scholarly journals Constitutional Courts as Majoritarian Instruments

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-397
Author(s):  
Jorge Farinacci-Fernós
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Minority Rights ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The People ◽  
The Status ◽  
Self Rule ◽  
Democratic Principles

Abstract Constitutional courts are portrayed as counter-majoritarian institutions empowered to strike down ordinary legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution. This power is to be used sparingly, since it is seen as being in tension with basic democratic principles. Judicial review in these circumstances should be limited to minority rights protection and the enforcement of structural limitations that prevent majority rule excess. But this is only half the story. Depending on the democratic credentials of the particular constitution, courts that strike down legislation as inconsistent with the constitution can also be said to be engaging in majoritarian action. The characterization of constitutional courts as counter-majoritarian institutions is premised on: (1) the status of ordinary legislation as the quintessential majoritarian instrument, (2) the un-elected nature of judges, (3) a narrow understanding of the concept of the ‘negative legislator’, and (4) the democratic deficit that results when judges impose their views over those enacted by parliament. This Article challenges these assumptions. First, this Article demonstrates that ordinary statutes adopted by elected legislatures are not necessarily the superior articulation of popular will. On the contrary, the democratization of modern constitution-making allows the constitution to acquire ultimate majoritarian status. Because of popular skepticism about the ability of ordinary politics to adequately reflect society’s views on important substantive policy matters, the People have repeatedly decided to bypass the legislative process and directly entrench these policy views in the constitutional text. As a result, it is the constitution that embodies popular will. Second, this Article dissects the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty, in order to distinguish between illegitimate counter-majoritarian review and legitimate counter-majoritarian review. The former occurs when the constitutional court substitutes the legislature’s policy views with its own, thus generating an impermissible democratic deficit. The latter occurs when the constitutional court invalidates ordinary legislation that violates minority rights or exceeds the structural limits imposed by the constitution. In both instances, counter-majoritarian intervention is warranted, precisely, to make sure that democratic self-government through ordinary politics can be adequately carried out. Third, this Article suggest the existence of a third class of judicial review: legitimate majoritarian review. This is when a constitutional court invalidates ordinary statutes because the legislature attempted to substitute the will of the constitutional drafters with their own. In other words, in instances when the legislative body carries out an anti-majoritarian act by ignoring the policy choices made by the People and entrenched in the constitutional text. When a court strikes down legislation of this sort, it is actually re-establishing majoritarian self-rule by making sure that the constitution’s policy commands are respected. In that sense, the court is not exercising independent judgment. Instead, it becomes the enforcement instrument of the majoritarian constitution to avoid legislative usurpation. This makes the un-elected nature of courts an almost irrelevant factor. Finally, this Article explores how the majoritarian potential of judicial review on constitutional matters interacts with the ‘negative legislator’ role of constitutional courts. In particular, how the ‘negative legislator’ should not be characterized, necessarily, as a limited one.

scholarly journals KEDUDUKAN DAN WEWENANG MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI DALAM SISTEM HUKUM KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA

Jurnal Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 1088
Author(s):  
Nanang Sri Darmadi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
The Third ◽  
The People ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Guardian

Fundamental changes in the 1945 is the amendment of Article 1 paragraph (2) as follows: "Sovereignty belongs to the people and carried out according to the Constitution". Change the 1945 Constitution has given rise to the Constitutional Court. By the Constitutional Court, the constitution guaranteed as the supreme law that can be enforced as it should. The Constitutional Court in its development, it is feared will be the agency that has authority super body.Particularly in resolving the matter related to its authority, the Constitutional Court can unilaterally interpret the Constitution without being questioned, other than that produced the Constitutional Court ruling is final and binding, so that when there is one party who feels aggrieved by the decision of the Constitutional Court cannot make the effort for other law.From the approach used in this study is normative juridical, because the study was conducted by examining library materials or secondary data relating to the status and authority of the Constitutional Court in constitutional legal system of Indonesia. Specifications of this research is descriptive analysis, which is expected to give a detailed overview, systematic, and comprehensive on all matters relating to the object to be examined. The data used in this study is secondary data, it means the data obtained from library materials collected through the study of literature and documentary studies, which are then analyzed qualitatively. The conclusion of this study is that the formation of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia is inseparable from the development of judicial review occurring in several countries in the world, especially during the implementation of judicial review which was pioneered by John Marshall in Marbury versus Madison case.Thinking about the importance of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia has emerged during the discussion of the draft Constitution in BPUPKI, then the idea of judicial review of the need to re-emerge during the discussion draft Judicial Power Act (Act No. 14 of 1970). At the time of the discussion of the 1945 changes in the era reformation, the opinion of the importance of the Constitutional Court appeared. Ultimately, the Third Amendment to the 1945 to be of the Constitutional Court, which serves as the guardian of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation.

The Concentrated and Hybrid Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-38
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Hybrid Models ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Government

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the civil law countries: the Concentrated Model and the Hybrid Model. The Concentrated Model of judicial review is built around the idea that what judges do when they enforce constitutions and Bills of Rights is inherently political and nonjudicial. For this reason, a separate Constitutional Court is created outside the ordinary judicial system, and is the only entity with the power of judicial review. The power of judicial review of Constitutional Courts is conceived as being a power to make the law and not simply to interpret it. Hence, a Constitutional Court in a civil law country is, essentially, a fourth branch of the government. Meanwhile, many countries, especially in Latin America, have developed distinct Hybrid Models of judicial review. The country of Brazil can be considered as the archetypal Hybrid Model. Brazil’s Hybrid Model of judicial review consists of a very complex system full of institutional mechanisms that are meant to enforce the Constitution. The Brazilian system combines features from both the Concentrated and the Diffuse Models hence the term Hybrid Model.

Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and Democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-53
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Similar Tendency ◽  
External Threats ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review

This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.

Constitutional Rights and Democracy: A Reply to Professor Bellamy

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1039-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.J. Waluchow
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Character ◽  
Self Rule ◽  
Elected Representatives

In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy.

From Parliament to Courtroom

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubomír Kopeček ◽  
Jan Petrov
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Political System ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
The Government

The Czech Constitutional Court has gained a strong position within the political system. This article examines the judicial review of legislation from the point of view of the relation between the court and the parliament. The authors analyze trends in the use of petitions proposing the annulment of statutes, who makes use of the petitions, how successful the petitioners are, and what issues the petitions concern. The article pairs a quantitative view with a qualitative analysis of key selected decisions by the court, especially in the sphere of mega-politics. The authors test whether judicial review of legislation serves as a tool for parliamentary opposition. The results show the decisive effects of a legislative majority in the lower house of the parliament. If the government lacks a majority, the use of judicial review of legislation as an oppositional tool fades. Also important is the weakness of the upper house, which makes senators more likely to resort to using judicial review of legislation. An especially crucial factor is the presence of independent and semi-independent senators who, without broader political backing, see judicial review of legislation as a welcome tool. The most frequent topics of the petitions were transitional justice, social policy, and the legislative process.

scholarly journals POLITIK HUKUM PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN TERHADAP ANAK LUAR NIKAH

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-126
Author(s):  
Muammar Rachman
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Research Problem ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Marriage Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Status

The formation of the 1974 Marriage Law is based on Islamic Law, which became a problem when the Constitutional Court gave a decision on the judicial review of the Marriage Law with a decision that was considered by the public that the decision was against Islamic law. The research problem in this article is, How is the Politics of Law in the Reform of Legislation in the Post-Constitutional Court Ruling on Marriage related to the status of children outside of marriage? Does the Constitutional Court Decision No 46 / PUU-VII / 2010 contradict Islamic law?The research approach used in this research is normative juridical. The results of the study indicate that children who are born must receive legal protection. If this is not the case, then the children who are born outside of marriage will suffer losses. The relationship between the child and the father does not only occur because of a legal marriage, but can also be based on evidence of a blood relationship between the child and the boy as the father. This is because birth is a legal result of a legal relationship in which there are reciprocal rights and obligations between the child, mother and father. This decision refers, because there is a relationship that is carried out without any legal conditions for marriage, both religiously and in a state, so that it does not cause harm which implies a child who has not done anything wrong. In conclusion, the Constitutional Court granted the renewal of the norm in article 43 of the Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974, which is to provide constitutional rights for children born out of wedlock whether born from a legally valid marriage or not. The decision of the Constitutional Court related to the addition of article 43 paragraph (1) of this marriage law is still in the spirit of Islam as the struggle of Muslims to be able to apply their religious values in this law is not only legally religiously or nationally. Abstrak Pembentukan Undang-Undang (UU) Perkawinan Tahun 1974 berdasarkan Hukum Islam, menjadi permasalahan saat Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) memutuskan judicial review atas UU perkawinan, bagi masyarakat bertentangan dengan hukum Islam. Permasalahan penelitian ini,  Bagaimana Politik Hukum dalam Pembaharuan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dalam UU Perkawinan Pasca Putusan MK terkait dengan status anak diluar nikah? Apakah Putusan MK No 46/PUU-VII/2010 bertentangan dengan hukum Islam? Pendekatan penelitian ini yuridis normatif. Hasil penelitian menguraikan, anak yang lahir harus mendapat perlindungan hukum. Jika tidak, yang dirugikan adalah anak yang dilahirkan diluar perkawinan. hubungan anak dengan bapak tidak semata-mata terjadi karena adanya sebuah perkawinan yang sah, tapi berdasar pembuktian adanya hubungan darah antara anak dan laki-laki sebagai bapak. Hal ini karena kelahiran adalah akibat hukum dari hubungan hukum yang terdapat hak dan kewajiban secara timbal balik. Putusan ini mengacu, sebab adanya hubungan yang dilakukan tanpa adanya syarat pernikahan yang sah, baik secara agamadan negara, sehingga tidak menimbulkan kerugian yang berimplikasi pada anak yang tidak melakukan kesalahan. Pembaharuan norma dalam pasal 43 UU  Perkawinan No. 1 Tahun 1974, memberikan hak konstitusional  anak yang dilahirkan di luar nikah baik yang lahir dari pernikahan yang sah secara agama atau tidak. Putusan MK terkait penambahan pasal 43 ayat (1) UU perkawinan masih bernafaskan Islam sesuai perjuangan ummat Islam untuk dapat menjalankan nilai-nilai agamanya dalam UU ini hannya tidak sah secara agama  dan Negara.

scholarly journals Inkonstitusionalitas Sistem Unbundling dalam Usaha Penyediaan Listrik

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Jefri Porkonanta Tarigan
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
The People

Fungsi negara tidak hanya sebagai regulator (pengatur) dan umpire (wasit), namun juga berfungsi sebagai provider (penyedia) dan entrepreneur (pengusaha). Oleh karena itu, sudah seharusnya negara terlibat langsung dalam usaha penyediaan listrik untuk kepentingan umum bagi sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat sebagaimana amanat Pasal 33 UUD 1945. Usaha penyediaan listrik untuk kepentingan umum dengan unbundling system yaitu terpisahnya antara usaha pembangkitan, transmisi, distribusi, dan penjualan listrik, telah dinyatakan inkonstitusional oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Putusan Nomor 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, bertanggal 15 Desember 2004. Namun kemudian adanya putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 149/PUU-VII/2009, bertanggal 30 Desember 2010, justru dipandang sebagai peluang dibolehkannya kembali sistem unbundling dalam usaha penyediaan listrik sebagaimana ketentuan Pasal 10 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2009 tentang Ketenagalistirkan. Hal tersebut kemudian mendorong diajukannya kembali permohonan pengujian terhadap ketentuan Pasal 10 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2009. Melalui Putusan Nomor 111/PUU-XIII/2015, bertanggal 14 Desember 2016, Mahkamah Konstitusi pun menegaskan bahwa unbundling dalam usaha penyediaan tenaga listrik adalah tidak sesuai dengan konstitusi.The function of the state is not only as a regulator and referee, but also serves as provider and entrepreneur. Therefore, the state should be directly involved in the business of electric providing for the public interest to the greatest prosperity of the people as mandated by Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. The unbundling system in electric providing for the public interest is the separation between the business of generation, transmission, distribution, and sales. The unbundling system has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in Decision Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 dated December 15, 2004. However, the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 149/PUU-VII/2009 dated 30 December 2010, is judged as an opportunity to re-enable the unbundling system in the business of electric providing as stipulated in Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 30 Year 2009 about Electricity. It then encourages the re-submission of the petition for judicial review of the provisions of Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 30 Year 2009. Then, through Decision Number 111/PUU-XIII/2015, dated December 14, 2016, the Constitutional Court confirm that unbundling in the business of providing power electricity for public interest is inconstitutional.

scholarly journals Kewenangan Legislasi Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dalam Reformasi Kelembagaan Perwakilan Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Khamami Zada
Keyword(s):  
Political Representation ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Regional Autonomy ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The People ◽  
Check System ◽  
Theoretical Conception

Abstract: The authority of the Regional Representatives Council Legislation In Institutional Reform Legislative Following the Ruling of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court's decision reflects the theoretical conception DPDformation which is intended to reform the structure of the Indonesian parliament into two chambers (bicameral) consisting of DPR and DPD. With the bicameral structure of the legislative process is expected to be held by a double-check system that allows the representation of the interests of all the people in relative terms can be dispensed with broader social base. Parliament is a reflection of political representation, while the Council reflects the principle of territorial or regional representation. DPD legislative authority is still limited. DPD does not have the authority to establish laws, although it can propose draft laws relating to regional autonomy.  Abstrak: Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi mencerminkan konsepsi teoritis pembentukan DPD yang dimaksudkan dalam rangka mereformasi struktur parlemen Indonesia menjadi dua kamar (bikameral) yang terdiri atas DPR dan DPD. Dengan struktur bikameral ini diharapkan proses legislasi dapat diselenggarakan berdasarkan sistem double-check yang memungkinkan representasi kepentingan seluruh rakyat secara relatif dapat disalurkan dengan basis sosial yang lebih luas. DPR merupakan cermin representasi politik (political representation), sedangkan DPD mencerminkan prinsip representasi teritorial atau regional (regional representation). Kewenangan legislasi DPD masih dibatasi DPD tidak memiliki kewenangan membentuk undang-undang dalam bentuk penetapan/pengesahan rancangan undang-undang, meskipun rancangan undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan otonomi daerah, hubungan pusat dan daerah, pembentukan dan pemekaran serta penggabungan daerah, pengelolaan sumber daya alam dan sumber daya ekonomi lainnya, serta yang berkaitan dengan perimbangan keuangan pusat dan daerah.   DOI: 10.15408/jch.v2i1.1839

scholarly journals Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai Negative Budgeter dalam Pengujian Undang-Undang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Susanto
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
State Budget ◽  
The People ◽  
Conceptual Study ◽  
The Guardian

Doktrin Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) yang dahulu dipercaya hanya sebagai negative legislature telah bergeser menjadi positive legislature. Menjadi pertanyaan, apakah doktrin MK sebagai negative legislature maupun positive legislature, dapat pula dimaknai sebagai negative budgeter dan positive budgeter dalam pengujian Undang-Undang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (UU APBN). Berdasarkan hasil kajian konseptual dan pendalaman terhadap beberapa putusan MK dalam pengujian UU APBN, secara nyata dan dalam keadaan tertentu, doktrin MK sebagai negative legislature dapat dimaknai sebagai negative budgeter dalam bentuk pernyataan mata anggaran tertentu dalam UU APBN bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. Bahkan dapat pula dimaknai sebagai positive budgeter karena MK juga mengharuskan pemerintah dan DPR untuk menambahkan mata anggaran tertentu dalam UU APBN. Hal tersebut tidak lain sebagai bentuk diakuinya supremasi konstitusi, sehingga MK yang berperan sebagai the guardian constitution harus menjaganya. Apalagi dalam UUD 1945 terdapat pasal yang spesifik menyebut batas minimal anggaran pendidikan 20% dan pasal-pasal lain yang mengharuskan APBN harus dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat.The doctrine of the Constitutional Court which was previously believed to be only as a negative legislature has shifted into positive legislature. The question, is the doctrine of the Constitutional Court as a negative legislature and a positive legislature can also be interpreted as a negative budgeter and a positive budgeter in the judicial review of the State Budget Law. Based on the result of conceptual study and deepening of several decisions of the Constitutional Court in the judicial review of the State Budget Law, in real and in certain circumtances, the doctrine of the Constitutional Court as a negative lagislature can be also interpreted as a negative budgetary in the form of specific budget items in the State Budget Law contradictory to the 1945 Constitution. Also as a positive budgeter because the Constitutional Court requires the executive and the legislative to add a specific budget in the State Budget Law. It is a form of recognition of constitutional supremacy, so that the Constitutional Court can role as the guardian constitution. Moreover in the 1945 Constitution there is a specific article that mentions the minimum limit of 20% education budget and other articles that require the state budget should be used for the greatest prosperity of the people.

scholarly journals Filling the Hole in Indonesia’s Constitutional System: Constitutional Courts and the Review of Regulations in a Split Jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Do So

The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.

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