scholarly journals DIALOGAS PRIEŠ DIALOGĄ E. LEVINO MĄSTYME „ANAPUS PATIRTIES“

Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mintautas Gutauskas
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Western Tradition ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Common World ◽  
The Way

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas dialogo problemos apmąstymo procesas E. Levino filosofijoje. Rekonstruojama dialogo samprata, susiformavusi Vakarų tradicijoje, kuri dialogą tapatina su komunikacija ir yra grindžiama dalykine etika. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama fenomenologijos kritikai, labiausiai išryškinančiai Levino nuostatas. Levino pozicija pirmiausia nagrinėjama kaip opozicija fenomenologijai, pabrėžianti santykio ir sakymo momentus, kurie yra „anapus patirties“ ir remiasi „sužlugusiu intencionalumu“. Tiriama, kokiu būdu E. Husserlio fenomenologijoje keliamas klausimas apie kitą ir kaip Husserlio įžvalgomis grindžiamas trinaris dialogo modelis: aš, kitas ir dalykas bendro pasaulio kontekste. Nagrinėjama, kaip tokia dialogo struktūra veikia dalykinę etiką, realizuojamą sokratiškame dialoge, aptartame H.-G. Gadamerio darbuose. Levino žingsnis fiksuojamas kaip perėjimas nuo komunikacijos –susikalbėjimo prie etinio santykio. Nagrinėjama, kaip tokį perėjimą sąlygoja atpažįstama prievarta, užslėpta pažintiniame-dalykiniame dialoge. Levino išryškinta sakymo plotmė trakuojama kaip dialogas prieš dialogą, t. y. kaip sluoksnis, liekantis neapčiuoptas, kol dialogo problema sprendžiama tik perduodamos reikšmės lygmenyje. Sakymo plotmė traktuojama kaip artimo artumas, leidžiantis perduoti reikšmę. Pabaigoje keliamas klausimas, kaip sakymo matmens išryškinimas gali būti vėl integruotas į dialogo aprašymą. Daroma išvada, kad Levino kritikuojama patirties samprata paties Levino dėka prasiplečia, dialogo aprašymas įtraukia ir patirties lūžius, o kartu pats dialogo esmės klausimas išsiskaido į dialogų daugybės klausimą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Levinas, dialogas, komunikacija, intencionalumas, patirtis.Dialog Prior to Dialog in Levinas’ Thought Beyond Experience Mintautas Gutauskas SummaryThe article deals with Levinas’ approach to the problem of the dialogue. The conception of the dialogue, which has been formed in the Western tradition of thought, identifies the dialogue with communication and is grounded in the ethics of the “things themselves” is analysed in the context of Levinas’ criticism of the Western thought. The author focuses on the criticism of phenomenology which highlights Levinas’ position. His position is analysed first of all as an opposition to phenomenology. Levinas emphasizes the moments of relation and saying that are “beyond experience” and are grounded in the “blasted intentionality”. The way the question about the other raised in Husserl’s phenomenology and also the trinomial structure of the dialogue (I, other and the thing in the context of the common world) realized in the early works of M. Theunissen and B. Waldenfels are questioned. The article investigates how this structure of the dialogue influences the ethics of Socratic communication about the “things themselves”, which has been explicated in the works of H. G. Gadamer. Levinas’ motion is understood as a shift from the concept of the dialogue as communication to the ethical relation. Author analyses how this shift is determined by violence recognized as hidden under such dialogue as cognitive communication. The dimension of saying, emphasized by Levinas, is treated as a dialogue prior to the dialogue, i.e. as the dimension of the dialogue which is left out by the theories that treat dialogue as sheer communication. The dimension of saying is approached as the proximity of the near, which enables the meaning in communication. In the end, the question is raised how this dimension of saying can be reinterpreted in the description of the dialogue. The conclusion is that Levinas’ criticism of the conception of experience expands this conception; the description of the dialogue includes the ruptures of experience, and at the same time the questionabout the essence of the dialogue dissolves into the question about the multiplicity of the dialogue. Keywords: Levinas, dialogue, communication, intentionality, experience.ight: 18px;"> 

Voices of Spectators and Audience Power

Pólemos ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Biet
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationship ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Period ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dramatic Action ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Voice ◽  
The Way

AbstractTheatre and law are not so different. Generally, researchers work on the art of theatre, the rhetoric of the actors, or the dramaturgy built from law cases or from the questions that the law does not completely resolve. Trials, tragedies, even comedies are close: everybody can see the interpenetration of them on stage and in the courts. We know that, and we know that the dramas are made with/from/of law, we know that the art the actors are developing is not so far from the art of the lawyers, and conversely. In this paper, I would like to have a look at the action of the audience, at the session itself and at the way the spectators are here to evaluate and judge not only the dramatic action, not only the art of the actors, not only the text of the author, but also the other spectators, and themselves too. In particular, I will focus on the “common judgment” of the audience and on its judicial, aesthetic and social relationship. The spectators have been undisciplined, noisy, unruled, during such a long period that theatre still retains some prints of this behaviour, even if nowadays, the social and aesthetic rule is to be silent. But uncertainty, inattention, distraction, contradiction, heterogeneity are the notions which characterise the session, and the judgments of the spectators still depend on them. So, what was and what is the voice of the audience? And with what sort of voice do spectators give their judgments?

The Violence of the Neutral in Interfaith Relations

2012 ◽  
pp. 149-166
Author(s):  
Meir Sendor
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Real Relationship ◽  
Interfaith Relations ◽  
Unique Character ◽  
Authentic Relationship ◽  
The Common

This chapter analyses the common and unfortunate trend in interfaith dialogue of ‘neutralizing’ the Other. In an attempt to find commonality, neutralization introduces syncretism and relativism into interfaith discourse. Worse still, it does violence to the unique character of each religion and its practitioners who participate in the dialogue. According to Emmanuel Levinas, to proceed in this way is to doom the possibility of real relationship from the start and to fall prey to the most insidious and destructive habit of Western thought: the deception of the Neutral that derives from the tyranny of the Same. Meanwhile, Jacques Derrida repeatedly explored the nature of hospitality at length, employing it as a paradigm for the dynamics of interfaith relations. Finally, Paul Ricoeur's notion of the conscience, of the reciprocity of Otherness, of the response within responsibility, contributes an essential element to the groundwork for an authentic relationship outlined by Levinas and Derrida.

scholarly journals Skopje: Time, Narrative, and Politics

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Jacques Rancière ◽  
Drew S. Burk
Keyword(s):  
Literary Fiction ◽  
Jacques Ranciere ◽  
Social Sciences And Humanities ◽  
Jacques Rancière ◽  
Flow Of Time ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ways Of Being ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge ◽  
Common World ◽  
The Way

I would like to recall several ideas that have supported the entirety of my work for the past 40 years: forms of worker emancipation and the regimes of the identification of art; the transformations of literary fiction and the principles of democracy; the presuppositions of historical science and the forms of consensus by today’s dominant apparatuses. What unites all these areas of research is the attention to the way in which these practices and forms of knowledge imply a certain cartography of the common world. I have chosen to name this system of relations between ways of being, doing, seeing, and thinking that determine at once the common world and the ways in which everyone takes part within it the “distribution of the sensible.” But it must also be said that temporal categories play an important role in this as well. By defining a now, a before and an after, and in connecting them together within the narrative, they predetermine the way in which the common world is given to us in order to perceive it and to think it as well as the place given to everyone who occupies it and the capacity by which each of us then has to perceive truth. The narrative of time at once states what the flow of time makes possible as well as the way in which the inhabitants of time can grasp (or not grasp) these “possibles.” This articulation is a fiction. In this sense, politics and forms of knowledge are established by way of fictions including as well works that are deemed to be of the imagination. And the narrative of time is at the heart of these fictions that structure the intelligibility of these situations, which is to say as well, their acceptability. The narrative of time is always at the same time a fiction of the justice of time. Author(s): Jacques Rancière Title (English): Skopje: Time, Narrative, and Politics Translated by (French to English): Drew S. Burk Journal Reference: Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 2015) Publisher: Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities – Skopje  Page Range: 7-18 Page Count: 11 Citation (English): Jacques Rancière, “Skopje: Time, Narrative, and Politics,” translated from the French by Drew S. Burk, Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 2015): 7-18.

Face to Face, Hand to Hand: Relations of Exchange in Hamlet

2019 ◽  
pp. 109-131
Author(s):  
Emily Shortslef
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Mutual Awareness ◽  
The Face ◽  
Sense And Respond ◽  
The Way

In this essay, Emily Shortslef reads three linked encounters between Hamlet and Laertes in Act 5 of Hamlet—their fight at Ophelia’s grave, Hamlet’s recollection of this event in his subsequent expression of remorse, and their fatal duel before Claudius—in relationship to Levinas’s conceptualization of the face-to-face encounter as the ethical relation. She shows how Levinas’s notion of the self as constituted through the encounter with irreducible and unknowable alterity makes these scenes visible as moments in which the self is called into question by the other. At the same time, in contrast to Levinas’s famously asymmetrical concept of relationality and responsibility, the relationality that emerges in these scenes—one generated by the risk inherent in fighting on stage—necessitates mutual awareness of the other’s presence, careful attunement to movement, and reciprocal gestures of provocation and response. Each character discloses himself through the way that their facing bodies sense and respond to the other’s motion. In these antagonistic but collaborative encounters between Hamlet and Laertes, Shakespeare stages a relation of exchange that at the end of the play will also enable an exchange of forgiveness.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

The Ethical Dimension of Work: A Feminist Perspective

Hypatia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Gurtler ◽  
Andrew F. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Dimension ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Raising Children ◽  
The Common ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Woman's Work

My contribution intends to show that the traditional philosophical concept of work (Marx, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marcuse, Arendt, Habermas, and the rest) leaves out a crucial dimension. Work is reduced, for example, to the interaction with nature, the problem of recognition, or economic self-preservation. But work also establishes an ethical relation having to do with the needs of others and to the common good—a view of work that should be of particular interest for feminist and gender philosophy. This dimension makes visible, as socially necessary work, the so-called reproductive sphere pertaining to giving birth and raising children, but it also generalizes the aspect of care, which plays a significant role in traditional woman's work. The ethical relation to the other is a characteristic feature of human work and in this sense, the possibility of working is a part of a good life.

scholarly journals AKIVAIZDAUS TAPATUMO KERAI

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-101
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

Šiuo straipsniu siekiama permąstyti tradicinę tapatumo sąvoką. Į tapatumą Vakarų mąstymo istorijoje buvo žiūrima visų pirma ontologiniu požiūriu. Moderniųjų laikų posūkis į subjektą susitelkia į Aš kaip bet kokio tapatumo centrą, pagrindą ir gamintoją. Fenomenologinė analizė tapatumo ištakas pagilina iki Aš santykio su išore, su pasauliu, su kitybe. Tačiau kitybė, tapdama sąmonės turiniu, nėra absoliuti kitybė. Būdas, kuriuo tapatumas, įsisavindamas savinasi pasaulį ir naikina kitybę, yra reprezentacija, siekianti akivaizdumo. Reprezentacija kaip intencionalus įžvalgumas bet kokį objektą lokalizuoja sąmonės šviesoje. Šviesa ir regėjimas – tai paradigminės Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos metaforos. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kodėl ir kaip šviesa bei akivaizdumas netoleruoja absoliučios kitybės. Iš akivaizdumo kerų tapatumas atsitokėti gali tik per atsakingą santykį su Kitu, tai yra etiką. Čia tapatus subjektas praranda pirmumo teisę kito asmens imperatyvo atžvilgiu. Begalybės idėja, draskydama totalų tapatumą iš vidaus, neleidžia jam nurimti ir skatina atsižvelgti į transcendenciją, į kitybę, idant ji būtų laisva nuo prievartinio tapimo egocentrinio tapatumo turiniu ir manipuliacijos auka. Atsakomybė kito žmogaus veido akivaizdoje eina pirma akivaizdaus suvokimo ir įteisina jį.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tapatumas, akivaizdumas, kitybė, socialumas.Charms of Evident IdentityNerijus Čepulis SummaryIn this article I seek to rethink the traditional notion of identity. In the tradition of Western thought identity was viewed first and foremost from an ontological point of view. After the turn toward the subject, the I is thought of as the centre, the base and the producer of any identity. Phenomenological analysis deepens the origin of identity to the relation of the I to the world, i.e. to the alterity. Yet the alterity, by becoming the content of consciousness, is not an absolute alterity. The way, in which identity assimilates, possesses the world and annihilates alterity, is representation. Representation seeks evidence. Representation as intentional perceptivity localizes every object in the light of consciousness. Light and vision are paradigmatic metaphors of the traditional Western thought. Hence in this article I seek to show why and how light and evidence do not tolerate absolute alterity. Identity can be sobered from the charms of evidence only by responsible relation to the Other, i.e. by ethics. Here identical subject loses the right of priority in front of the imperative of the other person. Idea of infinity worries total identity from within. Infinity does not permit identity to quiet down and induces to heed transcendence and alterity. Only in this way alterity can escape the violence to become a content of egocentrical identity and the victim of manipulation. Responsibility in the face of the other person precedes evident perception and legitimates the latter.Keywords: identity, evidence, alterity, sociality.

scholarly journals TINJAUAN BUDAYA ATAS KULTUR TASAWUF BERBASIS MURSYID PEREMPUAN

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 259
Author(s):  
Mustofa Mustofa
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Leadership Model ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Female Role ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Common ◽  
Male Superiority ◽  
The Way

<p>Male and female, basically, have the same chance as idol muttaqin person, as well as a leader in the earth, including becoming a teacher of tarekat (mursyid). Assigning female as mursyid will not reduce or break the identity of the Sufism group, on the other hand, it is a kind of glorifying and respecting to the God. However, in tasawuf culture, most of the rituals conducted by the followers often reflecting the God in the male form. This conception, then, influences the way they lead the group. The common way of practicing the leadership model finally drives into legalizing the male superiority as the mursyid rather than the female one. Because of the phenomenon, the paper is written, to explore the issues on male and female role in the Sufism, specifically, for becoming the mursyid. It is expected to be powerful and meaningful cultural analysis which is viewed from tasawuf paradigm.</p><p> </p><p>Pria dan wanita pada dasarnya memiliki kesempatan yang sama dengan orang idola muttaqin, sekaligus pemimpin di bumi, termasuk menjadi guru tarekat (mursyid). Menugaskan wanita sebagai mursyid tidak akan mengurangi atau menghancurkan identitas kelompok Sufisme, di sisi lain, ini adalah semacam memuliakan dan menghormati Tuhan. Namun, dalam budaya tasawuf, sebagian besar ritual yang dilakukan oleh para pengikut sering mencerminkan Tuhan dalam bentuk laki-laki. Konsepsi ini, kemudian, mempengaruhi cara mereka memimpin kelompok. Cara umum mempraktikkan model kepemimpinan akhirnya mendorong legalisasi keunggulan laki-laki sebagai mursyid dan bukan pada perempuan. Karena fenomena tersebut, tulisan itu ditulis, untuk mengeksplorasi isu peran pria dan wanita dalam tasawuf, khususnya, untuk menjadi mursyid. Hal ini diharapkan bisa menjadi analisis budaya yang kuat dan bermakna yang dilihat dari paradigma tasawuf.</p><p> </p>

The Trouble with Kant

Philosophy ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (279) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Anthony Quinton
Keyword(s):  
The Common ◽  
Single World ◽  
Common World ◽  
The Way

In setting out to discuss the trouble with Kant I may seem to be suggesting that there is only one. I do think that there is one fundamental one, which is that he is a wild and intellectually irresponsible arguer. Any innate leaning that way must have been enhanced by the intellectual isolation of Konigsberg, which preserved him from serious criticism. I shall be sticking to one particular example of this failing. It is the account he gives of the way in which the common world of experience is constructed or synthesized by applying some piece of mental apparatus—the forms of intuition and the categories—to what he calls the manifold of sensation. The rather elementary question I want to raise about this theory is that of how the claim can be made good that the outcome of this process is just one, single world; for all of us, for each of us at different times, even for any one of us at a particular time.

scholarly journals L’art, entre jouissance et utopie selon Emmanuel Levinas

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141
Author(s):  
Rodolphe Olcèse
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
Ethical Relation ◽  
Artistic Creation ◽  
The Moment

This text aims to show how, in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, the moment of jouissance is constitutive of the selfhood of the ego and conditions the very possibility of a sensitivity to the other man, and so the possibility of the ethical relation itself. These considerations on the enjoyment invited us to think artistic creation and poetry as a way to respond to anesthesia of our sensibility through knowledge, which is a characteristic of western thought for Emmanuel Levinas.

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