Griechenlands EG-Beitritt aus der Sicht der Regierung Schmidt/Genscher (1976–1982) / The Federal Government of Schmidt and Genscher and the Entry of Greece to the European Communities (1976–1982)

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-154
Author(s):  
Tim Szatkowski

Abstract The government of the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher supported Greece’s joining of the European Communities which took place at the beginning of 1981, more than every other EC member state. This essay shows that primarily political motives played a role. Under the conditions of the East/West conflict the Federal Government hoped to win a reliable ally and to strengthen the southeast flank of the NATO. Doubts resulted from possible financial burdens and social problems as a result of the freedom of movement agreed on by contract for Greek employees. However, these worries weren’t decisive at the end. Economic aspects not least were disregarded negligently. The question whether Greece was capable of the joining because of serious structural difficulties received little attention. The government Schmidt/Genscher thought to be able to overcome all problems with the transfer of financial resources which especially the Greek government under Prime Minister Papandreou demanded.

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Szatkowski

AbstractThe government of the Federal Republic of Germany under Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher supported Greece’s joining of the European Communities which took place at the beginning of 1981, more than every other EC member state. This essay shows that primarily political motives played a role. Under the conditions of the East/West conflict the Federal Government hoped to win a reliable ally and to strengthen the southeast flank of the NATO. Doubts resulted from possible financial burdens and social problems as a result of the freedom of movement agreed on by contract for Greek employees. However, these worries weren’t decisive at the end. Economic aspects not least were disregarded negligently. The question whether Greece was capable of the joining because of serious structural difficulties received little attention. The government Schmidt/Genscher thought to be able to overcome all problems with the transfer of financial resources which especially the Greek government under Prime Minister Papandreou demanded.


Author(s):  
Afroz Ahmad ◽  
Usha Roopnarain

The last Indian parliamentary election held in 2014, proved to be the finest example of India’s age-old commitment towards the pinnacle of democratic norms. India had set a niche by conducting the largest democratic franchise in history. First time ever since the 1984, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved the majority in the Lok Sabha without clubbing with coalition partners. It also got the absolute mandate to rule India’s federal government by ending the Congress monopoly. Interestingly, the Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi in his campaigns criticized Congress-led United Progressive Alliance II (UPA II) for its impotency towards establishing friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbors. He also gave assurance that if his party (BJP) got the mandate, his leadership would adopt appropriate measures to resuscitate convivial ties with neighbors. Since forming the government, Prime Minister Modi has been persistently trying to pursue those promises by proceeding towards friendly ties with India’s neighbors. In the light of above discussion, this paper seeks to critically analyze the progress in Indo-Nepal relations under BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Chapnick

In January 2019, a leading Canadian foreign policy blog, OpenCanada.org, declared that “[u]nder the government of Justin Trudeau, Canada has embraced a feminist foreign policy—gradually at first, and with fervor over the past year.” Although critics have debated the policy’s effectiveness, the embrace, if not also the fervor, was indisputable. By 2019, the Trudeau government’s second foreign minister, Chrystia Freeland, was proclaiming Canada’s feminist approach to international relations openly and regularly. The international community had also noticed. This article investigates the origins of the new Canadian foreign policy “brand.” It finds that, contrary to popular thinking, the prime minister himself played at most a minor role in the initiation of what became a full-fledged transformation of Canada’s global image.


2012 ◽  
Vol 02 (12) ◽  
pp. 01-07
Author(s):  
Awe A.A

The paper examines the mobilization of domestic financial resources for agricultural productivity in Nigeria with a view to identify the contributions of the various sources of finance to agricultural productivity in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper employed Vector Auto Regressive Model (VAR) to analyze time series data from (1980 – 2009). The paper identified the various instruments and strategies used by the government for mobilizing resources for the agricultural sector in Nigeria to include subsidy and agricultural credit policies that were financed through Nigerian Agricultural Credit Bank (NACB), credit facilities from Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries at the state level, credit through Commercial and Merchant Banks and provision of agricultural credit to the defunct Commodity Board by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The OLS (VAR) result revealed positive relationships between the variables and the variance decomposition measured the proportion of forecast error. The paper therefore recommend that the Federal government recurrent expenditure on agriculture should be reviewed upward for enhanced agricultural productivity and that both the Federal government and the Commercial Banks should mobilize more financial resources toward the agricultural sector to boost agricultural productivity which would guaranteed maximum agricultural productivity in Nigeria.


Author(s):  
John T. Lauridsen

John T. Lauridsen: The government’s recommendations were not voiced in vain. Erik Scavenius’ meeting with the press on 14 September 1942 Erik Scavenius did not hold many major press conferences in his time as Foreign Minister, nor as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the period 1940–43. An exception occurred on 14 September 1942, when a great number of issues coincided and led him to hold a large scale meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain simultaneously to prominent members of Danish press, politicians and civil servants what the government’s policy was, how the government and its policy was handled in the press and in particular, how the government’s policy should be presented. Both the government’s partners and the press were severely criticized and it was implied there was a government mole so that confidential information was being leaked. The press needed to understand its responsibility at this difficult time in Denmark. The people from the press were allowed to respond and on the whole were seemingly receptive to the instructions. What took place at the meeting was not reported in the newspapers the following day. Instead, background material was provided with the intent of counteracting tendencies in the press running counter to government policy.


Author(s):  
Kevin Featherstone ◽  
Dimitris Papadimitriou

In recent years, significant attention has focused on the reform ‘failures’ of Greece in the context of its European Union membership and the implementation of its bailout commitments. Systemic public-policy constraints are increasingly recognized, but our understanding of how the senior echelons of the Greek government are able to coordinate the policy process remains rather incomplete. This chapter examines the evolution of the Greek core executive since the transition to democracy in 1974 and offers an appraisal of the efforts of successive Greek prime ministers to manage government business. The main argument put forward is that the extensive formal powers afforded to the prime minister by the Greek Constitution have not materialized in an effective system of governance at the top of the government. In reality, the structure is one of a ‘solitary centre’ amidst a ‘segmented government’ in which the prime minister lacks the necessary resources to effectively coordinate and control its direction. The chapter discusses the reasons behind this discrepancy by reference to both structural and agency-driven explanations.


Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  

The Prime Minister of Japan announced Japan’s willingness to lend up to $100 billion to the Fund to help overcome the current crisis in the lead up to the November 2008 summit of the Leaders of the Group of Twenty. The loan proposed by the Government of Japan would make a substantial contribution to the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the Fund’s financial resources. The Government of Japan intends that the proposed loan be used to support the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members in the current global financial turbulence, including to the emerging market economies that are expected to continue their roles as drivers of global growth.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pnina Lahav

On 19 January 1976, the Government of Israel announced its intention to impose censorship on two categories of information:(1) Information about the existence or content of a document relating to Israel's foreign affairs which is classified “top secret” or similarly classified and which is addressed from Israel to a foreign country or from a foreign country to Israel.(2) Information relating to a visit by an Israeli official to a foreign country or a visit by a foreign official to Israel, or a meeting between an Israeli and a foreign official—when no diplomatic relations obtain between Israel and that country and when the visit or meeting was not conducted in public nor officially announced in Israel.This step was the Government's response to a series of leakages which appeared in the preceding weeks in the press in Israel. Two publicized items had particularly outraged the Government. One item discussed President Ford's secret message to Prime Minister Rabin. The other item disclosed a secret visit by Foreign Minister Allon to Europe.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26

This section comprises international, Arab, Israeli, and U.S. documents and source materials, as well as an annotated list of recommended reports. Significant developments this quarter: In the international diplomatic arena, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2334, reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements and calling for a return to peace negotiations. Additionally, former U.S. secretary of state John Kerry delivered a final address on the Israel-Palestine conflict, outlining a groundwork for negotiations. Two weeks later, international diplomats met in Paris to establish incentives for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to return to the negotiating table. Despite international discussions of peace talks and the impediment settlements pose to a two-state solution, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial Regulation Law, enabling the government to retroactively legalize settlements and confiscate Palestinian land throughout the West Bank. Meanwhile, U.S. president Donald Trump took office on 20 January 2017, and he wasted no time before inviting Netanyahu to the White House for their first meeting, in February.


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