Military Expenditures and Income Inequality among a Panel of OECD Countries in the Post-Cold War Era, 1990–2007

Author(s):  
Jeremy C. Graham ◽  
Danielle Mueller

AbstractDoes military spending exacerbate income inequality? After the Cold War, many developed countries sought to reduce military expenditures in the face of a new security environment without the clear and present threat of large-scale international conflict. The literature has presented mixed evidence on the economic effects of military spending. Moreover, during this era analysts in the OECD have become preoccupied with the economic indicator of income equality. Our study examines the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality. Complementing the established literature on the subject, we find that these two phenomena indeed possess a positive relationship and it is unlikely that this association is due to random chance. Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables common in the literature. These findings lead us to contemplate the historical and theoretical account of the peace dividend narrative.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332098082
Author(s):  
Scott Cooper ◽  
Kendall W Stiles

Studies of NATO rely heavily on military spending as a fraction of GDP as the key indicator of members’ contribution to the alliance, but a growing number of scholars have challenged this approach. We suggest that each member’s public goods provision is a better measure of commitment to the alliance. In the case of post-Cold War NATO, out-of-area troop deployments (adjusted for population) constitute one of the strongest indicators of a state’s contribution to public goods. Providing troops for NATO missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the clearest signals of high commitment to the alliance. Using deployment data from 2004 to 2018, we show that there is evidence of disproportionate burden-sharing within the alliance. Countries like Slovenia, Denmark, the USA and UK contributed far more to NATO deployments than others like Turkey, Spain, Poland, and Portugal. We also use the data to begin examining possible causes of these disparities. We find that wealthier countries, countries that spend more on their militaries, and newer alliance members are more likely to contribute. Our indicator and first-cut model open avenues for further research on why some members demonstrate higher commitment to NATO than others.


2008 ◽  
pp. 142-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Kentor ◽  
Edward Kick

After the “peace bonus” era, global military expenditures have escalated sharply despite some worldwide declines in military personnel. Theories on the economic impacts of the military institution and escalated military spending greatly differ and include arguments that they either improve domestic economic performance or crowd out growth-inducing processes. Empirical findings on this matter are inconclusive, in part due to a failure to disentangle the various dimensions of military expenditures. We further suggest that modern sociology's relative inattention to such issues has contributed to these shortcomings. We explore a new dimension of military spending that clarifies this issue—military expenditures per soldier —which captures the capital intensiveness of a country’s military organization. Our cross-national panel regression and causal analyses of developed and less developed countries from 1990 to 2003 show that military expenditures per soldier inhibit the growth of per capita GDP, net of control variables, with the most pronounced effects in least developed countries. These expenditures inhibit national development in part by slowing the expansion of the labor force. Labor-intensive militaries may provide a pathway for upward mobility, but comparatively capital-intensive military organizations limit entry opportunities for unskilled and under- or unemployed people. Deep investments in military hardware also reduce the investment capital available for more economically productive opportunities. We also find that arms imports have a positive effect on economic growth, but only in less developed countries.


1974 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 167-177
Author(s):  
Willy Østreng

This article examines the possible political and economic effects of large-scale mineral extraction from the seabed. The findings presented indicate that development in new territories may conceivably serve to exacerbate existing conflict dimensions, notably the North/South dimension in global politics. Because of the developed countries' monopoly on know-how and economic capability, exploration and exploitation of the inorganic resources of the ocean floor has de facto been the exclusive domain of these countries. On the basis of this the author shows that if large-scale production of seabed resources should become a reality in the near future, the underdeveloped countries will be forced to watch it from the sidelines. As a consequence, the exploitation of offshore raw materials will probably contribute to the further widening of the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries. Further commenting on the fact that the latter today are the main producers of the most promising seabed resources, the author expresses the view that exploitation will have a detrimental effect on the economics of the Third World countries, since it might lead to overproduction and price reductions.


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucan A. Way ◽  
Steven Levitsky

This article examines coercive capacity and its impact on autocratic regime stability in the context of post-Soviet Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. In the post-Cold War era, different types of coercive acts require different types of state power. First, high intensity and risky measures – such as firing on large crowds or stealing elections – necessitate high degrees of cohesion or compliance within the state apparatus. Second, effective low intensity measures – including the surveillance and infiltration of opposition, and various forms of less visible police harassment – require extensive state scope or a well-trained state apparatus that penetrates large parts of society. Coercive state capacity, rooted in cohesion and scope, has often been more important than opposition strength in determining whether autocrats fall or remain in power. Thus, the regime in Armenia that was backed by a highly cohesive state with extensive scope was able to maintain power in the face of highly mobilized opposition challenges. By contrast, regimes in Georgia where the state lacked cohesion and scope fell in the face of even weakly mobilized opposition. Relatively high scope but only moderate cohesion in Belarus and Ukraine has made autocratic regimes in these countries generally more effective at low intensity coercion to prevent the emergence of opposition than at high intensity coercion necessary to face down serious opposition challenges.


1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jurgen Brauer ◽  
John Tepper Marlin

As a proportion of gross national product, U.S. military spending has declined steadily since the mid-1980s. The end of the Cold War has given rise to calls for even more cuts in military spending. In early 1992, President George Bush proposed to reduce military spending by 3 percent per year, in real dollars, for the next five years. The Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives countered with a plan calling for substantially deeper cuts. Any substantial changes in military expenditures imply a “conversion” of physical and human resources from military to nonmilitary uses. This article will focus on some distinctive characteristics of the U.S. military sector and on some adjustment costs that reduced military spending are likely to impose on military industries, occupations, regions, and communities.


2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 460-472
Author(s):  
Salma Malik

In the Contemporary Conflicts of the post-Cold War period, the question of what comes first, Conflict or Weapons, becomes irrelevant in the face of the quantity and sophistication arms available to actors involved. Pakistan is a country that shows many of the symptoms which are a characteristic of small arms diffusion into the larger social fabric. Given the complex nature of politics, the country is affected not only by external but domestic sources and drivers that have complicated the issue over the decades. For academic purposes, these sources and problems can broadly be divided into four categories canvassing the range of regulated and non-regulated drivers and causes both at the domestic as well as external level. The study aims to examine at length the impact of how regulated sources of SALW in the private armament sector have gradually emerged and cast an impact on the security profile of the country.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nusrate Aziz ◽  
M. Niaz Asadullah

Purpose While the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth during the Cold War period is well-researched, relatively less is known on the issue for the post-Cold War era. Equally how the relationship varies with respect to exposure to conflict is also not fully examined. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the causal impact of military expenditure on growth in the presence of internal and external threats for the period 1990-2013 using data from 70 developing countries. Design/methodology/approach The main estimates are based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) regression model. But for comparison purposes, the authors also report estimates using fixed and random effects as well as pooled cross-section regressions. The regression specification accounts for non-linear effect of military expenditure allowing for interaction with conflict variable (where distinction is made between external and internal conflict). Findings The analysis indicates that methods as well as model specification matter in studying the effect of military spending on growth. Full sample estimates based on GMM, fixed, and random effects models suggest a negative and statistically significant effect of military expenditure. However, fixed effects estimate becomes insignificant for low-income countries. The effect of military spending is also insignificant in the cross-sectional OLS model if conflict is not considered. When the regression model additionally controls for conflict, the effect of military spending conditional upon (internal) conflict exposure is significant and positive. No such effect is present conditional upon external threat. Research limitations/implications One important limitation of the analysis is the small sample size – the authors had to restrict analysis to 70 low and middle-income countries for which the authors could construct post-Cold War panel data on military expenditure along with information on armed conflict exposure (the later from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015). Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the joint impact of military expenditure and conflict on economic growth in post-Cold War period in a sample of developing countries. Moreover, an attempt is made to review and revisit the large Cold War literature where studies vary considerably in terms findings. A key reason for this is the somewhat ad hoc choice of econometric methods – most rely on cross-section data and rarely conduct sensitivity analysis. The authors instead rely on panel data estimates but also report results based on naïve models for comparison purposes.


Author(s):  
Edward M. Geist

This conclusion describes some general findings about the historical evolution of civil defense in the two superpowers over the course of the Cold War. Neither U.S. nor Soviet officials regarded their civil defense efforts as successful, but the shortcomings of the programs appear to have resulted from domestic political obstacles rather than technical, strategic, and budgetary considerations. In the United States, Congressional opponents blocked large-scale funding for civil defense before its unpopularity with the general public became a crippling obstacle. In the Soviet Union, ideological strictures simultaneously impelled the development of civil defense yet undermined its plausibility. This chapter also makes some observations about post-Cold War developments in U.S. and Russian civil defense and their possible policy implications.


Author(s):  
Luis Cabrera

Is a global institutional order composed of sovereign states fit for cosmopolitan moral purpose? This question has lain near the heart of cosmopolitan thought at least since Kant’s interventions of the 1780s and 1790s. Kant seemed torn between supporting large-scale global institutional reforms—the creation of a world republic—and promoting a more modest transformation of states and their interrelations within a voluntary union. Likewise, in the more recent flowering of cosmopolitan thought, dating to the 1970s and intensifying from the immediate post–Cold War period, a persistent question has been whether states can be ascribed duties consistent with a cosmopolitan moral orientation, or whether, as Harold Laski memorably put it in 1925, state sovereignty is simply “incompatible with the interests of humanity.” Such institutional questions are central to this volume. This chapter introduces the major themes examined here and summarizes each author’s contribution.


Explores the momentous changes that have taken place in the Russian national identity discourse since Putin’s return to the presidency Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a watershed in post-Cold War European history and brought East–West relations to a low point. At the same time, by selling this fateful action in starkly nationalist language, the Putin regime achieved record-high popularity. This book shows how, after the large-scale 2011–2013 anti-Putin demonstrations in major Russian cities and the parallel rise in xenophobia related to the Kremlin’s perceived inability to deal with the influx of Central Asian labour migrants, the annexation of Crimea generated strong ‘rallying around the nation’ and ‘rallying around the leader’ effects. The contributors to this collection go beyond the news headlines, focusing on aspects of Russian society that have often passed under the radar, such as intellectual racism and growing xenophobia. These developments are contextualised by chapters that provide a broader overview of the latest developments in Russian nationalism – both state-level nationalism and independent, bottom–up-driven societal nationalism, and the tensions between the two are explored.


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