scholarly journals Grand strategy, grand rhetoric: The forgotten covenant of campaign 1992

Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 026339572093578 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D Boys

The presidential campaign of 1992 is remembered for its focus on the US economy, as George Bush, Ross Perot, and Bill Clinton proposed solutions for the state of the nation’s finances. A key challenge for the Clinton campaign was to present their candidate as a viable commander-in-chief, with a viable foreign policy, without betraying the campaign’s focus on the domestic economy. A consideration of key speeches reveals the evolution of the candidate and his foreign policy, as the campaign served as a training ground for power. What emerges is Clinton’s adoption of foreign policy as a positive force in American domestic political life, in contrast to his many predecessors and successors, who regularly utilised foreign policy to assail foreign nations and entities. In doing so, parallels and contrasts with the Trump’s 2016 message emerge, enabling a greater appreciation of the use of campaign rhetoric in the development of US grand strategy.

2021 ◽  
pp. 45-65
Author(s):  
Kardo RACHED ◽  
Salam ABDULRAHMAN

Since the Second World War, the Middle East has been mentioned in connection with the national interest of America manifested by US presidents. This paper looks at the US foreign policy in the Middle East from Truman to Clinton on the premise that the US foreign policy has contributed to creating a breeding ground for dissatisfaction toward the US In this context, the paper focuses on the doctrines in use from the time of President Truman to Clinton. Thus, every American president has a doctrine, and this doctrine tells what political line the president follows regarding domestic and foreign policies. Keywords: Middle-East, Israel, US national interest, Soviet Union, Natural resources, ideologies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


Author(s):  
John Dumbrell

This chapter examines how the external environment of US foreign policy and internal pressures on policy makers both shifted radically in the 1990s. Internationally, the ‘long 1990s’ were characterized by intense democratic possibility. Yet they were also years of atavistic negativity and irrationality, as seen in Rwanda and Bosnia. Two questions arise: First, how should the United States respond to a world which was apparently both rapidly integrating and rapidly disintegrating? Second, was it inevitable, desirable, or even possible that the US should provide global leadership? Before discussing various approaches to these questions, the chapter considers the wider international environment of apparent unipolarity and globalization. It also analyzes the development of American foreign policy under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, focusing in particular on the so-called ‘Kennan sweepstakes’ during the first year of Clinton’s presidency as well as Clinton’s turn towards unilateralism and remilitarization.


1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN O'CONNOR

This paper reviews the Reagan administration's attack on the US welfare system during the 1980s. The paper considers the origins, provisions and impact of Reagan's three major pieces of retrenchment legislation: the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Social Security Amendments of 1983, and the Family Support Act of 1988. It is argued that Reagan's record in retrenching welfare was limited in budgetary terms, but was successful in making welfare programmes more restrictive. Reagan's welfare legacy is assessed in terms of his attempts at restructuring social provision and shifting the welfare debate to the right. The paper concludes by asserting that Reagan's critique of, and attack on, social provision was accepted by his presidential successors, George Bush and Bill Clinton.


1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack S. Levy

Do political leaders learn from historical experience, and do the lessons of history influence their foreign policy preferences and decisions? It appears that decision makers are always seeking to avoid the failures of the past and that generals are always fighting the last war. The “lessons of Munich” were invoked by Harry Truman in Korea, Anthony Eden in Suez, John Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, and George Bush in the Persian Gulf War. The “lessons of Korea” influenced American debates about Indochina, and the “lessons of Vietnam” were advanced in debates about crises in the Persian Gulf and in Bosnia. Statesmen at Versailles sought to avoid the mistakes of Vienna and those at Bretton Woods, the errors of the Great Depression. Masada still moves the Israelis, and Kosovo drives the Serbs. Inferences from experience and the myths that accompany them often have a far greater impact on policy than is warranted by standard rules of evidence. As J. Steinberg argues, in words that apply equally well to the Munich analogy and the Vietnam syndrome, memories of the British capture of the neutral Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1807 (the “Copenhagen complex”) “seeped into men's perceptions and became part of the vocabulary of political life,” and it influenced German decision making for a century.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-351
Author(s):  
Matheus de Carvalho Hernandez

A II Conferência Mundial para os Direitos Humanos da ONU, conhecida como Conferência de Viena, realizada em 1993, foi objeto de estudo da literatura de Relações Internacionais durante os anos noventa principalmente, inclusive no Brasil, devido à destacada participação da delegação brasileira. Entretanto, há ainda uma carência na área em relação à análise da importante participação dos Estados Unidos nesse evento da ONU. Sendo assim, o objetivo deste artigo é tentar contribuir no sentido de suprir essa lacuna, isto é, tentar compreender melhor a participação dos EUA – assim como suas motivações e contradições no que tange à política externa – nesse que foi o mais importante evento internacional em matéria de direitos humanos no pós-Guerra Fria. A hipótese aqui discutida é que a participação destacada dos EUA na referida Conferência seria resultado de dois fatores associados: um impulso inicial favorável aos direitos humanos, incitado pela necessidade do recém eleito Bill Clinton demonstrar relativa coerência com suas críticas às posturas de seu antecessor em matéria de direitos humanos; e a formação inicial de uma equipe de governo ligada à temática dos direitos humanos. Por outro lado, a análise da participação dos EUA em Viena diante do foco de Clinton nas questões econômicas domésticas e em comparação com outras ações de política externa parece demonstrar a permanência da ambivalência da política externa de direitos humanos dos EUA, resultando no que se designa como dupla padronização. The Second World Conference on Human Rights, known as the Vienna Conference, held in 1993, was studied by the literature of International Relations especially during the 1990s, including in Brazil, due to the outstanding participation of the Brazilian delegation. However, there is a lack of studies about the significant participation of the U.S. in the meeting. Thus, the aim of this article is to contribute towards filling this gap, in other words, to better understand the American involvement – as well as their motivations and contradictions regarding foreign policy – in this event, considered the most important international human rights event in the post-Cold War era. The hypothesis here is that the U.S. outstanding participation in the Conference would be the outcome of two linked factors: an initial push to favor human rights incited by the need of the newly elected Bill Clinton to demonstrate coherence with his criticism on the former administration's acts in the human rights field; and the initial composition of a government staff closer to human rights issues. On the other hand, the analysis of U.S. active involvement in Vienna - in contrast to the focus of Clinton on domestic and economic issues and compared to other foreign policy actions - seems to point to the continuing ambivalence of human rights foreign policy of the U.S., thus resulting in what is designated as double-standard.


Author(s):  
S. Kislitsyn

The research examines the main problems of a grand strategy in the US foreign policy. Attention is paid to the conceptual understanding of this term, its historical development, and the current state. The article analyzes the positions of American foreign policy elites and the expert community regarding the problem of the US self-positioning in the outside world. The article consists of three parts. The first analyses the main conceptual provisions of the “grand strategy” as a term. It describes its development from a military term, reflecting the general tactics in interstate confrontation to its comprehensive understanding as a coordination principle of long-term and medium-term goals with short term actions. The second part of the article focuses on the American foreign policy elites, their approaches, as well as public opinion on this issue. It is noted that the ideology of global leadership has become an important component of the establishment's thinking. It largely impedes the development of new foreign policy concepts and, as a result, reformatting the grand strategy. The third part is devoted to the positions of the expert community on the issue of grand strategy. Four main versions are considered: "Offensive", "Selective engagement", "Offshore Balancing", "Zero-sum". The author comes to a conclusion that the US foreign policy mixes several types of strategies at the moment. It is noted that as China strengthens, the United States faces a new competition, which, unlike the Soviet threat, implies not military-political, but economic confrontation. The implementation of the scenario of a "new Cold War" between Washington and Beijing can define the new goals of the grand strategy. At the same time, this also creates an ideological dilemma of recognizing a new challenge, an increasing alternative for American global leadership - the idea of which is still popular among representatives of American foreign policy elites.


Author(s):  
Viktoriia Bondaruk

The US foreign policy serves as an example for other countries, as it is one of the most developed countries in the world. For a better understanding of the features of contemporary foreign policy, the preconditions for its formation are determined. The history of the United States of America has been analyzed, which has inevitably influenced the formation of its current foreign policy and geostrategy. The political system of the country is defined as one of the direct factors influencing the formation of foreign policy. It is revealed that the very political preconditions create the legal basis for the existence and development of foreign policy, and therefore their study is very important for a deeper understanding of the vectors, principles and means of implementing the modern foreign policy of any state, namely, the United States. The internal economic situation, structure and development of the country’s economy, as well as problems and challenges on the way to the development of the national economy that are directly relevant for defining the functions, priorities and directions of foreign policy are considered. After all, it is the economy that is one of the most important factors shaping the foreign economic strategy of the state, which is an important factor in the formation of foreign economic relations and politics in general. It is proved that the geopolitical situation is the main factor for the definition of foreign policy vectors of the state. The geographic and geopolitical location of the state, in this case, the United States, defines the directions and vectors of the foreign policy of the state. The article explores all the factors and preconditions for the formation of US foreign policy during the presidency of Bill Clinton and his predecessors.


2021 ◽  
pp. 440-456
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis

How do we explain the vigorous debate about what American grand strategy should be? Most of the proponents are Realists, and this is particularly true for the alternatives of Restraint and Deep Engagement discussed here. These camps disagree not about whether the US is in decline, but in how secure it is, how tightly the world is interconnected, how much commitments can be kept within bounds, whether alliances and military ties are necessary to underpin a productive international economic system, and the links between foreign policy and domestic values. Few analysts in either camp are willing to acknowledge tradeoffs among the significant values they hold, which indicates that psychological processes as well as analytical differences are at work.


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