective Conditions Count, Political Beliefs Decide: The Conditional Effects of Self-Interest and Ideology on Redistribution Preferences

2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199365
Author(s):  
Klaus Armingeon ◽  
David Weisstanner

How can we explain variation in demand for redistribution among cross-pressured voters? We argue that redistributive preferences reflect an interaction between material self-interest and political ideology. The self-interest argument predicts growing opposition to redistribution as income increases, while the argument of ideologically driven preferences suggests that left-leaning citizens are more supportive of redistribution than right-leaning citizens. Focusing on cross-pressured voters, we expect that the difference in redistribution preferences between left- and right-leaning citizens is smaller at the bottom of the income hierarchy than at the top. Among the group of left-leaning citizens, the role of material self-interest is expected to be smaller than among right-leaning citizens. We provide evidence in line with our argument analysing data from the European Social Survey in 25 European democracies between 2008 and 2018.

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
ACHIM GOERRES ◽  
MARKUS TEPE

AbstractIn order to explain why people differ in their attitudes towards public childcare, we present a theoretical framework that integrates four causal mechanisms: regime socialisation, political ideology, family involvement and material self-interest. Estimation results obtained from multivariate regressions on the 2002 German General Social Survey and replications on the 2008/9 European Social Survey can be condensed into three statements: (1) Regime socialisation is the single most important determinant of attitudes toward public childcare, followed by young age as an indicator of self-interest and political ideology. Family involvement does not have any sizeable impact. (2) Regime socialisation conditions the impact of some indicators of political ideology and family involvement on attitudes toward public childcare. (3) Despite a paradigmatic shift in policy, the dynamics of 2008 mirror those of 2002, highlighting the stability of inter-individual differences in support. The results suggest that the ‘shadow of communism’ still stretches over what people in the East expect from the welfare state and that individual difference in the demand for public childcare appears to be highly path-dependent.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 609-609
Author(s):  
Marja Aartsen ◽  
Gražina Rapolienė

Abstract Loneliness in later life is two times more prevalent in Eastern and Southern European countries than in Northern and Western European countries. One explanation that is put forth is the difference in expectations about social relations. We examine a not often evaluated role of trust in society as factor contributing to the country differences in loneliness. We adopt the trust-as-antecedent model of social integration, and assume that social integration is associated with loneliness. We use data of respondents aged 65 and over participating in the European Social Survey and conduct a latent factors path analysis to examine the effect of trust in the system and trust in people on social capital and loneliness. Loneliness is two times more prevalent in Eastern Europe than the rest of Europe (26% vs 10%), levels of trust are substantially lower in Eastern European countries, which in turn is associated with higher levels of loneliness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 682 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lukeš ◽  
Manuel Feldmann ◽  
Federico Vegetti

In this study, we ask how work values impact different forms of labor market participation of young adults across Europe. We define work values as individuals’ intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to work and the value of work as the importance or centrality of work in individuals’ lives. We use data gathered from young adults in eleven European countries in the CUPESSE project to investigate the role of the two sets of values regarding employment and self-employment. We then replicate our analysis on a larger sample using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Our findings suggest a high importance of nonpecuniary benefits for self-employment. Analyses based on both CUPESSE and ESS datasets clearly showed the high, positive impact that independence and creativity have on self-employment. We also show that extrinsic values, such as job security, are more important for employees than they are for the self-employed. Additionally, we find that the value of work in life does not differ between the employed and the self-employed. In sum, these findings suggest that values related to self-employment are not rooted in a general value of work, as Max Weber postulated in his Protestant Work Ethic nearly one hundred years ago, as much as in the aim to achieve personal satisfaction.


2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria da Paz Campos Lima ◽  
Antonio Martín Artiles

Taking into consideration the debate on the role of social movements and of trade unions in organising social protests, in the light of contentious and conventional politics, this article examines participation in demonstrations in Europe and the political attitudes of the participants. The article uses data from the European Social Survey to examine the differences and similarities between European countries in respect of mobilisation levels over the past decade, arguing that distrust and dissatisfaction with political institutions might be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one to justify resorting to contentious politics. The article reveals the contrasts between the levels of mobilisation in southern European countries (Portugal and Spain) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Hungary and Poland) and examines the patterns and (re)configuration of the profile of the protestors in the 2002–2014 period.


Author(s):  
Dimiter Toshkov

AbstractThe link between age and happiness has been the subject of numerous studies. It is still a matter of controversy whether the relationship is U-shaped, with happiness declining after youth before bouncing back in old age, or not. While the effect of age has been examined conditional on income and other socio-demographic variables, so far, the interactions between age and income have remained insufficiently explored. Using data from the European Social Survey, this article shows that the nature of the relationship between age and happiness varies strongly with different levels of relative income. People in the lowest decile of the income distribution experience a ‘hockey stick’: a deep decline in self-reported happiness until around age 50–55 and a small bounce back in old age. The classic U-curve is found mostly in the middle-income ranks. For people at the top of the income distribution, average happiness does not vary much with age. These results demonstrate the important role of income in moderating the relationship between age and happiness.


2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Barni ◽  
Alessio Vieno ◽  
Michele Roccato

We performed a multilevel, multinational analysis using the 2012 European Social Survey dataset (N = 41 080, nested in 20 countries) to study how living in a non–communist versus in a post–communist country moderates the link between individual conservative values (drawn on Schwartz's theory of basic human values) and political orientation (assessed as self–placement on the left–right axis and attitude towards economic redistribution). The results supported the moderating role of living in a non–communist versus in a post–communist country in the case both of political self–placement and of attitude towards economic redistribution, even controlling for the countries’ degree of individualism, power distance and democracy. Specifically, conservative values were positively related to a rightist political self–placement among participants living in countries without a communist past, and to a favourable attitude towards economic redistribution in countries with a communist past. The limitations, implications and future directions of this study are discussed. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology


2020 ◽  
pp. 088832542095453
Author(s):  
Bermond Scoggins

This article tests cultural and economic explanations of why the longest surviving illiberal government in Central Europe, Hungary’s FIDESZ, has maintained popular support throughout two elections despite dismantling institutional checks and balances. Much of the literature on illiberalism in Central Europe attributes the appeal and successes of these governments to the brand of identity politics and rhetorical vilification of “others” practiced by their leaders. Yet the role of economic growth, a strong determinant of voter behaviour, has received little theoretical attention in accounting for illiberal party support. Using five rounds of European Social Survey data from 2010 to 2018, I show that economic satisfaction rather than a host of cultural factors, notably anti-migrant and anti-European Union attitudes, better predicts support for FIDESZ and satisfaction with government. I examine the implications of these results for understanding and conceptualising voter behaviour under backsliding. Voters may not understand what backsliding is and therefore are unable to penalise it or they may take information about backsliding into account and judge backsliding to be the price of prosperity. These findings and the discussion of voter behaviour raise important questions about the role of economic growth in sustaining illiberalism in Central Europe and other third wave democracies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 435-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Shore ◽  
Carolin Rapp ◽  
Daniel Stockemer

Health affects nearly all facets of our lives, including the likelihood of getting involved in politics. Focusing on political efficacy, we zoom in on one potential mechanism as to why people in poor health might, for example, stay at home on Election Day. We first look at the ways in which health is related to both people’s perceptions of their abilities to take part in politics (internal political efficacy) as well as the extent to which they believe policymakers are responsive to citizen needs (external political efficacy). Second, we examine how the social policy context intervenes in the relationship between health and political efficacy. Multilevel models using 2014 and 2016 European Social Survey data on roughly 57,000 respondents nested in 21 European countries reveal complex results: while good health, rather unsurprisingly, fosters internal and external political efficacy, more generous welfare states, though associated with higher levels of political efficacy, are not a panacea for remedying political inequalities stemming from individual health differences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Jolien Galle ◽  
Koen Abts ◽  
Marc Swyngedouw ◽  
Bart Meuleman

This article contributes to the debate about migration’s impact on welfare state support by investigating the welfare opinions of migrants and their descendants. It examines whether experiences of group and individual discrimination explain the welfare attitudes of this group over and beyond classical predictors of self-interest and political ideology. Using survey data from Belgian citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent, we show that stronger support for redistribution is associated with higher levels of perceived group discrimination, religious involvement, and belonging to the second generation. Preferences of government responsibility, however, are strongly determined by labor market position and left-right ideology.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 1511-1532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henar Criado ◽  
Francisco Herreros

The analysis of the causes of political support for political institutions has been focused either on one-case studies that stress the relevance of individual variables or cross-national studies that stress the role of institutions. In this article, the authors suggest that to understand the logic of political support, it is necessary to combine both types of explanations. Using evidence from 17 European countries of the 2002 to 2003 European Social Survey data set, the authors show that the effect of the performance of the institution on political support is higher in majoritarian democracies, where the attribution of responsibility for policy outcomes is clear, than in proportional democracies. They also show that the effect of ideology on political support depends on the type of democracy: Those citizens ideologically far from the government will show higher levels of political support in proportional democracies than in majoritarian ones.


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