Evaluating the Mind’s Eye

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (12) ◽  
pp. 1535-1542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Pearson ◽  
Rosanne L. Rademaker ◽  
Frank Tong

Can people evaluate phenomenal qualities of internally generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid or detailed? This question exemplifies a problem of metacognition: How well do people know their own thoughts? In the study reported here, participants were instructed to imagine a specific visual pattern and rate its vividness, after which they were presented with an ambiguous rivalry display that consisted of the previously imagined pattern plus an orthogonal pattern. On individual trials, higher ratings of vividness predicted a greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear dominant when the participant was subsequently presented with the binocular rivalry display. Off-line self-report questionnaires measuring imagery vividness also predicted individual differences in the strength of imagery bias over the entire study. Perceptual bias due to mental imagery could not be attributed to demand characteristics, as no bias was observed on catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry displays. Our findings provide novel evidence that people have a good metacognitive understanding of their own mental imagery and can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imagination.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgia Floridou ◽  
Kaya Peerdeman ◽  
Rebecca Schaefer

Mental imagery is a highly common aspect of everyday cognitive functioning. While substantial progress is being made in clarifying this fundamental human function, much is still unclear or unknown. Examining individual differences in age, sex, and background experience in an activity in relation to the sensory and motor modality and intentionality level of imagery as well as the relation between them will contribute to a more comprehensive account of this mental function. The current online study combined multiple imagery self-report measures in a sample (n=279) with a substantial age range (18-65), aiming to identify whether age, sex, or background experience in sports, music, or video games were associated with aspects of imagery in the visual, auditory, or motor stimulus modality and voluntary or involuntary intentionality level. The findings show weak associations between age and auditory imagery aspects, weak associations between sex and visual imagery, and relations of music and video game experience with involuntary musical imagery. Moreover, all imagery stimulus modalities were associated to each other, for both intentionality levels, except involuntary musical imagery, which was only related to voluntary auditory imagery. These results replicate previous research but also contribute new insights, showing that individual differences in age, sex, and background experience can make modest contributions to various aspects of imagery. The findings can inform the growing domain of applications of mental imagery to clinical and pedagogical settings.


Author(s):  
Sarah Cooper

This opening chapter serves to introduce the principal focus of the book, which explores the felt experience of mental image-making while watching film. The introductory discussion positions the book first of all in relation to cognitivist work on imagination within film studies and points to the gap in scholarship on spectatorship regarding the experience of the image-making capacity of the imagination, situating it within a broader debate on mental imagery. The chapter engages with film theory and philosophy that anticipates the kind of image-making that will be focused on throughout the book and introduces what it means to imagine in images. It also justifies the book’s concentration on sound rather than silent cinema, since the verbal dimension and soundtracks are crucial to the kind of direction that produces the most vivid mental images, and the verbal dimension in particular permits introduction of the work of Elaine Scarry on guided imagining. It is the vivacity of such mental images that this first chapter outlines. In conceptual terms, this chapter and the following chapter serve to set up the key notion of ‘dual vision’ – of seeing what is on screen and ‘seeing’ what is in the mind – that informs the entire study.


2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 1013-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. M. O'Craven ◽  
N. Kanwisher

What happens in the brain when you conjure up a mental image in your mind's eye? We tested whether the particular regions of extrastriate cortex activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the image. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we demonstrated selective activation within a region of cortex specialized for face perception during mental imagery of faces, and selective activation within a place-selective cortical region during imagery of places. In a further study, we compared the activation for imagery and perception in these regions, and found greater response magnitudes for perception than for imagery of the same items. Finally, we found that it is possible to determine the content of single cognitive events from an inspection of the fMRI data from individual imagery trials. These findings strengthen evidence that imagery and perception share common processing mechanisms, and demonstrate that the specific brain regions activated during mental imagery depend on the content of the visual image.


Author(s):  
Georgia A. Floridou ◽  
Kaya J. Peerdeman ◽  
Rebecca S. Schaefer

AbstractMental imagery is a highly common component of everyday cognitive functioning. While substantial progress is being made in clarifying this fundamental human function, much is still unclear or unknown. A more comprehensive account of mental imagery aspects would be gained by examining individual differences in age, sex, and background experience in an activity and their association with imagery in different modalities and intentionality levels. The current online study combined multiple imagery self-report measures in a sample (n = 279) with a substantial age range (18–65 years), aiming to identify whether age, sex, or background experience in sports, music, or video games were associated with aspects of imagery in the visual, auditory, or motor stimulus modality and voluntary or involuntary intentionality level. The findings show weak positive associations between age and increased vividness of voluntary auditory imagery and decreased involuntary musical imagery frequency, weak associations between being female and more vivid visual imagery, and relations of greater music and video game experience with higher involuntary musical imagery frequency. Moreover, all imagery stimulus modalities were associated with each other, for both intentionality levels, except involuntary musical imagery frequency, which was only related to higher voluntary auditory imagery vividness. These results replicate previous research but also contribute new insights, showing that individual differences in age, sex, and background experience are associated with various aspects of imagery such as modality, intentionality, vividness, and frequency. The study’s findings can inform the growing domain of applications of mental imagery to clinical and pedagogical settings.


1993 ◽  
Vol 76 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1089-1090 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Richard Ferraro

The present article describes a demonstration experiment used in a large introductory psychology class pertaining to mental imagery ability. The experiment is effective in providing a concrete instance of mental imagery as well as an effective discussion regarding individual differences and gender differences in imagery ability.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Wittmann ◽  
Henrike Fiedler ◽  
Wilhelm Gros ◽  
Julia Mossbridge ◽  
Cintia Retz Lucci

With this cross-sectional study we investigated how individual differences regarding present- and future-oriented mental processes are related to the experience of time in the seconds and minutes range. A sample of students (N = 100) filled out self-report measures of time perspective (ZTPI), mindfulness (FMI), impulsiveness (BIS), and the daydreaming frequency scale (DDFS). Furthermore they were asked to (a) retrospectively judge the duration of a waiting period of five minutes, and (b) to prospectively perform an visual duration reproduction task with intervals of 3, 6, and 9 seconds. Regression models show that (a) being more present fatalistic (ZTPI) and more impulsive are related to longer duration estimates of the waiting period, and (b) having a stronger propensity to daydream leads to a stronger under-reproduction of temporal intervals. These findings show how personality traits related to present orientation are associated with the state-like perception of duration.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin C. Hayes ◽  
Katherine L Alfred ◽  
Rachel Pizzie ◽  
Joshua S. Cetron ◽  
David J. M. Kraemer

Modality specific encoding habits account for a significant portion of individual differences reflected in functional activation during cognitive processing. Yet, little is known about how these habits of thought influence long-term structural changes in the brain. Traditionally, habits of thought have been assessed using self-report questionnaires such as the visualizer-verbalizer questionnaire. Here, rather than relying on subjective reports, we measured habits of thought using a novel behavioral task assessing attentional biases toward picture and word stimuli. Hypothesizing that verbal habits of thought are reflected in the structural integrity of white matter tracts and cortical regions of interest, we used diffusion tensor imaging and volumetric analyses to assess this prediction. Using a whole-brain approach, we show that word bias is associated with increased volume in several bilateral language regions, in both white and grey matter parcels. Additionally, connectivity within white matter tracts within an a priori speech production network increased as a function of word bias. These results demonstrate long-term structural and morphological differences associated with verbal habits of thought.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Marengo ◽  
Kenneth L. Davis ◽  
Gökçe Özkarar Gradwohl ◽  
Christian Montag

AbstractThe Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales (ANPS) were constructed as a self-report assessment to measure individual differences in Jaak Panksepp’s cross-species primary emotional systems: SEEKING, PLAY, CARE (positive emotions) and FEAR, SADNESS, ANGER (negative emotions). Beginning with the first published work on the ANPS in 2003, individual differences on the ANPS measures of these six primary emotional systems have been consistently linked to Big Five personality traits. From a theoretical perspective, these primary emotional systems arising from subcortical regions, shed light on the nature of the Big Five personality traits from an evolutionary perspective, because each of these primary emotional systems represent a tool for survival endowing mammalian species with inherited behavioral programs to react appropriately to complex environments. The present work revisited 21 available samples where both ANPS and Big Five measures have been administered. Our meta-analytical analysis provides solid evidence that high SEEKING relates to high Openness to Experience, high PLAY to high Extraversion, high CARE/low ANGER to high Agreeableness and high FEAR/SADNESS/ANGER to high Neuroticism. This seems to be true regardless of the ANPS inventory chosen, although much more work is needed in this area. Associations between primary emotional systems and Conscientiousness were in the lower effect size area across all six primary emotions, thereby supporting the idea that Conscientiousness rather seems to be less directly related with the subcortical primary emotions and likely is the most cognitive/cortical personality construct out of the Big Five. In sum, the present work underlines the idea that individual differences in primary emotional systems represent evolutionarily ancient foundations of human personality, given their a) meaningful links to the prominent Big Five model and b) their origins lying in subcortical areas of the human brain.


1997 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine L. Pillitteri ◽  
Lynn T. Kozlowski ◽  
Christine T. Sweeney ◽  
Todd F. Heatherton

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document