Achieving Effective International Cooperation: How Institutional Formalization Shapes Intergovernmental Negotiations
This article explores how formalization of institutions and domestic constraints influence the outcomes of international cooperation and negotiation processes—particularly in a regional setting like the European Union (EU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Examining different forms of institutional setup along the formal-informal continuum, this study evaluates their impact on the successes and failures of intergovernmental negotiation processes. While some scholars have been vocal about the importance of institutional setting on negotiation outcomes, there has not yet been any systematic analysis of the impact of institutional variations on the actual negotiation process. This project specifies under what conditions domestic actors constrain governments, and how these conditions depend on institutional structures. I analyze the impact of institutional variations, concentrating on negotiation failure and deadlock situations, to form a framework that can differentiate between various bargaining situations and to understand their impact on the possibility to facilitate successful negotiation outcomes. The central argument highlights the need for more nuanced connections between institutional design, domestic constraints, and the level of formalization to understand the likelihood of success or failure of intergovernmental negotiation processes.