scholarly journals Slovakia and V4: European Dimension

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 38-44
Author(s):  
Viktor Nikitin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
European Dimension ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
Visegrad Group ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Government Coalition ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

After the formation in March 2020 of a new government coalition led by Igor Matovic, the Slovak government has adopted the foreign policy concept analyzing the European agenda. The Slovak Prime Minister participates in several meetings of the EU Council and at the EU summit on July 17-21, 2020. Before his arrival in Brussels, the Slovak politician visited all the countries of the Visegrad Four. Both the meetings of the EU Council and bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the Visegrad Group had a pronounced «pandemic» component: they mainly discussed the EU instruments for overcoming the consequences of COVID-19 (EU budget, Recovery Fund and Next generation EU). The organization of a videoconference between the Prime Ministers of the Central European countries and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 19, 2020, had a very positive effect on the satisfactory results for the Visegrad countries of the EU Summit. As the pandemic subsides, on the agenda of European Council appeared foreign policy issues, especially the Belarus crises.

scholarly journals Politicized Transnationalism: The Visegrád Countries in the Refugee Crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koß ◽  
Astrid Séville
Keyword(s):  
Regional Integration ◽  
European Politics ◽  
Refugee Crisis ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Economic Preferences ◽  
Visegrad Group ◽  
Collective Actor ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

Existing research on the evolution of European integration has pitted economic against identity issues. In the economic sphere, governments are arguably able to pursue their preferences more independently. If, however, identity issues become politicized this is supposed to suggest that governments lose their dominant position in integration and gradually become agents of Eurosceptic parties and/or electorates. This article looks at a phenomenon neither the intergovernmentalist nor the postfunctionalist perspective can fully explain: the emergence of the Visegrád Group (V4) as a collective actor in European politics in early 2016. This emergence occurred in the wake of the refugee crisis during which the identity issue of migration was politicized. However, there was no coherent partisan composition uniting V4 governments. Based on a sequence elaboration of all press statements of meetings of the V4 Prime Ministers since their EU-accession in 2004, we show that what at first sight appears to be informed by anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments may in fact display a more ambivalent position towards regional integration. The post-refugee crisis V4 appears as a case of politicized transnationalism—that is, cooperation to achieve transnational interests under the condition of politicization. This transnational interest not only comprised opposition to a relocation of migrants, but also the maintenance of a core transnational freedom within the EU, namely free movement under the Schengen acquis. We conclude that, under the condition of increasing politicization, identity issues help to forge government alliances of governments pursuing economic preferences.

scholarly journals Perspectives for German-Polish Relations in the EU-27

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Christian Schweiger
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
The Future ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
Migration Crisis ◽  
Visegrad Group ◽  
Governance Architecture ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

In recent years the seemingly firm historical ties between Warsaw and Berlin have become increasingly strained. This results from a growing political asymmetry between the two countries. Germany moved into a semi-hegemonial position under the conditions of the triple crisis of banking, economy and sovereign debt in the eurozone. Consequently, German chancellor Angela Merkel was in a strong enough position to implement ordoliberal reforms of the eurozone’s governance architecture, which were promoted as an approach without alternatives. Merkel maintained her uncompromising stance during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, when she demanded implementation of compulsory migrant distribution quotas across the EU. Poland and the Visegrád countries had initially strongly supported German leadership in resolving the eurozone crisis. The alienation from Germany’s European agenda however became significant under the conditions of the migration crisis. Here the firm opposition of Poland and the rest of the Visegrád Group towards Germany’s preferences shows a strategic mismatch between the EU’s liberal core, which is spearheaded by Germany, and the concept of the “illiberal” state, which Poland has embraced under the PiS government. The willingness to resolve these differences will be crucial in determining the future shape of Polish-German relations.

Turkish-EU migrant policies will continue to diverge

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Press Conference ◽  
Syrian Refugees ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Member States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
The Eu

Significance German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said Germany is "ready to offer support" on four Turkish demands in return for cooperating with the EU in the migrant crisis. At a joint press conference in Istanbul yesterday, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu repeated Ankara's four conditions for implementing an action plan against the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe. It wants more EU aid for those refugees inside Turkey; three chapters opened in Turkey's EU accession negotiations; visa liberalisation for Turks travelling to the EU; and a seat for Turkey at EU summits. Impacts Erdogan's resentment over EU condemnations of growing authoritarianism is so deep that any EU softening will have little impact. Davutoglu and Erdogan present Turkey as so important globally, that the EU is desperate that it join; they have no interest in accession. Several EU member states have severe reservations about visa liberalisation, funding aid and opening new accession chapters.

scholarly journals Britain between the U.S. and Europe

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Ananieva Elena
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Eu

Prime Minister T. May has put forward the concept of "Global Britain". After the United Kingdom had left the EU, the concept was formalized under the government of Boris Johnson in the document “Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy "Global Britain in a Competitive Age"”. The article presents an analysis of its goals, methods and practical implementation. Britain, realizing itself as a "middle power", intends to build a system of alliances to counter China and Russia, the latter designated as an ”acute direct threat” to the UK.

scholarly journals Russian-Greek Relations: Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel?

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-175
Author(s):  
Yu. D. Kvashnin
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
European Integration ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Eastern Enlargement ◽  
Political Dialogue ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
Ukrainian Crisis ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Of Greece ◽  
The Eu

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, relations between Russia and Greece entered a protracted period of stagnation, which continues to this day, despite numerous attempts by both countries to intensify political dialogue. One of the reasons is the general degradation of Russia’s relations with the Western countries, which intensified in the middle of the last decade against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, the “sanctions wars” have become an important, but not the only reason for the reduction in bilateral contacts. There were other factors as well: Greece’s dissatisfaction with the excessively close cooperation between Russia and Turkey, different views on NATO’s Eastern enlargement, as well as interchurch disagreements.On the economic plane, Russian-Greek cooperation was hampered by the desire of Greece to diversify its energy supplies, the food embargo regime introduced by Russia against the EU countries, as well as the policy of investment protectionism pursued by Greece towards Russian companies.The greatest success has been achieved in the humanitarian field. Due to the cultural and historical closeness of the two peoples, as well as due to the disappointment of the Greeks in the results of European integration, Greece remains one of the few countries where most people treat Russia with sympathy. At the same time, the perception of Russia by the Greeks is distorted and often fragmentary. The positive effect of Russian-Greek humanitarian cooperation is often overshadowed by negative coverage of Russian foreign policy in the Greek media.

scholarly journals Visegrad Group and Relations with Russia

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radovan Višňovský
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Central European ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
The Past ◽  
Visegrad Group ◽  
The Eu

This article refers to the Central European countries by meaning the Visegrad Group countries (V4) - Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. The development of the Visegrad Group aimed on integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures fulfilled its promise, nevertheless, the membership in Western structures does not necessarily mean the loss of Russian influence in the region of Central Europe. On the contrary, the region’s connection to Russia developed in the past remained to some extent even after the process of political transition in particular countries. Such connections are responsible for foreign policy discourse with a plethora of questions and misunderstandings on issues related to the political attitudes of Visegrad members towards Russia and some contradictory stances of the V4 countries among themselves as well with respect to Brussels. The EU’s politics of sanctions towards Russia is having a direct, counterproductive effect in Visegrad, what is resulting in undermined relations and weakened coherence inside the EU with the emergence of anti-Western and pro-Russian political parties that creates the space for Russian foreign policy to achieve more influence in the region. This article is analyzing the background of such discourse and some of the reasons behind the pro-Russian sentiment or discrepancies and non-coherence of the EU members’ opinions on Russia. At the same time, the awareness of the outcomes of this article can be relevant in analyzing the possibilities to avoid the deepening of the conflictual foreign policy between the EU and Russia, or the Visegrad and Russia, respectively. The research is built on both, primary and secondary sources, related mainly to the evolution of relations in specific areas between both sides. The mentioned historical perspective creates the basis of the analysis and is further put into contemporary discourse to find the answers on the question: what are the reasons for non-coherence of the EU and Visegrad towards the policy against Russia? To achieve the above-mentioned results, the analysis is provided in chronological perspective using the mixed methods by exploring the official documents, scholarly articles published on the topic, and public polls as well.

scholarly journals Globalisation Scepticism in the Visegrad Countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451
Author(s):  
Marianna Dudášová
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
European Integration ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Parallel Processes ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Visegrad Group ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
The Eu

Recent developments in the European Union revealed significant differences between the Visegrad countries and the remaining members of the EU. The enlargement euphoria of the first decade of the 21st century was replaced by certain enlargement fatigue, manifesting itself not only in concrete governmental policies but also in the public opinion towards the EU. As European integration and globalisation are parallel processes, declining support for European integration must not necessarily be the result of disagreement with specific policies and should be examined in the broader context of globalisation fears and anxieties. The article describes variations in globalisation scepticism between the group of Visegrad countries and the remaining countries of the EU as well as variations within the Visegrad group itself, focusing on the main drivers of economic globalisation – international trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration. The development of public opinion since the financial and economic crisis in 2009 indicates that Visegrad countries should not be treated as a uniform bloc of globalisation sceptics as there are significant differences in opinion between the more pessimistic Czechs and Slovaks and the more optimistic Poles and Hungarians. Their globalisation scepticism also varies across different dimensions of globalisation and is fuelled by different motivations.

scholarly journals Leading by Example: The Work of Minister K. K. Shailaja of Kerala State, India in Combating COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. p1
Author(s):  
Amb. John O. Kakonge
Keyword(s):  
Women Leaders ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
African Woman ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
Paper Briefly ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Angela Merkel ◽  
Kerala State

In recent months, much public attention has been given to the women leaders of developed countries who have done well in containing the coronavirus and ensuring a low rate of infection and death. Such leaders include Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand; Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany; Erna Solberg, Prime Minister of Norway; Katrin Jacobsdottir, Prime Minister of Iceland; Sanna Marin, Prime Minister of Finland; and Tsai Ing-wen, President of Taiwan. In addition to their own expertise, these leaders have been fortunate in being able to rely on the support of well-trained public officials and scientists, adequate financial resources, and well-equipped health facilities. Little has been written, however, about women leaders from developing countries who are trying hard to contain the pandemic. Sadly, in Africa, a continent with 54 states, only Namibia and Togo have women prime ministers, while the only African woman president hails from Ethiopia.This paper briefly examines the work of K.K. Shailaja, Minister of Health and Social Welfare of the state of Kerala in India, and proposes how lessons from her work could be useful for other parts of the developing world, especially in Africa.

Taro Kono could be Japan’s next prime minister

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Administrative Reform ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
High Profile ◽  
New Directions

Significance He has held high-profile posts since 2015, as minister for foreign affairs and then defence during Shinzo Abe's administration. He now oversees Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s signature ‘digitalisation’ campaign as minister for administrative reform. Last month, Suga made him ‘COVID-19 vaccine czar’, adding to his portfolio. Impacts Under Kono, the LDP would be taken in new directions after Suga’s continuity strategy. Kono is neo-liberal on social and economic policy and less of a cultural conservative than recent prime ministers. Despite his fluent English and contacts in Washington, Kono would tilt foreign policy in an Asia-centric direction.

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