“Do Gun Policy Specifics Matter? Hyper-Polarization And The Decline Of Vote Splitting In Congress”

The Forum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-282
Author(s):  
Genevieve Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Gun Control ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Marked Decline ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Over Time

AbstractBy tracing the changing electoral incentives and political circumstances of partisans in Congress over time, this paper unpacks how and why substantive policy content has lost its relevance for influencing Congressional voting on gun control. It argues that as gun control positions have crystallized to become part of partisan identity, policy specifics have come to matter less for partisans in Congress than the general pro gun control or pro gun rights position that a piece of legislation symbolizes. Today, regardless of the specific policy contents of a bill, a gun vote serves as a signaling device from members of Congress to their partisan supporters that they are either passionate defenders of the Second Amendment (Republicans) or fierce protectors of America’s children from gun violence (Democrats). That policy content has lost its relevance for Congressional voting on gun control is evident through the marked decline in vote splitting, the extinction of gun control moderates, and the all or nothing voting behavior of partisan shifters – those formerly pro-control Republicans, anti-control Democrats, and gun control moderates who shifted positions over time to vote the party line.

Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Voting Decisions

The proposed model predicts that voting behavior of legislators is more variable early in their career and that junior members are more likely to vote with their party than senior members. The results from the analysis of voting patterns in the House of Representatives and the Senate are consistent with the hypotheses: Party line voting and variability of voting decisions decline with increasing seniority. Changes in voting behavior are also induced by redistricting. The empirical results show that legislators subject to redistricting change their voting behavior to accord better with altered constituency preferences.

When the team’s jersey is what matters: Network analysis of party cohesion and structure in the Canadian House of Commons

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 555-569
Author(s):  
David Chartash ◽  
Nicholas J Caruana ◽  
Markus Dickinson ◽  
Laura B Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
Network Analysis ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Central Control ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
Over Time

Are parties “high discipline, low cohesion” in Westminster legislatures? This study applies network analysis to voting behavior among members of parliament (MPs), a novel approach that measures not deviation from party-line voting, but rather whether MPs with similar voting patterns are co-partisans. We study the Canadian Parliament from 2006 to 2015, during which time the governing party under Prime Minister Stephen Harper maintained tight central control and discipline, a likely source of elevated cohesion. We find that “low cohesion” generally holds, and parties do not always conform to commonsense expectations about how cohesively they “should” behave in various parliamentary situations, though they show themselves capable of learning over time. Moreover, we find that party cohesion stems less from shared voting behaviors and more from simple partisan identity. Further research should consider to what extent parliamentary behavior is based mainly on party alignment.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Handguns: Risks versus Benefits

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 77 (5) ◽  
pp. 781-782
Author(s):  
KATHERINE K. CHRISTOFFEL ◽  
TOM CHRISTOFFEL
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
New York Times ◽  
The United States ◽  
Gun Control ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
High Prevalence ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
P 16

THE ISSUE There are an estimated 40 to 50 million handguns in the United States, with approximately 2 million more being manufactured annually1 (The New York Times, July 9, 1985, p 16). The high prevalence of handgun injury in the United States is unique in all the world and is increasing. Children are among the growing legions of US citizens harmed by the handgun epidemic.2 The effort to control handguns is focussed on developing laws to control their manufacture, importation, purchase, possession, and use. Opponents of these legal approaches claim that gun control endangers constitutional freedoms. When asked, the US Supreme court has consistently rejected that position in favor of the view that the Second Amendment protects a collective, not a personal, right to bear arms.3,4

Austria

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-174
Author(s):  
Marcelo Jenny ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller
Keyword(s):  
Party Leader ◽  
Policy Area ◽  
Party Size ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Time Regime ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Legislation ◽  
New Instruments

In the Austrian parliament a strict time regime keeps the length of debates at bay. While the government sets most of the agenda, opposition parties can get some proposals debated, and new instruments provide room for debate of topics independent of government legislation and reports. Debates are under tight party control with regard to the speakers’ nomination and the speakers sticking to the party line. Individual MPs do have electoral incentives to seek speaking assignments, but for most this results in low-level satisficing rather than maximizing speaking assignments. Party-size is a crucial factor determining the floor presence: MPs belonging to a small party have better chances to speak. Within parties, individual talent of MPs as speakers and their occupation of key party functions such as parliamentary party leader, or party spokesperson in a specific policy area are crucial for nominations.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 249-258
Author(s):  
Emily J. Charnock
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Party System ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Party Change ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Major Interest ◽  
Ideological Dimension ◽  
Over Time

This conclusion highlights the importance of PACs in twentieth-century American political development. The emergence of partisan PACs, initially formed by major interest groups, played an important and neglected role in fostering the polarization of American politics—a phenomenon that has raised concern in recent decades. Seeking to reconfigure party politics around specific policy issues—more broadly, to realign the party system along an ideological dimension of conflict—these PACs helped make the parties more distinct and more deeply divided over time. They did so via electoral tools and tactics that are now ubiquitous in political life but are rarely probed in scholarship. A focus on PACs thus illuminates the very mechanisms through which party change was brought about, as much as its wider meaning. The book concludes with a consideration of contemporary US politics, in which PACs continue to play a prominent role.

Policy Dynamics in Federal Systems: A Framework for Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
R Kent Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Policy Dynamics ◽  
Policy Variation ◽  
Over Time

Abstract A central puzzle in federalism research is that federal arrangements have been associated with a variety of policy effects, ranging from emulation of policy innovations among sub-national units to policy variation based on preferences of state or provincial voters and elites to a competitive “race to the bottom.” This article outlines twelve federalism policy dynamics discussed in the literature and provides an analytical framework for understanding when specific policy dynamics are likely to emerge, in either a strong or muted form. Shifts in four sets of facilitating and limiting conditions shape specific federalism policy dynamics and their emergence, consolidation, or weakening over time.

Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL J. HISCOX
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Factor Mobility ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
The Past ◽  
Trade Politics ◽  
Over Time ◽  
American Trade ◽  
Trade Legislation

The extent to which political conflict over U.S. trade policy has led to clashes between broad-based class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries. I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns.

The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
Donald Niemi
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Degree ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Stability Of Coalitions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Do So

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

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