Facing forwards, looking backwards: Coming to terms with continuing uneven development in Europe

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Hudson
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The North ◽  
Political Response ◽  
The Uk ◽  
North And South ◽  
The Eu

At a time of major changes in the geography of the global economy, and following the major financial and economic crises of 2007/2008, the European Union (EU) is marked by deepening uneven economic development, between and within the territories of its 28 (for now) member states. This is one expression of neo-liberalisation as the dominant political force in the EU, combined with deep austerity policies in response to the crises of 2007/2008. Within the Eurozone, a common currency without a common fiscal policy further intensified inequalities, especially between the economies of the north and south of the EU. These developments had profound political ramifications as the promise of increasing economic growth and material well-being has been rudely shattered for many people and unemployment, poverty and ill-being have burgeoned in many parts of the EU. The political response to this – in ways reminiscent of the 1930s – has been a resurgence of regressive virulent right-wing nationalisms, sometimes with fascistic tendencies, as people have come to see the EU, and neoliberal globalisation, as inimical to their interests. This tendency has been further intensified by inflows of migrants and refugees, many in response to neo-imperialist ventures in the Middle East. This is most starkly (so far) the case in the UK, leading to the British Exit from the European Community (BREXIT) vote to leave the EU. There are counter-tendencies, locally based political movements that espouse a more humane social democratic model of the EU, but there seems little chance of these cohering politically to challenge the dominant view.

Peripherality and Northern Ireland

1994 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 90-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg ◽  
David Mayes
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Action ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
The North ◽  
Working Age ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Uk ◽  
North Western ◽  
The Eu

In writing recently about the economic problems that Northern Ireland faces (Begg and Mayes, 1994) we argued, uncontroversially, that an end to the ‘Troubles’ would significantly alter the region's prospects. Our analysis, nevertheless, focused on other factors which might be amenable to policy action. With an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland now on the cards, these other characteristics of the Northern Ireland economy must be expected to be of increased importance in determining the Province's competitiveness compared with other parts of the UK and, indeed, other regions of the European Union. In particular, Northern Ireland is a prime example of a ‘peripheral’ economy, located as it is at the North-Western corner of the EU and facing the further barrier of a sea crossing to markets other than the Republic of Ireland. It is also a region that shares a number of the characteristics of the older industrial regions of Britain, such as high unemployment, persistent emigration of working-age population and difficulties in achieving industrial restructuring (Harris et al., 1990; Harris 1991).

scholarly journals The Impact of Hard Brexit on Polish Exports

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Jakub Borowski ◽  
Jakub Olipra ◽  
Paweł Błaszyński
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
First Year ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) is unprecedented, especially considering the recent trend in the global economy toward economic integration. There is a multitude of research concerning the implications of economic integration; however, research in the field of disintegration is scarce. Brexit serves as an interesting case study to investigate the effects of economic disintegration. The implications for trade are especially fascinating as trade liberalization is one of the most important benefits of economic integration. Existing studies focus mainly on Brexit’s impact on the UK’s exports and imports, while less attention has been paid to Brexit’s effects on the trade of other countries. The main objective of our research is to estimate Brexit’s influence on Polish exports. We present several possible scenarios of future trade relations between the UK and the EU and assume that, at least in the nearest-future post-Brexit scenario, trade under the World Trade Organization rules is most likely. This will result in the imposition of tariffs on trade between the UK and the EU members, including Poland. In our research, we used the real exchange rate of the Polish zloty against the British pound as a proxy for the changes in price competitiveness of Polish exports due to the imposition of tariffs. We find that in the first year after Brexit, the dynamics of Polish exports to the UK will decrease due to the imposition of customs duties by 1.3 percentage points (pp) and by 0.1 pp when it comes to total Polish exports. This paper contributes to the discussion on the effects of disintegration on trade. We propose a new method for assessing changes in trade volume due to increase of trade barriers.

Brexit and the Crisis of European Integration

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-125
Author(s):  
Kent Jones
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Regulatory Issues ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses the role Europe’s long history of conflict over geography, religion, and national identity, as well as its aristocratic traditions, on modern European populism. The Brexit referendum gave direct electoral voice to the accumulated resentments of populist forces in the United Kingdom against EU rules administered by what its supporters regarded as an elite bureaucracy in Brussels. Their concerns, mainly over budgetary and regulatory issues, overrode the prospect of losing trade benefits from the EU single market. Elsewhere in the European Union populist parties continue to be active, and many of them are Euroskeptic, based largely on immigration and monetary issues. Many right-wing and left-wing populist parties in particular tend to favor protectionism, but will not be in a position to challenge centralized EU trade policy until they gain power in large EU countries. The UK exit from the European Union will weaken a prominent pro-trade voice in the EU Council of Ministers.

„Lexit” – pozalaburzystowska, antyunijna lewica brytyjska w referendum 2016 roku

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-118
Author(s):  
Filip Ilkowski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Identity ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Immigration Control ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Political Milieu ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

The article presents the analysis of activities and ideological motivations of politicians and political formations connected to those parts of non-Labour British left, that appealed during the 2016 referendum to vote for leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom. It points to key ideological pillars of this heterogenic political milieu with its common and divergent elements. The thesis is put forward in the text that, as in the case of Labour politicians, also among the left-wing outside the Labour Party, we can point to two ideological and political poles that decide to opt for leaving the EU by the UK: socialist universalism and national-identity particularism. Their key determinant was the views on immigration control, also affecting their attitude to cooperation with the anti-EU right-wing political milieu.

scholarly journals Populist referendum: Was ‘Brexit’ an expression of nativist and anti-elitist sentiment?

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801877396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evgeniia Iakhnis ◽  
Brian Rathbun ◽  
Jason Reifler ◽  
Thomas J. Scotto
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Conditional Effect ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Was the outcome of the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum to leave the European Union a visible and consequential manifestation of right-wing populism? After all, skepticism in the UK towards the EU predates the recent rise of European right wing populism. Original survey data show, however, that the interaction of nativist sentiment and anti-elitist attitudes, the cocktail of right-wing populism, led to widespread support for Brexit, even while controlling for other factors. Although hostility to immigrants was an important factor, nativists were particularly prone to vote ‘leave’; if they also did not trust political elites, a crucial element of populism. Further underscoring this explanation is the conditional effect of anti-elite sentiment. The relationship between anti-elite sentiment and support for leaving the EU only exists among those with high nativist sentiment; among those low in nativist sentiment, anti-elite feelings did not increase support for Brexit.

scholarly journals UK – EU Security and Defence Cooperation after Brexit

2020 ◽  
pp. 278-300
Author(s):  
Alexander Aleshin
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Losses ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Future System ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union launched a transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security area, which led to uncertainty and the creation of political forks for key regional actors on military integration. The Euro-Atlantic security complex has moved towards bipolarity with centers in NATO and the EU, but so far this is only a trend. The consequence of Brexit is the strengthening of polycentricity in the European sub-complex of the Euro-Atlantic security area and the strengthening of the leadership of the EU, Paris and London. The future system and structure of this sub-complex largely depends on the results of negotiations between the UK and the EU both on trade and economic issues, and on cooperation in the field of security, defence and foreign policy cooperation. The economic aspects of Brexit are still not clear, the economic losses due to the coronavirus pandemic and the slowdown in the global economy are obvious, which leads to unpredictability in the formation of military and foreign policy budgets of both the UK and the EU member states. The UK intends to establish the most deep and comprehensive military-political cooperation with the EU. In the absence of institutional mechanisms for the interaction of Brussels with London on security issues, the country seeks to strengthen bilateral ties in the field of foreign policy, security and defence with EU leaders, primarily France and Germany. An important influence on the above processes have external actors, among them the United States play a paramount role. The UK is likely to seek its place between the USA and the EU, which will force London to deliberately combine multilateral and bilateral cooperation with individual countries. The security area in Europe will gain more certainty after the conclusion of a political agreement between the UK and the EU, but this will not happen until the conclusion of a trade and economic agreement.

scholarly journals Political Reactionism as Affective Practice: UKIP Supporters and Non-Voters in Pre-Brexit England

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Brent Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Collective Emotions ◽  
Political Views ◽  
Eu Referendum ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters and non-voters in England participate respectively in forms of engaged and disengaged anti-political activity, but the role of individual, group-based, and collective emotions is still unclear. Drawing upon recent analyses of the complex emotional dynamics (e.g., <em>ressentiment</em>) underpinning the growth of right-wing populist political movements and support for parties such as UKIP, this analysis explores the affective features of reactionary political stances. The framework of affective practices is used to show how resentful affects are created, facilitated, and transformed in sharing or suppressing populist political views and practices; that is, populism is evident not only in the prevalence and influence of illiberal and anti-elite discourses but also should be explored as it is embodied and enacted in “past focused” and “change resistant” everyday actions and in relation to opportunities that “sediment” affect-laden political positions and identities. Reflexive thematic analysis of data from qualitative interviews with UKIP voters and non-voters (who both supported leaving the EU) in 2015 after the UK election but before the EU referendum vote showed that many participants: 1) shared “condensed” complaints about politics and enacted resentment towards politicians who did not listen to them, 2) oriented towards shameful and purportedly shameless racism about migrants, and 3) appeared to struggle with shame and humiliation attributed to the EU in a complex combination of transvaluation of the UK and freedom of movement, a nostalgic need for restoration of national pride, and endorsement of leaving the EU as a form of “change backwards.”

UKIP supporters and non-voters in England 2015: reactionism as pre-Brexit affective practice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Brent Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Community Solidarity ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Eu

UKIP supporters and non-voters in England are often identified as groups that respectively participate in forms of engaged and disengaged “unhealthy” anti-political activity. The analysis draws upon recent complex emotion frameworks (e.g., resentment, ressentiment) that underpin the growth of right-wing political movements and parties and understand this development in terms of political reactionism rather than populism. I argue that the concept of affective practices can play a critical role in exploring how resentful affects are created, shared or suppressed and facilitated, mobilized or transformed; that is, not just through the influence and performance of anti-elite discourses but also as they are embodied and enacted in a wide range of everyday actions and opportunities to “sediment” affect-laden political positions and identities. Data from qualitative interviews with UKIP voters and in-depth discussions with non-voters in 2015 after the UK Election were examined in order to answer the following research questions taking into account the different affect-laden and focused practices that afford and shape political reactionism in these two groups: what role do contrasting experiences of shame, loss and possible ressentiment play in relation to deliberative democratic opportunities (e.g., elections versus the EU Referendum) and what forms of “change backwards” do reactionists want to enact? Reflexive thematic analysis revealed heterogeneous non-voting and UKIP supporting stances while also demonstrating how most members of both groups came to anticipate a vote to leave the EU as a chance to address an ongoing lack of political efficacy and affective dilemmas of community solidarity and nationhood.

The Law & Politics of Brexit: Volume II

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Financial Settlement ◽  
The Eu

This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the withdrawal agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the European Union to create the legal framework for Brexit. Building on a prior volume, it overviews the process of Brexit negotiations that took place between the UK and the EU from 2017 to 2019. It also examines the key provisions of the Brexit deal, including the protection of citizens’ rights, the Irish border, and the financial settlement. Moreover, the book assesses the governance provisions on transition, decision-making and adjudication, and the prospects for future EU–UK trade relations. Finally, it reflects on the longer-term challenges that the implementation of the 2016 Brexit referendum poses for the UK territorial system, for British–Irish relations, as well as for the future of the EU beyond Brexit.

The European Union as an object of insecure collective attachment: A response to ‘Brexit: Who is afraid of group attachment? Part I. Europe: What Europe?’ by Arturo Ezquerro

2021 ◽  
pp. 053331642110012
Author(s):  
Antigonos Sochos
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Attachment Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
European Population ◽  
Insecure Attachment ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Group Attachment ◽  
Asymmetrical Power ◽  
The Eu

In this commentary I argue that the European Union has been functioning as an insecure object of collective attachment for large parts of the European population for many years. According to attachment theory, in relationships of asymmetrical power insecure attachment is formed as the narrative constructed by the most powerful party overwrites the authentic experience of the weakest, generating conflicted representation of self and the attachment object. That attachment object may be interpersonal or collective. The EU narrative on how it safeguards democracy and citizen well-being contradicts the true experience of many Europeans who struggle to make ends meet in neoliberal Europe. On this basis, an insecure collective bond with the EU is established, as the latter fails to recognize and address the needs of many of its citizens.

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