Two Dogmas of Egalitarianism

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Den Uyl ◽  
Douglas B. Rasmussen

AbstractIt is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy.  Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call “two dogmas of egalitarianism” will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These “dogmas” can be stated as follows: (1) The burden of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one’s ethical conclusions.

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 343-358
Author(s):  
Leszek Skowroński

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff

To trace the history of the concept of equality in political philosophy is to explore the answers that have been given to the questions of what equality demands, and whether it is a desirable goal. Considerations of unjust inequality appear in numerous different spheres, such as citizenship, sexual equality, racial equality, and even equality between human beings and members of other species. Ancient Greek political philosophy, despite Aristotle's famous conceptual analysis of equality, is generally hostile towards the idea of social and economic equality. Plato's account of the best and most just form of the state in the Republic is a society of very clear social, political, and economic hierarchy. It is with Thomas Hobbes that the idea of equality is put to work. This article explores equality as an issue of distributive justice; equality in the history of political philosophy; equality in contemporary political philosophy; the views of Ronald Dworkin, Karl Marx, and David Hume; equality of welfare; equality, priority, and sufficiency; Amartya Sen's capability theory; and luck egalitarianism.


Author(s):  
Mathias Risse

This book explores the question of what it is for a distribution to be just globally and proposes a new systematic theory of global justice that it calls pluralist internationalism. Up to now, philosophers have tended to respond to the problem of global justice in one of two ways: that principles of justice either apply only within states or else apply to all human beings. The book defends a view “between” these competing claims, one that improves on both, and introduces a pluralist approach to what it terms the grounds of justice—which offers a comprehensive view of obligations of distributive justice. It also considers two problems that globalization has raised for political philosophy: the problem of justifying the state to outsiders and the problem of justifying the global order to all.


Author(s):  
James Gouinlock

The philosophy of John Dewey is original and comprehensive. His extensive writings contend systematically with problems in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy and education, and philosophical anthropology. Although his work is widely read, it is not widely understood. Dewey had a distinctive conception of philosophy, and the key to understanding and benefiting from his work is to keep this conception in mind. A worthwhile philosophy, he urged, must be practical. Philosophic inquiry, that is, ought to take its point of departure from the aspirations and problems characteristic of the various sorts of human activity, and an effective philosophy would develop ideas responsive to those conditions. Any system of ideas that has the effect of making common experience less intelligible than we find it to be is on that account a failure. Dewey’s theory of inquiry, for example, does not entertain a conception of knowledge that makes it problematic whether we can know anything at all. Inasmuch as scientists have made extraordinary advances in knowledge, it behoves the philosopher to find out exactly what scientists do, rather than to question whether they do anything of real consequence. Moral philosophy, likewise, should not address the consternations of philosophers as such, but the characteristic urgencies and aspirations of common life; and it should attempt to identify the resources and limitations of human nature and the environment with which it interacts. Human beings might then contend effectively with the typical perplexities and promises of mortal existence. To this end, Dewey formulated an exceptionally innovative and far-reaching philosophy of morality and democracy. The subject matter of philosophy is not philosophy, Dewey liked to say, but ‘problems of men’. All too often, he found, the theories of philosophers made the primary subject matter more obscure rather than less so. The tendency of thinkers is to become bewitched by inherited philosophic puzzles, when the persistence of the puzzle is a consequence of failing to consider the assumptions that created it. Dewey was gifted in discerning and discarding the philosophic premises that create needless mysteries. Rather than fret, for instance, about the question of how immaterial mental substance can possibly interact with material substance, he went to the root of the problem by challenging the notion of substance itself. Indeed, Dewey’s dissatisfaction with the so-called classic tradition in philosophy, stemming at least from Plato if not from Parmenides, led him to reconstruct the entire inheritance of the Western tradition in philosophy. The result is one of the most seminal and fruitful philosophies of the twentieth century.


Author(s):  
Ian Shapiro

Every political philosophy takes for granted a view of human nature, and every view of human nature is controversial. Political philosophers have responded to this conundrum in a variety of ways. Some have defended particular views of human nature, while others have sought to develop political philosophies that are compatible with many different views of human nature, or, alternatively, which rest on as few controversial assumptions about human nature as possible. Some political philosophers have taken the view that human nature is an immutable given, others that it is shaped (in varying degrees) by culture and circumstance. Differences about the basic attitudes of human beings toward one another – whether selfish, altruistic or some combination – have also exercised political philosophers. Although none of these questions has been settled definitively, various advances have been made in thinking systematically about them. Four prominent debates concern: (1) the differences between perfectionist views, in which human nature is seen as malleable, and constraining views, in which it is not; (2) the nature/nurture controversy, which revolves around the degree to which human nature is a consequence of biology as opposed to social influence, and the implications of this question for political philosophy; (3) the opposition between self-referential and other-referential conceptions of human nature and motivation – whether we are more affected by our own condition considered in itself, or by comparisons between our own condition and that of others; and (4) attempts to detach philosophical thought about political association from all controversial assumptions about human nature.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT C. BARTLETT

No one can claim to have thought seriously about the question “How ought I to live?”, the guiding question of political philosophy, without having confronted the powerful answer to it supplied by hedonism. In thinking about hedonism today, we may begin from that thinker who was both very important to and early in its history: Plato. Of the dialogs that have come down to us as Plato's, only the Philebus takes as its direct aim the examination of pleasure's claim to be the human good. The Philebus culminates in the suggestions that the need for self-awareness or self-knowledge may finally be more fundamental to all human beings (and hence to hedonists) than is even the desire for pleasure, and that the experience of at least some pleasures constitutes a great obstacle to precisely the self-knowledge we seek. The Philebus is important today not only because it contains a searching analysis of hedonism but also because it compels us to raise the crucial question of the precise nature of “the good” with which we are justly most concerned—our own or that of others—a question whose centrality to self-knowledge we are in danger of forgetting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-34
Author(s):  
Maximilian Jaede

This article argues that the artificiality of Hobbesian states facilitates their coexistence and eventual reconciliation. In particular, it is suggested that international relations may be characterised by an artificial equality, which has a contrary effect to the natural equality of human beings. Unlike individuals in Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, sovereigns are not compelled to wage war out of fear and distrust, but have prudential reasons to exercise self-restraint. Ultimately rulers serve as disposable figureheads who can be replaced by a foreign invader. Thus, this article highlights the implications of Hobbes’s views on sovereignty by acquisition, which allow for states to be decomposed and reassembled in order to re-establish lasting peace. It is concluded that these findings help to explain why Hobbes does not provide something akin to modern theories of international relations, as foreign affairs appear to be reducible to a matter of either prudence or political philosophy.


2017 ◽  
pp. 343-358
Author(s):  
Leszek Skowroński

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rarita Mihail ◽  

The notion of vulnerability is one of the beliefs of a recent current of moral and political philosophy, namely care ethics. Stemming, especially, from the North American feminist movement, this care ethics, based on the rejection of a universal and abstract morals, privileges the relational dimension based on the orientation towards human vulnerability.Subject to the weight of the tyranny of normality and perfection, contemporary societies, glorifying the individual who is useful and performant, struggle to hide, or more often than not deny the vulnerability of human beings. The notion of vulnerability appeared not only as a mutual sign of any person who is in a dependent situation, but also as one of the constitutive dimensions of the essence of living beings and of their life environment. In this article, the notion of vulnerability will be studied by identifying the representative themes of human vulnerability particular to their life and its conditions of being. Firstly, the hypothesis proposed by Freud in Le malaise dans la culture (2010)represents the underlying basis of this study on human vulnerability. Next, two important concepts guide the study proposed: the vulnerability inherent to human subjectivity, from the perspective of Lévinas, and the one akin the process of socialising of human beings, from the perspective of Habermas.


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