Altruists with Green Beards: Still Kicking?

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert H. Frank
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Resource Acquisition ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Observable Feature

AbstractIn earlier work, I proposed the ‘adaptive standard of rationality’, according to which narrow self-interest models can be broadened by positing additional tastes, but only upon a plausible showing that those tastes do not hamper resource acquisition in competitive environments. This proposal is related to the green beard hypothesis from biology, according to which altruism might be adaptive if its presence could be reliably signaled by some observable feature, such as a green beard. In their contribution to this issue Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher offer theoretical arguments and describe laboratory experiments whose results they interpret as refuting my version of the green beard hypothesis. In this response, I argue that their theoretical arguments and experimental evidence pose no threat to the green beard hypothesis.

Self-Interested Giving: The Relationship Between Conditional Gifts, Charitable Donations, and Donor Self-Interestedness

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Chao ◽  
Geoffrey Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Charitable Donations ◽  
Prosocial Motives ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Relationship

Nonprofits regularly use conditional “thank you” gifts to entice prospective donors to give, yet experimental evidence suggests that their effects are mixed in practice. This paper uses multiple laboratory experiments to test when and why thank you gifts vary in effectiveness. First, we demonstrate that although gifts often increase donations to charities that donors did not rate highly, many of the same gifts had no effects or negative effects for charities that prospective donors already liked. We replicate these findings in a second experiment that uses a different range of charity and gift options as well as different measures of participant perceptions of a charity. We also find that making gifts optional, as is common in fundraising campaigns, does not eliminate these negative gift effects. In additional experiments, we directly test for donor motives using self-report and priming experiments. We find that thank you gifts increase (decrease) the weight that donors place on self-interested (prosocial) motives, leading to changes in donation patterns. Altogether, our results suggest that practitioners may find gifts more useful when appealing to donors not already familiar with or favorably inclined to their charity, such as during donor acquisition campaigns. They may be less useful when appealing to recent donors or others who already favor the charity, in part because the gift may activate mindsets or norms that emphasize self-interested motives instead of more prosocial, other-regarding motives. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

scholarly journals Human Cooperation When Acting Through Autonomous Machines

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (9) ◽  
pp. 3482-3487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Celso M. de Melo ◽  
Stacy Marsella ◽  
Jonathan Gratch
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Collective Interest ◽  
Intelligent Machines ◽  
Cooperative Society ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Autonomous Machines ◽  
Present Experimental Evidence

Recent times have seen an emergence of intelligent machines that act autonomously on our behalf, such as autonomous vehicles. Despite promises of increased efficiency, it is not clear whether this paradigm shift will change how we decide when our self-interest (e.g., comfort) is pitted against the collective interest (e.g., environment). Here we show that acting through machines changes the way people solve these social dilemmas and we present experimental evidence showing that participants program their autonomous vehicles to act more cooperatively than if they were driving themselves. We show that this happens because programming causes selfish short-term rewards to become less salient, leading to considerations of broader societal goals. We also show that the programmed behavior is influenced by past experience. Finally, we report evidence that the effect generalizes beyond the domain of autonomous vehicles. We discuss implications for designing autonomous machines that contribute to a more cooperative society.

scholarly journals Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1826-1846 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R Hamman ◽  
George Loewenstein ◽  
Roberto A Weber
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Unethical Behavior ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Efficiency Gains ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Experimental Treatments ◽  
Allocation Decisions ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)

scholarly journals Competitive Work Environments and Social Preferences: Field Experimental Evidence from a Japanese Fishing Community

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey P Carpenter ◽  
Erika Seki
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Treatment Effect ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Work Environments ◽  
Fishing Community ◽  
The Third ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
Toyama Bay ◽  
Individual Effort

Abstract Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while individual effort may increase as competition intensifies between workers, the incentive for workers to cooperate with each other diminishes. We report on a field experiment conducted with workers from a fishing community in Toyama Bay, Japan. Our participants are employed in three different aspects of fishing. The first group are fishermen, the second group are fish wholesalers (or traders), and the third group are staff at the local fishing coop. Although our participants have much in common (e.g., their common relationship to the local fishery and the fact that they all live in the same community), we argue that they are exposed to different amounts of competition on-the-job and that these differences explain differences in cooperation in our experiment. Specifically, fishermen and traders, who interact in more competitive environments are significantly less cooperative than the coop staff who face little competition on the job. Further, after accounting for the possibility of personality-based selection, perceptions of competition faced on-the-job and the treatment effect of job incentives explain these differences in cooperation to a large extent.

scholarly journals Preferences for redistribution and pensions. What can we learn from experiments?

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANZISKA TAUSCH ◽  
JAN POTTERS ◽  
ARNO RIEDL
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Preferences For Redistribution ◽  
Pension Schemes ◽  
Actuarial Fairness ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Distributional Preferences ◽  
Mandatory Participation ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Individual Choices

AbstractRedistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. However, little is known on how these preferences interact with preferences for different pension schemes. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution and suggest some links to redistribution through pensions. For that purpose we distinguish between three types of situations. The first deals with distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than individual choices. In the closing sections of the paper, we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we have less redistribution and more actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved?

scholarly journals In-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 896-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector Solaz ◽  
Catherine E. De Vries ◽  
Roosmarijn A. de Geus
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Identity Politics ◽  
Real World ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Group Identity ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Group Loyalty ◽  
Group Identities ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Do So

This study suggests that in-group loyalty, defined as the degree to which people favor their own group over others, undermines the punishment of corruption. We present evidence from two studies. First, we utilize a real-world corruption scandal involving the ruling party in Spain that broke during survey fieldwork. People exposed to the scandal withhold support from the incumbent, but in-group loyalty based on partisanship weakens this effect. Second, we explore in-group loyalty beyond partisanship through laboratory experiments. These experiments artificially induce group identities, randomly assign the group identity of candidates and shut down any instrumental benefits of in-group loyalty. The experimental evidence suggests that people support corrupt candidates as long as they share a group identity and are willing to sacrifice material payoffs to do so. Our findings have important implications. Most importantly perhaps, they suggest that candidates can get away with corruption by engaging in identity politics.

scholarly journals No evidence for hedonic shifts to bring about more moral hypocrisy: A comment on Lindenberg et al. (2018)

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 354-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wojtek Przepiorka
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Moral Issue ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Moral Stance ◽  
Do So

Lindenberg et al. report experimental evidence for the effect of hedonic shifts on subjects’ propensity to engage in moral hypocrisy. Hedonic shifts are changes in individuals’ cognitive states that can be triggered by cues in these individuals’ environments such as ambient smells. Individuals in a hedonic cognitive state aim at doing what makes them feel good. Hence, the authors hypothesize that (1) individuals who are in a bad mood and are put in a hedonic cognitive state will more often take a moral stance and (2) when asked to act morally refuse to do so, (3) especially when the costs for acting morally are high, and (4) even if the moral issue upon which they are asked to act is unrelated to the issue pertaining to the moral stance they took. The authors test these four hypotheses in two laboratory experiments and conclude that their results support these hypotheses. In this comment, I highlight design, measurement, and data analysis issues arising with the two studies that challenge this conclusion. Throughout my comment, I give some indications as to how a laboratory experiment testing these four hypotheses could be designed and conducted.

Decorating behaviour by the majid crab Tiarinia cornigera as protection against predators

2003 ◽  
Vol 83 (6) ◽  
pp. 1235-1237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phan Due Thanh ◽  
Keiji Wada ◽  
Michiko Sato ◽  
Yoshihisa Shirayama
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Predator Avoidance ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Predation Pressure ◽  
Rock Pool ◽  
Antipredator Response ◽  
Puffer Fish ◽  
Avoidance Strategy

Although decorating behaviour is widely reported as a predator avoidance strategy among marine crabs, few studies have provided experimental evidence for this. Significance of decorating behaviour of the majid crab Tiarinia cornigera as antipredator response was examined by the field tethering and laboratory experiments. Survival of decorated crabs was significantly higher than that of non-decorated crabs after two days in an intertidal rock pool. In a laboratory experiment, crabs used more algae for decoration in the presence of predators (puffer fish) than when predators were absent. These data demonstrate that T. cornigera decorates with algae in response to predators to reduce predation pressure.

scholarly journals Reciprocity, self-interest and reputation: debt vs equity contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Syed Munawar Shah ◽  
Mariani Abdul-Majid
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Behavioral Economic ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Better Than

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether reputation element affects the decision relative performance of trust, bonus and incentive contracts using social laboratory experiments. Design/methodology/approach The study conducts the following lab experiments bonus–incentive treatment without reputation, bonus–incentive treatment with reputation and trust–incentive treatment with reputation. Findings The study finds that the reputation and fairness concerns, in contrast to self-interest, may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choices in the reciprocity-based contracts. The principal pays higher salaries in the bonus contract as compared to an incentive contract. Originality/value The study contributes to the behavioral economic literature in the following dimensions. The existing literature on lab experiments considers a bonus contract as better than the debt contract; however, it does not consider the trust contract better than the debt contract.

Interactions Between Fish and Robots: An Experimental Study

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Aureli ◽  
Francesca Fiorilli ◽  
Maurizio Porfiri
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Statistical Mechanics ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Collective Behavior ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Collective Motion ◽  
Controlled Environment ◽  
Schooling Behavior ◽  
Control Actions ◽  
Mapping Analysis

In this paper, we present an experimental study of gregarious fish collective behavior in the presence or absence of biomimetic vehicles. This study is aimed at developing a first understanding of fish shoal controllability using robotic exogenous mates. Macroscopic features of the group schooling are identified through laboratory experiments, conducted in a controlled environment. Experimental evidence proves the existence of qualitatively different shoal collective responses to the exogenous mate. We adapt global observables from statistical mechanics to capture the main features of the shoal collective motion, and identify possible distinct states of aggregation. Further, we investigate the effect of the exogenous mate on the shoal by using a diffusion mapping analysis performed on the global observables. The analysis shows that the exogenous mate is able to exert organizing control actions on the schooling behavior that generally result into a higher cohesion for the shoal.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document