scholarly journals Narratiivsuse roll Hegeli filosoofilises süsteemis: üks täiendus "dialektilise" meetodi mittemetafüüsilise tõlgendamise juurde

2010 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tõnu Viik
Keyword(s):  
Deductive System ◽  
The Body ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
End Points ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Dialectical Method ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Absolute Knowledge

Artikkel lähtub Hegeli filosoofilise süsteemi mittemetafüüsilisest tõlgendusest ja keskendub ühele aspektile Hegeli dialektilise meetodi juures, mille iseloomustamiseks oleks autori arvates kõige adekvaatsem kasutada narratiivi mõistet. Artikli tees on kokkuvõtlikult järgmine: Hegeli arvates ei ole filosoofiline tõde väljendatav ühe lause või propositsiooniga, vaid (1) see nõuab tervet väidete jada, kusjuures (2) mõistete määratlused selles väidete jadas peavad suutma teiseneda --- nii nagu kirjandusliku jutustuse käigus võivad teiseneda tegelaste iseloom ja arusaamine asjadest (eriti ilmne on see Bildungsroman'ile omase narratiivi puhul). Lisaks neile kahele omadusele on narratiivile iseloomulik talle omaste struktuurielementide (algus, keskpaik ja lõpp) abil loodud (3) terviklikkus, mis võimaldab tal anda edasi sellist mõtet, mis ei sisaldu üheski narratiivi moodustavas lauses üksikult võetuna.  Need kolm omadust võimaldavad Hegeli "dialektilisele" meetodile narratiiviteooria vahenditega uut valgust heita ja spekulatiivse tõe loomust paremini mõista.The paper discusses the nature of Hegel's dialectical method and criticizes its wide-spread interpretation according to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula.  It is argued that there is no evidence of triadic structures in Hegel's works.  Rather, the elements (usually defined as "moments", "formations" (Gestalten) or "determinations" (Bestimmungen)) that make up the body of Hegel's texts, are organized as "series" (Reihen) that form circles, in which, as Hegel maintains, the last element leads us back to the first.  If synthesis means creating something new by using the initial elements then it is problematic whether anything becomes synthesized in Hegel texts.  The paper argues against interpreting the every third element of the series (the moment of Becoming being the most obvious candidate in the Science of Logic) or the end-points of the series (such as the final moment of absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit) as synthetic unities.  Instead, the paper proposes that Hegel's speculative method uses the form of narrative for creating a vessel that is able to express the "speculative truth" which is "fluid" (flüssig) and which requires a "plastic" (plastische) form of presentation.  Narrative can accomplish what a singular proposition and a deductive system cannot, because (1) it consists of a series of claims (2) that is able to express the movement of what is said in each claim, and (3) because its ending creates a point at which the story as a whole obtains a meaning that is not expressed in any particular sentence constituting the story.

Absolute Knowledge and the Ethical Conclusion of the Phenomenology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Absolute Knowledge

Hegel wrote in The Science of Logic that the deduction of the concept of science was accomplished at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit in ‘Absolute Knowledge.’ This chapter links the deduction claim to the metaphor of a ladder to science that Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology Preface, and to the sublation of the form of objectivity that is the focus of ‘Absolute Knowledge.’ It argues that this reconciliation of self-consciousness with objectivity coincides with the task of unifying the theoretical and practical domains. Once one appreciates that Hegel’s goal is such a unification, one can see why he holds that the agent of conscience is already quite close to possessing absolute knowledge. The agent’s knowledge in deliberation, together with the agent’s relation to other agents in the process of recognizing action on conscience, has the same conceptual form as the complete theoretical object, the expanded version of the Concept, or inferential objectivity.

scholarly journals O diálogo de Hegel com as ciências modernas na lógica da essência a partir do aparecimento

2021 ◽  
pp. 4-28
Author(s):  
Agemir Bavaresco Bavaresco ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Logical Space ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Dialectical Method ◽  
New Meanings ◽  
Dialectical Tension ◽  
Sense Of Time ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Specific Sense

Hegel's Science of Logic concludes with the “absolute idea”. The end meets the beginning, at the same time, as a retrospective of logical foundation and perspective of opening to spatiotemporal and historical exteriority. The problem is how this process is made explicit through the dialectical method, that is, articulated by the contradiction between idealism and realism, in a categorical network of logical space and time that imply a reason that is justified as true insofar as the idea becomes effective in history. The research addresses critical points in the structure of the dialectical method and its relationship with the absolute idea; contextualizes the historical debate of Hegelian idealism and realism; explains the essential role of the moment of contradiction that moves the logical-historical process; thematizes the specific sense of time and logical space, and finally, describes the dialectical tension between reason and effectiveness and its modern and contemporary historical implications. The absolute idea is the leitmotiv that contains in itself the form and the content of the logical whole as a whole in motion always open to constitute new meanings and produce new figurations of meaning for the circles of the logical idea.

Commentary on a Passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Wahl
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Dialectical Method ◽  
The Third ◽  
French Study

In this, the third chapter from the work that began the twentieth-century Hegel renaissance in France, Wahl’s 1929 Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, he relates the chapter on “the Unhappy Consciousness” to earlier and later chapters of the Phenomenology (“Master and Slave,” “Stoicism and Scepticism,” “Culture,” “Revealed Religion,” “Absolute Knowing”) as well as Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history. Wahl’s was the first major French study of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), marking a turn away from Hegel’s Science of Logic to the affective and experiential basis of Hegel’s dialectical method.

Sergey Rubinstein on Hegel’s Method of Thinking: a Neo-Kantian Criticism

2021 ◽  
pp. 90-102
Author(s):  
Nina A. Dmitrieva ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Open System ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Transcendental Logic ◽  
Methodological Rule ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Absolute Knowledge

In this research I focuse on Sergey L. Rubinstein’s German dissertation “A Study on the Problem of Method” (1913–1914), which aimed at solving the problem of method in transcendental philosophy as distinguished from Hegel’s philosophy and dualistic philosophical systems. After a brief description of the context in which this problem emerged in the 1910s, I reconstruct its general original in­tent from the archive copy of the dissertation. Further I show that the published part of Rubinstein’s study was the first serious attempt to explain the difference between the transcendental logic of Cohen and Natorp and what the Neo-Kan­tians called Hegel’s “absolute rationalism”. This issue has become one of the most difficult questions in the philosophical self-reflection of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. I reveal that in his critique of Hegel Rubinstein is based on the Co­hen’s thesis on the immanence of thinking and being, which means that all being in sense of its substantive determination is a function of thinking. In Hegel’s “Science of Logic” Rubinstein finds a violation of this principle, namely dualis­tic features expressed in the independence of being and thinking. From Rubin­stein’s further reflections it becomes clear that his critical thesis against Hegel about the transcendence of being in relation to all other logical definitions is ori­ented on Cohen’s conception of the last ground and his own project of an open system of categories. However, Rubinstein has overlooked that the epistemologi­cal differences between the concept and the object of the concept, thinking and being, are overcome on the last pages of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” by the concept of absolute knowledge, and “The Science of Logic” is a theory of pure thinking which seeks to justify the substantivity of thinking on the basis of a methodological rule, by means of which both the difference of being and think­ing, and their unity with the concept of pure thinking are revealed simultaneously.

Differenzierungen im Begriff, Gegenwart‘ bei Husserl und Merleau-Ponty

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Jörg Zimmer
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
Fundamental Concept ◽  
Phenomenological Description ◽  
Philosophy Of Time ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Empty Time

In classical philosophy of time, present time mainly has been considered in its fleetingness: it is transition, in the Platonic meaning of the sudden or in the Aristotelian sense of discreet moment and isolated intensity that escapes possible perception. Through the idea of subjective constitution of time, Husserl’s phenomenology tries to spread the moment. He transcends the idea of linear and empty time in modern philosophy. Phenomenological description of time experience analyses the filled character of the moment that can be detained in the performance of consciousness. As a consequence of the temporality of consciousness, he nevertheless remains in the temporal conception of presence. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, however, is able to grasp the spacial meaning of presence. In his perspective of a phenomenology of perception, presence can be understood as a space surrounding the body, as a field of present things given in perception. Merleau-Ponty recovers the ancient sense of ‘praesentia’ as a fundamental concept of being in the world.

‘You be my body for me’

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Kellogg
Keyword(s):  
Settler Colonialism ◽  
Forced Migration ◽  
Judith Butler ◽  
The Body ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Politics Of Recognition ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Property Relations ◽  
History Of ◽  
Current Shift

Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou’s recent exchange, ‘You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape and Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, is remarkable because in their rereading of Hegel’s famous lord and bondsman parable, rather than focusing on recognition, work, or even desire, Butler and Malabou each wonder about how Hegel contributes to a new way of thinking about ‘having’ a body and how coming to ‘be’ a body necessarily involves a kind of dispossession. Butler and Malabou’s reading of Hegel is congruent with a current shift on the left away from a liberal politics of recognition to a (post-)Marxist analytic of dispossession: a move, in other words, away from liberal ‘solutions’ of redistribution – of either goods or recognition – towards thinking through issues of settler colonialism, forced migration and empire. Butler and Malabou’s piece points towards the insight that Hegel’s parable must be thought in terms of the political history of possessive individualism, and so in terms of the history of juridically defined property relations; the history of regarding both the body and the land as property. The ‘two valences’ of dispossession, in other words, refers in fact to a logic of property relations, one between those who ‘have’ property (either land or the property of their own bodies) and those who are juridically defined as propertyless.

scholarly journals Spinning rough disc moving in a rarefied medium

2010 ◽  
Vol 466 (2119) ◽  
pp. 2033-2055 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Plakhov ◽  
Tatiana Tchemisova ◽  
Paulo Gouveia
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Zero Temperature ◽  
Optimal Mass Transport ◽  
Dense Gases ◽  
Magnus Effect ◽  
Inverse Effect ◽  
Transversal Force ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Complementary Mechanism

We study the Magnus effect: deflection of the trajectory of a spinning body moving in a gas. It is well known that in rarefied gases, the inverse Magnus effect takes place, which means that the transversal component of the force acting on the body has opposite signs in sparse and relatively dense gases. The existing works derive the inverse effect from non-elastic interaction of gas particles with the body. We propose another (complementary) mechanism of creating the transversal force owing to multiple collisions of particles in cavities of the body surface. We limit ourselves to the two-dimensional case of a rough disc moving through a zero-temperature medium on the plane, where reflections of the particles from the body are elastic and mutual interaction of the particles is neglected. We represent the force acting on the disc and the moment of this force as functionals depending on ‘shape of the roughness’, and determine the set of all admissible forces. The disc trajectory is determined for several simple cases. The study is made by means of billiard theory, Monge–Kantorovich optimal mass transport and by numerical methods.

Calling Time Out in Doha: The Seiko Block Camera and Image Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 019685992110408
Author(s):  
David Staton
Keyword(s):  
International Association ◽  
Ethics Of Care ◽  
The Body ◽  
Camera Angle ◽  
Time Out ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
The Moment

In an effort to put more eyeballs on television sets, and in an attempt to reinvigorate a sport long beleaguered by doping scandals, recent questions surrounding female sponsorships, and a vanishing audience, the International Association of Athletic Federations unveiled a new camera designed by Seiko during the September 2019 World Championships held in Doha, Quatar. The idea was to add to an immersive experience, offering unparalleled views of sprinters at the moment they exploded from the starting blocks. Like many things during the Doha meet, the effort became an ending to a bad joke. Rather than getting to the heart of the event, the camera’s focus was a bit lower; the Seiko angle became known derisively as the crotch shot. After objections by two female German sprinters the positioning of the camera angle (specifically what would be shown when) was reconsidered, reframed, and essentially retired. Control of the body, including how it is observed, and the closely related idea of the control of one’s image are bound by certain ethical dimensions, particularly when that control is violated or profited from by outside parties. This paper interrogates how those concerns may be ameliorated by embracing an ethics of care.

scholarly journals Reflexive Dressing: Rethinking Retro

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stella North
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Past ◽  
Present Experience ◽  
The Moment

This article undertakes a philosophical exploration of the act we know, or think we know, as ‘dressing’. Inhabiting, in thought, the moment in which we dress, I examine some of its constituent mechanisms, attending to the impulses by which dressing is generated out of subjective experience.  When those impulses are temporally marked, as they are in the case of retro dress, this generation is a two-pronged process, in which the holding of the body in time, and the holding of time in the body, recalibrate one another. The process of ‘dressing,’ in this understanding, has a reflexivity which is double; it entails the turning of the body, with dress as medium, towards itself, and the turning of present experience towards some felt notion of the past. Reflexively dressing, we are always becoming ourselves, and becoming other than ourselves, at once; a movement of circuitous internalisation and externalisation by which the ambiguation inherent in material experience is realised.  

scholarly journals Analytical and Experimental Analysis of a Free Link in Contact with a Granular Medium

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan B. Marghitu ◽  
Seung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Granular Medium ◽  
Stopping Time ◽  
The Body ◽  
Resistance Force ◽  
Time Interval ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Static Resistance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Resistance Forces ◽  
Empirical Approaches

In this study, the experimental and the simulation results for a planar free link impacting a granular medium are analyzed. The resistance force of the granular medium on the body from the moment of the impact until the body stops is very important. Horizontal and vertical static resistance forces developed by theoretical and empirical approaches are considered. The penetrating depth of the impacting end of the free link increases with the increase of the initial impacting velocity. We define the stopping time as the time interval from the moment of impact until the vertical velocity of the link end is zero. The stopping time of the end decreases as the initial velocity increases. The faster the end of the link impacts the surface of the granular medium, the sooner it will come to a stop. This phenomenon involves how rapidly a free link strikes the granular medium and how it slows down upon contact.

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