scholarly journals L’art, entre jouissance et utopie selon Emmanuel Levinas

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141
Author(s):  
Rodolphe Olcèse

This text aims to show how, in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, the moment of jouissance is constitutive of the selfhood of the ego and conditions the very possibility of a sensitivity to the other man, and so the possibility of the ethical relation itself. These considerations on the enjoyment invited us to think artistic creation and poetry as a way to respond to anesthesia of our sensibility through knowledge, which is a characteristic of western thought for Emmanuel Levinas.

Author(s):  
Meir Sendor

This chapter analyses the common and unfortunate trend in interfaith dialogue of ‘neutralizing’ the Other. In an attempt to find commonality, neutralization introduces syncretism and relativism into interfaith discourse. Worse still, it does violence to the unique character of each religion and its practitioners who participate in the dialogue. According to Emmanuel Levinas, to proceed in this way is to doom the possibility of real relationship from the start and to fall prey to the most insidious and destructive habit of Western thought: the deception of the Neutral that derives from the tyranny of the Same. Meanwhile, Jacques Derrida repeatedly explored the nature of hospitality at length, employing it as a paradigm for the dynamics of interfaith relations. Finally, Paul Ricoeur's notion of the conscience, of the reciprocity of Otherness, of the response within responsibility, contributes an essential element to the groundwork for an authentic relationship outlined by Levinas and Derrida.


PhaenEx ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 76-99
Author(s):  
KATHY J. KILOH

Emmanuel Levinas’ early essay “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” provides us with a clear description what Levinas’ conception of subjectivity as a lived, bodily experience rejects: “the European notion of man” (7). This paper traces the argument Levinas presents in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” providing links between this early essay and Levinas’ later, major works: Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The political interrogation of liberalism at the heart of Levinas’ depiction of the subject as creaturely and his discussion of subjectivity as substitution is revealed by orienting the later works towards “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” Levinas’ description of the ethical relation between myself and all the others locates both my freedom and my responsibility to the other in the inseparable unity of body and spirit. As creatures, and as subjects in substitution, we experience our own freedom as dependent upon our responsibility for the others; unlike the subject of liberalism, the Levinasian subject cannot conform to the racist ideology promoted by the philosophy of Hiterlism without renouncing its own freedom.


Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Belov ◽  

The article presents an attempt by one of the most interesting modern thinkers, the Austrian scientist Gerhard Oberhammer, to substantiate the possibility of a transcendental experience of meeting with God and the philosophical-hermeneutic objectification of this experience. Based on the traditions of Kant’s transcendental philosophy and its hermeneutical interpretation by Karl-Otto Apel, Oberhammer also draws on the productive intentions of Karl Jaspers’ con­cept of the “ciphers of the transcendent”, experience as a person’s being captured by Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas’ hypostase. The article deals with a heuristic interpretation of these concepts for Oberhammer’s explanation of the possibility of a transcendent experience as an experience of an absolute meeting of man with God. According to the Austrian philosopher and Indologist, the place of transcendent experience is the inner world of the subject, which is characterized by two main properties: depth and openness. The latter allows us to hope for the possibility of meeting with the other, but again, not outside the subject, but inside it, realizing the hidden structures of the inner world, as a world correlated with what is outside it. That is, according to Gerhard Ober­hammer, the transcendent experience of the subject can be comprehended in its two interdependent moments related to the subject’s situation, namely, the mo­ment of its self-explanation and the moment of its correlation. The Austrian philosopher represents the religious subject as being in a constant self-overcom­ing of its limited isolation and finding its true essence, which implicitly contains both its depth and its correlation with the other, as its ability to accept this other into itself. The article substantiates the idea that the Austrian scientist builds his concept of religious and philosophical hermeneutics with a firm belief in its pro­ductivity and the possibility of using it for the analysis of any religion, since he focuses on universal transformations and events that occur in the life of a be­liever, regardless of the religious tradition to which he belongs.


Phainomenon ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 18-19 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Michael Marder

Abstract In his rather fragmentary theory of attention, Emmanuel Levinas draws inspiration from phenomenology, while endeavoring to furnish it with an ethical foundation. On ·the one hand, he assigns to attention a crucial role coextensive with intentionality (the idea that, in each case, consciousness is consdous of, or directed toward, something). On the other hand, he mobilizes the methodology of reduction for the purpose of uncovering an ethical substratum of experience in the relation to the Other, which is deeper still than the life of consciousness it animates. Husserlian reduction is not radical enough for Levinas’s philosophical taste, since it fails to recognize. that this life comes into being thanks to the appeal emanating from the Other, whose calling out to me forces me to pay attention, even when it seems that I am attending only to inanimate things. The ethical relation to the Other lies not only at the bottom of all social and political structures, but also at the source of consciousness and of its attentive directedness to that of which it is conscious. Before I am able to intend or to attend to anything whatsoever, I am targeted by the Other, who reverses the movement of intentionality and, at once, breaches and founds my psychic interiority.


Hypatia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-58
Author(s):  
Valerie Giovanini

This article is meant to stage an encounter, a kind of rendezvous, between Emmanuel Levinas and Simone de Beauvoir regarding how alterity seems to enable an ethical relation for Levinas while closing one for Beauvoir. I will argue that Beauvoir's reading of Levinas on “the other” is not a charitable one, and the ethical ambivalence in Levinas's notion of alterity can motivate the praxis Beauvoir seeks for undoing social forms of oppression. I will start with Beauvoir's interpretation of alterity as “feminine otherness” in Levinas's ethics that, for her, originates in the violent perspective of male privilege. Then I will move to Levinas's response to this critique in a set of interviews with Philip Nemo, and to consideration of how a more charitable reading of alterity, understood as a sort of ambivalence in the structure of subjectivity, creates a close proximity between Levinas's and Beauvoir's ethics of action. I contend that both Beauvoir and Levinas respectively developed their ethics of action, either of ambiguity or of ambivalent alterity, in order to free thought from the absolute seriousness with which normative standards are held.


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mintautas Gutauskas

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas dialogo problemos apmąstymo procesas E. Levino filosofijoje. Rekonstruojama dialogo samprata, susiformavusi Vakarų tradicijoje, kuri dialogą tapatina su komunikacija ir yra grindžiama dalykine etika. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama fenomenologijos kritikai, labiausiai išryškinančiai Levino nuostatas. Levino pozicija pirmiausia nagrinėjama kaip opozicija fenomenologijai, pabrėžianti santykio ir sakymo momentus, kurie yra „anapus patirties“ ir remiasi „sužlugusiu intencionalumu“. Tiriama, kokiu būdu E. Husserlio fenomenologijoje keliamas klausimas apie kitą ir kaip Husserlio įžvalgomis grindžiamas trinaris dialogo modelis: aš, kitas ir dalykas bendro pasaulio kontekste. Nagrinėjama, kaip tokia dialogo struktūra veikia dalykinę etiką, realizuojamą sokratiškame dialoge, aptartame H.-G. Gadamerio darbuose. Levino žingsnis fiksuojamas kaip perėjimas nuo komunikacijos –susikalbėjimo prie etinio santykio. Nagrinėjama, kaip tokį perėjimą sąlygoja atpažįstama prievarta, užslėpta pažintiniame-dalykiniame dialoge. Levino išryškinta sakymo plotmė trakuojama kaip dialogas prieš dialogą, t. y. kaip sluoksnis, liekantis neapčiuoptas, kol dialogo problema sprendžiama tik perduodamos reikšmės lygmenyje. Sakymo plotmė traktuojama kaip artimo artumas, leidžiantis perduoti reikšmę. Pabaigoje keliamas klausimas, kaip sakymo matmens išryškinimas gali būti vėl integruotas į dialogo aprašymą. Daroma išvada, kad Levino kritikuojama patirties samprata paties Levino dėka prasiplečia, dialogo aprašymas įtraukia ir patirties lūžius, o kartu pats dialogo esmės klausimas išsiskaido į dialogų daugybės klausimą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Levinas, dialogas, komunikacija, intencionalumas, patirtis.Dialog Prior to Dialog in Levinas’ Thought Beyond Experience Mintautas Gutauskas SummaryThe article deals with Levinas’ approach to the problem of the dialogue. The conception of the dialogue, which has been formed in the Western tradition of thought, identifies the dialogue with communication and is grounded in the ethics of the “things themselves” is analysed in the context of Levinas’ criticism of the Western thought. The author focuses on the criticism of phenomenology which highlights Levinas’ position. His position is analysed first of all as an opposition to phenomenology. Levinas emphasizes the moments of relation and saying that are “beyond experience” and are grounded in the “blasted intentionality”. The way the question about the other raised in Husserl’s phenomenology and also the trinomial structure of the dialogue (I, other and the thing in the context of the common world) realized in the early works of M. Theunissen and B. Waldenfels are questioned. The article investigates how this structure of the dialogue influences the ethics of Socratic communication about the “things themselves”, which has been explicated in the works of H. G. Gadamer. Levinas’ motion is understood as a shift from the concept of the dialogue as communication to the ethical relation. Author analyses how this shift is determined by violence recognized as hidden under such dialogue as cognitive communication. The dimension of saying, emphasized by Levinas, is treated as a dialogue prior to the dialogue, i.e. as the dimension of the dialogue which is left out by the theories that treat dialogue as sheer communication. The dimension of saying is approached as the proximity of the near, which enables the meaning in communication. In the end, the question is raised how this dimension of saying can be reinterpreted in the description of the dialogue. The conclusion is that Levinas’ criticism of the conception of experience expands this conception; the description of the dialogue includes the ruptures of experience, and at the same time the questionabout the essence of the dialogue dissolves into the question about the multiplicity of the dialogue. Keywords: Levinas, dialogue, communication, intentionality, experience.ight: 18px;"> 


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audronė Žukauskaitė

Straipsnyje analizuojama Jeano Luco Nancy knygoje Corpus suformuluota kūno samprata, nurodoma jos priklausomybė nuo fenomenologinės Emmanuelio Levino ir Maurice’o Merleau-Ponty tradicijos. Straipsnyje taip pat siekiama atskleisti Nancy kūno sampratos radikalumą, jos artimumą tiek Jacques’o Derrida įteisintoms rašymo, paskirstymo erdvėje temoms, tiek Gilles’o Deleuze’o ir Felixo Guattari sukurtai materialistinei kūno koncepcijai. Nancy kūną siekia išlaisvinti nuo reikšmės ir bet kokio organizavimo principo. Tačiau norėdamas paaiškinti, kaip kūnai egzistuoja, jis priverstas išrasti naujas sąvokas: išstatymas, kūnų paskirstymas erdvėje, areališkumas, technē, kūrimas be kūrėjo. Būtent pastaroji sąvoka leidžia Nancy projektą vadinti „krikščionybės dekonstrukcija“; kita vertus, ši sąvoka savotiškai kompromituoja Nancy teorijos radikalumą, atskleisdama bet kurios kūno filosofijos priklausomybę nuo krikščioniškosios tradicijos. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: fenomenologinis suvokimas, prisilietimas, kūnas, technē, krikščionybės dekonstrukcija.Body and Signification in J.-L. Nancy’s CorpusAudronė Žukauskaitė SummaryThe author explores the notion of the body in Jean-Luc Nancy’s Corpus. On the one hand, she shows how Nancy’s project still depends on the phenomenological tradition of Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, she seeks to demonstrate the radical character of this notion and its similarity to Jacques Derrida’s concept of writing and spacing as well as to the materialistic concept of the body elaborated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This similarity is based on the assumption that the body could be thought of and described as beyond any meaningful principle of organization. In order to explain how such bodies exist, Nancy is forced to invent new concepts such as spacing out, expeausition, areality, technē, creation without creator. It is exactly the latter concept that enables Derrida to describe Nancy’s project as “deconstruction of Christianity”. This concept also indicates a compromise in Nancy’s radical thinking, revealing that any “philosophy of the body” in Western thought still belongs to the tradition of Christianity.Keywords: phenomenological perception, touching, the body, technē, deconstruction of Christianity.;"> 


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

Straipsnyje svarstoma Emmanuelio Levino mąstymo įrašymo į nihilizmo kontekstą galimybė. Levinas priklauso tai epochai, kuri, žvelgiant iš vakarietiškos perspektyvos, gali būti įvardyta nihilistine „par excellence“. Tad koks yra Levino mąstymo santykis su nihilizmu? Ar didysis Levino iššūkis Vakarų filosofijai nėra iššūkis prieš jos nihilizmą? Levinui, kaip ir Heideggeriui, nihilizmas yra „įvykis“, paliečiantis ne tik tam tikros epochos dvasią –moralę, religiją, politiką ir t. t., bet ir priskirtinas pačiam mąstymui kaip būties mąstymui. Tad nihilizmo „topos“ Levinui yra ta pati jau Vakarų mąstymo identifikuota dvasios ir būties „sfera“. Bet ar galima sakyti, kad Levino požiūris į nihilizmo fenomeną yra sutampantis su pačios Vakarų filosofijos nihilizmo savimone? Nors Vakarų filosofijoje įmanu įžvelgti ne vieną nihilizmo modelį, Vakarų mąstymui, pačiai jo tapatybei bei jos savivokai ypač svarbus yra nihilizmas, suprantamas kaip Überwindung (peržengimo, įveikos) teorija. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kad Levino filosofija reikalauja ne įveikti nihilizmą, o „pabėgti“ iš paties tokia „logika“ grindžiamo mąstymo. Mąstymas, kurį „grindžia“ nihilizmo „logika“, yra totalizuojantis būties mąstymas. Tad Levinui pabėgimas reiškia „pabėgimą“ „iš smaugiančios būties kilpos“, būties plotmės „apleidimą“. Ar Levinui pavyksta įvykdyti tai, ko nėra pavykę visai Vakarų metafizikai – atlikti (nihilizmo) įveikos, peržengimo judesį? Levinas vartoja tas pačias Vakarų metafizikos nihilistinę patirtį įprasminančias meta-fizikos, transcendento sąvokas, bet nukreipia jas prieš pačią nihilistinę Vakarų mąstymo „logiką“. Totalybės nuotrūkis (suardymas) Levinui įvyksta ne grynojo mąstymo plotmėje. Prasmė nėra „atgaunama“ kaip tai, ką Vakarų ontologijos nihilistinė „savimonė“ laikė esant prarasta. Ji aptinkama kitaip nei būtis – kaip Kitas. Tad leviniškasis Kito kaip kito mąstymas nėra įvykęs nihilizmo Überwindung: tai mąstymas, kuris steigiasi kaip pabėgimas iš paties tokio Vienio nostalgijos valdomo reikalavimo. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: nihilizmas, Būtis, Vakarų mąstymas, Überwindung, différance.Nihilism and the Problem of Sense: E. LevinasRita Šerpytytė SummaryIn the article, attempt is made to reveal the relation between Emmanuel Levinas’ thinking and nihilism. Levinas belongs to the epoch, which, from the Western perspective, can be called nihilistic par excellence. What is the relation of Levinas’ thought to nihilism then? Can the great challenge of Levinas to Western philosophy be interpreted as a challenge to (its) nihilism? Levinas, like Heidegger, does not regard nihilism as an “event” that concerns just the spirit – morality, religion, politics and so on – of a certain epoch, but assigns it to the thought itself as the thought of Being. Thus the topos of nihilism for Levinas is the very same “sphere” of spirit and Being identified already by the Western thought. Is it possible, however, to say that Levinas’ attitude to the phenomenon of nihilism coincides with the actual self-consciousness of nihilism in Western philosophy? Although in Western philosophy we may notice different models of nihilism, the understanding of nihilism as the theory of Überwindung (transgression, overcoming) is highly important for the Western thought, its identity, and its self-consciousness.In Levinas’ point of view, the Western thought, based on the nihilistic “logic”, by itself is the thinking from the perspective of totality. The requirement of overcoming nihilism is based on the nihilistic “logic” as well. Levinas’ philosophy requires not the overcoming of nihilism, but “escaping” from one’s own thinking based on such logic. Thinking “based on” the “logic” of nihilism is the totalizing thinking of Being. Therefore, escaping for Levinas means the “escaping” from the “strangling noose of Being” and the “desolation” of the level of Being. Does Levinas succeed in accomplishing what Western metaphysics has never accomplished, i.e. in performing the movement of overcoming and transgression of nihilism? Levinas applies the same conceptions of metaphysics and trans-cendent that gives sense to the nihilistic experience of Western metaphysics, although he maintains them against the nihilistic “logic” of Western thinking itself. The break (demolition) of totality appears for Levinas not in the plane of pure thinking. The meaning cannot be “regained” as something that, according to nihilistic “self-consciousness” of Western ontology, was lost. Otherwise than Being, it can be detected as the Other. Therefore Levinasian thinking of the Other as other is not the accomplishment of nihilistic Überwindung: it is a thinking that establishes itself as escaping from the requirement controlled by the nostalgia of the same One. Keywords: nihilism, Being, Western thought, Überwindung, différance.


2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teodor Negru

The debate surrounding the way in which Heidegger and Blumenberg understand the modern age is an opportunity to discuss two different approaches to history. On one hand, from Heidegger's perspective, history should be understood as starting from how Western thought related to Being, which, in metaphysical thinking, took the form of the forgetfulness of Being. Thus, the modern age represents the last stage in the process of forgetfulness of Being, which announces the moment of the rethinking of the relationship with Being by appealing to the authentic disclosure of Being. On the other hand, Blumenberg understands history as the result of the reoccupation process, which means replacing old theories with other new ones. Thus, to the historical approach it is not important to identify epochs as periods of time between two events, but to think about the discontinuities occurring throughout history. Starting from here, the modern age will be thought of not as an expression of the radicalization of the forgetfulness of Being, but as a response to the crises of medieval conceptions. For the same reason, the interpretation of history as a history of the forgetfulness of Being is considered by Blumenberg to subordinate history to an absolute principle, without taking into account its protagonists' needs and necessities.


Author(s):  
Antonio Gallardo Cervantes

RESUMENLos intentos de la antropología moderna que se empeñan en comprender el misterio del hombre a partir del yo solutario y orientado hacia el conocimiento del mundo acaban consiguientemente con la pérdida misma del hombre. El ser del hombre se manifiesta inaferrable e inexistente desde el momento en que se intenta captarlo en su forma pura, separada y aislada de la comunión con el otro. Emmanuel Lévinas hará una crítica radical a la orientación de esta antropología egológica.PALABRAS CLAVELÉVINAS-MODERNIDAD-ANTROPOLOGÍA-ALTERIDADABSTRACTThe intents of the modern anthropology that are impelled in understanding the mystery of the man from me solitary and oriented toward the knowledge of the world finish consequently with the same loss of the man. To be of the man is declared impossible to take and nonexistent since the moment in which tries to grasp it in their pure form, separated and remote of the communion with the other. Emmanuel Lévinas will do a critical radical to the orientation of this anthropology egocentric.KEYWORDSLÉVINAS-MODERNITY-ANTHOROPOLOGY-OTHERNESS 


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