1. The Great Powers’ Dilemma: Uncertainty, Intentions, and Rising Power Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Sarah Teo

Abstract Differentiation is a foundational premise in the study of middle powers, as evident in the way that the relevant literature distinguishes these states from the great powers and smaller states. Despite the underlying assumption of differentiation, the middle power literature has rarely engaged theoretically with the concept. This paper seeks to make more explicit this basis of differentiation in the study of middle powers, by advancing a new framework for middle power behavior that draws on differentiation theory. The framework makes the case that it is the differentiated structure in international politics – a departure from the dominant neorealist understanding of structure – that enables the behavior of middle powers. The effects of this differentiated structure are activated by the relative, relational, and social power politics that middle powers engage in, in a particular time and place. Through this process, middle powers are able to leverage their ‘middlepowerness’ in international politics by weakening stratification particularly where the great powers are concerned, and strengthening functional differentiation through taking on key and distinctive roles. By putting differentiation at the core of a framework for middle power behavior, the paper strives to make a constructive contribution to the theorizing of middle powers.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-462
Author(s):  
José Alexandre Altahyde Hage

Este artigo apresenta a análise como a energia foi historicamente controlada pelas classes sociais mais bem posicionadas politicamente e, na atualidade, pelos Estados industrializados. No aspecto conceitual, o artigo adota duas correntes teóricas de relações Internacionais de modo complementar: o marxismo aplicado às relações internacionais e o realismo (política do poder) e seus componentes mais modernos. O objetivo do texto é demonstrar que em algumas épocas as classes dominantes foram aquelas que controlaram recursos energéticos. No campo das relações internacionais há possível analogia ao verificar que grandes potências são os Estados que conseguem cadenciar fluxos de energia. Por fim, o artigo tenciona analisar em que condições países em desenvolvimento, como Brasil, conseguem alterar o sistema internacional por meio dos combustíveis renováveis, como o álcool combustível.  ABSTRACTThis article aims to analyze how energy resources are historically controlled by social classes in the higher political echelons and by industrialized States abroad. As concepts, the article embraces two complementary trends of thoughts: Marxism applied to international relations and Realism (power politics) with its most modern components. The goal of this paper is to show that in some moments, the ruling social classes were the ones over the energy resources. In the international relations sphere, there is a possible analogy in which we attest that the great powers are the States that can regulate the energy resources flow. To conclude, the paper aims to analyze in which conditions developing countries, Brazil, play a part in the international system with renewable fuels, such as ethanol. 


Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Kelanic

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the relationship between oil and great power politics. For over a hundred years, oil has been ubiquitous as both an object of political intrigue and a feature of everyday life, yet its effects on the behavior of major powers remain poorly understood. This book focuses on one particular aspect of oil: its coercive potential. Across time and space, great powers have feared that dependence on imported petroleum might make them vulnerable to coercion by hostile actors. They worry that an enemy could cut off oil to weaken them militarily or punish them economically, and then use this threat as a basis for political blackmail. Oil is so essential to great powers that taking a state's imports hostage could give an enemy significant leverage in a dispute. The book presents the first systematic framework to understand how fears of oil coercion shape international affairs. Great powers counter prospective threats with costly and risky policies that lessen vulnerability, ideally, before the country can be targeted. These measures, which can be called “anticipatory strategies,” vary enormously, from self-sufficiency efforts to actions as extreme as launching wars.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-362
Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki

An unprecedented geopolitical landscape, driven by the reduction of Arctic ice and the rise of China as “a Polar power,” is emerging. What does this mean for Canada, and how should Canada respond to it in a systematic and strategic manner? We need a coherent and holistic conceptual framework to answer these key policy questions. Yet, the current literatures do not offer us such a concept. In an attempt to fill the void, this article presents a vision that conceives of Canada as “a peninsula state” exposed to great power politics in its vicinity, involving China as a rising power as well as the United States and Russia as resident powers. Furthermore, it argues that Canada should be prepared for three kinds of strategic dynamics as it enters the game of great power politics: theatre-linkage tactics and wedge-driving tactics vis-à-vis China and Russia, as well as quasi-alliance dilemma with the United States. Moreover, in order for Canada to cope with this complex international environment effectively, this article calls for creating a cabinet-level unit to coordinate various federal bureaucracies’ foreign and security policies.


Author(s):  
Paul K. MacDonald ◽  
Joseph M. Parent

How do great powers respond to decline? The conventional wisdom is preventive war or domestic dysfunction. This book argues that declining states are neither more prone to aggression nor political paralysis. Instead, it makes three main claims. First, the most common and effective response to decline is retrenchment because, in the competitive world of power politics, states need to stay strategically solvent. Second, the rate of decline is the most powerful determinant of what retrenchment policies states adopt. And third, international conditions are important modifiers of how and how much states retrench. Examining all great power ordinal transitions since 1870, it employs statistical analysis and structured, focused historical comparisons to test rival views of great power decline.


Author(s):  
Savithri Sellapperumage

The COVID-19 pandemic has swept the world uprooting people from their livelihoods and toppling the economy of the world. Thus, to everyone's interest, producing a vaccine became the priority to gain at least half the normalcy in day-to-day activities of the world. With over a year passing, several states have come to the front in producing vaccines, having completed tedious processes of research and clinical trials. The next mammoth task at hand is distribution and administration in countries. However, with only a few countries gaining the advantage of production, they are seen to exercise power politics in purchasing and distribution of the vaccine. Developing countries have succumbed to a difficult predicament amidst balancing the great powers and the financial inability to obtain the vaccination. Therefore, the chapter explores the political dimension to vaccine distribution and the plight of developing nations in obtaining the vaccine. Further, the chapter observes the global initiatives taken to address the issue and the impact of distribution on health security.


Author(s):  
James Howard-Johnston

News about the war and its outcome percolated into the surrounding world, with dramatic effect in the Far East and Arabia. Explanations for Persian success and Roman resilience in the first two phases are not hard to find (in the spheres of material and ideological resources), but the sudden reversal of fortunes in the 620s is more problematic. Persian overstretch and war-weariness, brought to a head when the Turks intervened in the north, were a key factor, but greater weight should probably be placed on the generalship of Heraclius and the military qualities of his highly trained troops. As for the effects of the war, neither of the great powers was so debilitated as to become easy prey for the rising power of Islam. Hard-fought set-piece battles were needed to bring about the destruction of the one and the amputation of the Levant and Egypt from the other.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1317-1333
Author(s):  
Norrin M Ripsman

Abstract Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 21-43
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter outlines a theory called intentions pessimism. It begins by describing the information problems that confront states seeking to divine each other’s intentions. The first problem is that it is particularly difficult for a great power to access firsthand information about another state’s current intentions, that state’s actual ideas about how it intends to behave. The second problem is that although great powers can acquire information about each other’s declarations, interests, and actions, all of which are related to its intentions, this secondhand information is unreliable, which is to say that it is consistent with both benign and malign intent. The third problem is that states cannot access firsthand information about each other’s future intentions, while secondhand information on the matter is especially unreliable. The chapter then argues that given the inextricable link between information, on the one hand, and certainty and uncertainty on the other, these problems of access, reliability, and the future virtually preclude great powers from being confident that their peers have benign intentions, or more simply, from trusting them. Indeed, they typically cause states to be acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions. The chapter concludes by exploring the effects of uncertainty on great power politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter begins by explaining that the question of whether or not great powers can be confident that their peers have benign intentions is of enormous importance in both the real world and in international relations theory. In a nutshell, confidence causes peace and uncertainty causes security competition with the potential for war. The chapter then addresses the intentions question in three ways. First, it briefly describes a theory—intentions pessimism—that says great powers can rarely if ever be confident that their peers have benign intentions, because it is extraordinarily difficult for them to obtain the requisite information. Second, it argues that intentions pessimism matches up well with the historical record, and specifically, that it offers a compelling explanation of how great powers have actually thought about each other’s intentions over the past 150 years. Third, it applies intentions pessimism to the future of great power politics, predicting that the United States and China will each be uncertain about the other’s intentions, which will, in turn, cause them to compete for security and perhaps go to war.


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