Implizite Staatsverschuldung, Strukturreformen und Europäischer Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Fuest
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Member State ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Public ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Social Security Reforms ◽  
Special Rules

AbstractThe public debt rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact limit explicit debt but neglect the implicit debt embodied in pay as you go social insurance systems. This does not only imply that the pact fails to take into account the consequences of implicit debt for the sustainability of public finances. It is also possible that a member state violates the pact by transforming implicit into explicit debt in the context of social security reforms, without changing the overall sustainability of its public finances. The pact does include special rules for taking into account reforms of social insurance systems. But these rules are only partly appropriate.

scholarly journals THE CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE RISE OF THE SLOVENIAN CONSOLIDATION STATE

2021 ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Marko Hočevar
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Capitalist State ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Eu

Abstract. The purpose of the article is to explain the creation of the Slovenian debt state and its transformation into a consolidation state after the crisis of 2008. When the crisis struck Slovenia in 2009, the banking system was near collapse. Through the recapitalisations of the banking system the public debt began to grow. After a couple of years and under the structural pressures of rating agencies and pressures from the EU, the Slovenian state had to adopt austerity measures to consolidate its public finances, while limiting the scope of democracy. The main finding of the article is that the crisis of 2008 fundamentally changed the Slovenian state. Keywords: capitalist state, consolidation state, debt, Slovenia, democracy

Taking Stock of the EU Fiscal Rules over the Past 20 Years and Options for Reform

2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 861-894
Author(s):  
Christophe Kamps ◽  
Nadine Leiner-Killinger
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Maastricht Treaty ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Past ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This paper reviews how the European Union’s fiscal rules have developed from the Maastricht Treaty that established the single monetary policy up until today. It shows that the design of these rules did not always follow economic logic but often resulted from political constraints, giving rise to some flaws in the framework from its very beginning. At the same time, the repeated attempts to adjust the fiscal framework to a multitude of circumstances over the past 25 years have made it overly complex and incoherent. Based on a finding that euro area countries’ compliance with the EU fiscal rules has been unsatisfactory, the paper concludes that in its current shape the Stability and Growth Pact is an insufficient disciplining device in good economic times, with the consequence that there are no fiscal buffers, in particular in high-debt countries, such that growth can be supported in economic troughs. Based on this finding, the paper reviews reform options for making the fiscal framework more effective in bringing about sounder public finances and avoiding the pro-cyclicality observed over the past two decades.

The case of the undying debt

2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
François R. Velde
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Public ◽  
French Government ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
The French Revolution

The French government currently honors a very unusual debt contract: an annuity that was issued in 1738 and currently yields €1.20 per year, payable to the descendants of its original recipient. I tell the story of this unique debt, which serves as an anecdotal but symbolic summary of French public finances since the eighteenth century. Created by a powerful nobleman for one of his servants, it survived the turmoil of the French Revolution, became part of the public debt and has been scrupulously honored to this day, even though its value has been eroded away by decades of inflation.

scholarly journals THE ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION OF RETIREMENT AGE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Cabo ◽  
Ana García-González
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Nonlinear Dependence ◽  
Retirement Age ◽  
The Public ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Pension Benefits ◽  
Social Security Benefits

An aging population in modern societies has put stress on public pension systems. To prevent social security deficits from increasing to unbounded levels of public debt we focus on two policies: reducing the generosity of pension benefits, determined by the government, and postponing the effective retirement age, chosen by employees. An atomistic employee would disregard the effect of his retirement decision on the public debt and would retire as soon as possible. Conversely, an ideal farsighted agency considering all current and future employees would postpone retirement, thereby alleviating the pressure on public debt and allowing a more generous long-run pension. The government may design a proper incentive strategy to induce myopic atomistic decision makers to act nonmyopically. This strategy is a two-part incentive with nonlinear dependence on the stock of public debt. It is credible if deceiving employees slightly adjust their retirement-age decisions to increments in the public debt.

DEUDA, PAPELES Y COMPROMISOS EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL CRÉDITO PÚBLICO. LA CAJA NACIONAL DE FONDOS DE SUD AMÉRICA (BUENOS AIRES, 1818–1821)

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Martín L. E. Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Buenos Aires ◽  
Financial Innovation ◽  
South American ◽  
The South ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Credit

ABSTRACT The South American Funds National Exchequer was established in 1818 to contribute to the consolidation of the public debt of Buenos Aires. It was the first financial innovation since the revolutionary outbreak in Buenos Aires, and its failure allowed the authorities to understand the limits of the fiscal and financial commitment they proposed by means of that institution. Its suppression, in 1821, offered an antecedent to develop a deep reform of the financial institutional matrix of Buenos Aires, based on the Public Credit office, the Amortization Exchequer and the Bank of Buenos Aires. The South American Funds National Exchequer was, thus, the first movement in the negotiation on the terms of the financial commitment assumed by the nascent State. This paper analyzes the 973 accounting entries of the institution, providing an interpretation of that failure and its importance for the course of public finances in Buenos Aires.

scholarly journals Wybrane problemy przedsądowego postępowania w zakresie ubezpieczeń społecznych

2017 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 71-83
Author(s):  
Marek Pogonowski
Keyword(s):  
Social Insurance ◽  
National Interest ◽  
The State ◽  
Public Finances ◽  
The Public ◽  
Social Insurance Institution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Internal Procedures ◽  
Flow Of Information ◽  
Procedural Aspect

SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PREJUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INSURANCEThe article describes the procedural aspect of the Social Insurance Institution which, as an institution performing the tasks of the state, conducts proceedings which assess the rights and obli­gations of customers. Conducted proceeding is terminated by adecision. Generally it is adeclara­tory decision, which means that it doesn’t create aright to benefits, only confirms them. The Social Insurance Institution issues aconstitutive decisions, giving law, so-called decisions discretion.The proceeding in the field of social insurance must take into account the principle of respect for the public finances. Balancing the interests of the citizen and the national interest requires know­ledge of law, ability to interpret and use it, but also well-educated, competent employees, precise internal procedures, efficient flow of information and modern tools.

scholarly journals CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES AS AN ECONOMIC POLICY TOOL WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Marta Postuła ◽  
Justyna Sobolewska ◽  
Jacek Tomkiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Research ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Fiscal Imbalance ◽  
The Eu

The article presents the results of research indicating to what extent the convergence programmes submitted to the European Commission prove country’s willingness to improve the fiscal policy in a desired way and to what extent they constitute a mere fulfilment of a formal duty without any actual intent to achieve the indicated macroeconomic parameters. The conducted analyses allow to conclude that the European countries, while preparing the prognostic documents, have a tendency to hide the scale of the fiscal imbalance that reflects a lack of consistency between the current balance of the sector and an increase in the public debt. The results of quantitative and qualitative research indicate that, regardless of the implemented regulatory solutions at the EU level in the framework of the modified Stability and Growth Pact, certain flaws of the tools used for economic policy coordination at the European level are still visible.

scholarly journals The SGP – Faulty by Design or Made Faulty by Politicians? An Assessment Based on a Simulation Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-265
Author(s):  
Šárka Horáková ◽  
Robert Jahoda
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
Real Data ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Initial Results

Abstract By joining the European Monetary Union (the “EMU”), member countries lost the ability to use monetary policy as a tool for macroeconomic regulation. The attention was then focused on regulation of fiscal policy and Stability and Growth Pact (the “SGP”) was the instrument agreed upon. The states of the EMU have agreed to meet the 3% of GDP requirement for the maximum annual public budget deficit. Based on evolution of public debt in member countries, we can say that the SGP has failed as a tool for fiscal discipline. In this paper, we answer the question of whether the failure was due to the incorrect concept of the SGP or whether the development of the debt was affected more by arbitrary disrespect of the agreed rules. The two reasons mentioned above are interdependent. To separate them, we construct a dynamic model of EU countries’ public debt. By using real data, we simulate the potential values of public debt in a situation where the SGP rules have been respected in recent years. Comparing the results for the potential debt given by simulation of the model with the current real values, we are able to quantify the impact of non-compliance for each country. The initial results indicate that there are both EU states where non-compliance led to a negligible increase in public debt - up to 7% of GDP - and other states where this factor caused the growth of public debt by more than 30% of GDP.

A Slippery Slope: Economists and Social Insurance in the United States

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard B. Du Boff
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Young People ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Negative Images

Since the 1980s welfare state protections have been blamed for a host of economic problems. In the United States, conservatives have always disliked Social Security but could not effectively attack this popular program until the 1980s, when they devised a new tactic—warning young people that they would never get their “money's worth” from Social Security, which is on the brink of “bankruptcy.” The political climate, dominated by a drive to cut back “big government,” also became favorable for attempts to destabilize Social Security politically. Thus, negative images of Social Security have been forced onto the public agenda, and economists who consider themselves “liberal” have uncritically accepted this new set of political “givens.” It is an example of how they address “crises” as separable issues tied to no particular social context.

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