Bundling Health Insurance and Microfinance in India: There Cannot be Adverse Selection if There Is No Demand
2014 ◽
Vol 104
(5)
◽
pp. 291-297
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Keyword(s):
Drop Out
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Microfinance institutions have started to bundle their basic loans with other financial services, such as health insurance. Using a randomized control trial in Karnataka, India, we evaluate the impact on loan renewal from mandating the purchase of actuarially-fair health insurance covering hospitalization and maternity expenses. Bundling loans with insurance led to a 16 percentage points (23 percent) increase in drop-out from microfinance, as many clients preferred to give up microfinance than pay higher interest rates and receive insurance. In a Pyrrhic victory, the total absence of demand for health insurance led to there being no adverse selection in insurance enrollment.
2017 ◽
Vol 6
(3)
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pp. 365
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
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2020 ◽
Vol 80
(5)
◽
pp. 665-692
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2014 ◽
Vol 60
(No. 4)
◽
pp. 159-173
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Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 14
(3)
◽
pp. 82-92
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Keyword(s):