scholarly journals Perspectives for German-Polish Relations in the EU-27

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Christian Schweiger

In recent years the seemingly firm historical ties between Warsaw and Berlin have become increasingly strained. This results from a growing political asymmetry between the two countries. Germany moved into a semi-hegemonial position under the conditions of the triple crisis of banking, economy and sovereign debt in the eurozone. Consequently, German chancellor Angela Merkel was in a strong enough position to implement ordoliberal reforms of the eurozone’s governance architecture, which were promoted as an approach without alternatives. Merkel maintained her uncompromising stance during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, when she demanded implementation of compulsory migrant distribution quotas across the EU. Poland and the Visegrád countries had initially strongly supported German leadership in resolving the eurozone crisis. The alienation from Germany’s European agenda however became significant under the conditions of the migration crisis. Here the firm opposition of Poland and the rest of the Visegrád Group towards Germany’s preferences shows a strategic mismatch between the EU’s liberal core, which is spearheaded by Germany, and the concept of the “illiberal” state, which Poland has embraced under the PiS government. The willingness to resolve these differences will be crucial in determining the future shape of Polish-German relations.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-199
Author(s):  
Diana Ivanova

Abstract The migration crisis and related challenges for the future of the Schengen area are some of the main problems facing the EU. The opinion of the Visegrad Four on this issue, however, seriously differs from that of Brussels. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are firmly against the quota principle in the allocation of migrants. The aim of this article is to present the migrant crisis as a top priority during the fifth in the history Polish rotating presidency of the Visegrad Four - from July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017. This objective will be realized through the implementation of basic tasks - analysis of the documents adopted at the forums of the organization, and the views of leading politicians from the Visegrad countries


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 38-44
Author(s):  
Viktor Nikitin ◽  

After the formation in March 2020 of a new government coalition led by Igor Matovic, the Slovak government has adopted the foreign policy concept analyzing the European agenda. The Slovak Prime Minister participates in several meetings of the EU Council and at the EU summit on July 17-21, 2020. Before his arrival in Brussels, the Slovak politician visited all the countries of the Visegrad Four. Both the meetings of the EU Council and bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the Visegrad Group had a pronounced «pandemic» component: they mainly discussed the EU instruments for overcoming the consequences of COVID-19 (EU budget, Recovery Fund and Next generation EU). The organization of a videoconference between the Prime Ministers of the Central European countries and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 19, 2020, had a very positive effect on the satisfactory results for the Visegrad countries of the EU Summit. As the pandemic subsides, on the agenda of European Council appeared foreign policy issues, especially the Belarus crises.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 351-375
Author(s):  
Mateusz Rafał ◽  
Dominik Borek

This article takes up the innovatory subject of cooperation in the field of football and the tourism sector by the Visegrad Group states. The subject matter of this study has not been widely discussed in the literature, hence most of de lege ferenda postulates are open to further discussion. The current Visegrad Group was created as a political project, not an evolutionary social initiative. This does not mean, however, that the societies of its member states are significantly different from each other, and the structure itself is exotic. The benefits of an extended cooperation, which seems not to have an alternative, for all the participants are fully understood. Therefore, the direction of common thinking about maximizing profits in the developing sector of tourism, and making the most of the social potential of football, can be an attractive platform for international dialogue and extended cooperation among the V4 countries. The baggage of history, geographic and cultural proximity, the migration crisis, as well as the imperialist policy of the neighbouring Russia effectively motivate to strengthen cooperation and create stronger mechanisms with each other. It is indisputable that the tendencies for cooperation in the Visegrad countries are not a novelty.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (32) ◽  
pp. 37-63
Author(s):  
Petr Rožňák

Since 2015, the migration crisis continues with varying intensity, and international security crisis as well as debt, institutional, and personnel crises are worsening, not only in the Eurozone. Probably war, economic and climate immigrants will continue to move into the Schengen area, showing how helpless the European Union is. Angela Merkel said there was no upper limit for the number of people admitted to escape political persecution. Germany leaves the Dublin system inconsistently, runs counter to European cohesion and stops differentiating between immigrants and refugees. Migration is shared by the EU Member States. Between “old” and “new” EU countries, scissors are opened. Moreover, in some European regions (France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece) there are closed communities where majority law is not valid. Our current socio-political and economic existence is based on a traditional understanding of security. However, in the third decade of the 21st century the image of prosperity and security is to be seen from a different perspective than in previous years. Dramatic development has led to the mass migration of African and Asian people and to the division of the European Union, especially regarding the mechanism of redistribution of asylum seekers.


European View ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktória Jančošekovà

Regional cooperation is mutually beneficial collaboration between neighbouring countries. This holds regardless of whether it is a matter of cooperation between the Benelux countries, the Nordic–Baltic states, France and Germany, or the Visegrad countries. The last-mentioned countries' dismissive attitude to tackling the migration crisis has thrust them into the limelight. The most recent cooperative forums in the Central Eastern Europe region, such as the Slavkov Triangle and the Three Seas Initiative, evidence a new dynamic and a regrouping of forces on the basis of national interests and EU themes. Western and Eastern Europe have different approaches to the most pressing challenges, such as migration. These differences have caused deep divisions between their respective leaders. However, the disagreements on the migration issue and the future of the EU notwithstanding, regional cooperation among the Central and Eastern European countries remains valuable in areas that include the integration process, security and defence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koß ◽  
Astrid Séville

Existing research on the evolution of European integration has pitted economic against identity issues. In the economic sphere, governments are arguably able to pursue their preferences more independently. If, however, identity issues become politicized this is supposed to suggest that governments lose their dominant position in integration and gradually become agents of Eurosceptic parties and/or electorates. This article looks at a phenomenon neither the intergovernmentalist nor the postfunctionalist perspective can fully explain: the emergence of the Visegrád Group (V4) as a collective actor in European politics in early 2016. This emergence occurred in the wake of the refugee crisis during which the identity issue of migration was politicized. However, there was no coherent partisan composition uniting V4 governments. Based on a sequence elaboration of all press statements of meetings of the V4 Prime Ministers since their EU-accession in 2004, we show that what at first sight appears to be informed by anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiments may in fact display a more ambivalent position towards regional integration. The post-refugee crisis V4 appears as a case of politicized transnationalism—that is, cooperation to achieve transnational interests under the condition of politicization. This transnational interest not only comprised opposition to a relocation of migrants, but also the maintenance of a core transnational freedom within the EU, namely free movement under the Schengen acquis. We conclude that, under the condition of increasing politicization, identity issues help to forge government alliances of governments pursuing economic preferences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451
Author(s):  
Marianna Dudášová

Recent developments in the European Union revealed significant differences between the Visegrad countries and the remaining members of the EU. The enlargement euphoria of the first decade of the 21st century was replaced by certain enlargement fatigue, manifesting itself not only in concrete governmental policies but also in the public opinion towards the EU. As European integration and globalisation are parallel processes, declining support for European integration must not necessarily be the result of disagreement with specific policies and should be examined in the broader context of globalisation fears and anxieties. The article describes variations in globalisation scepticism between the group of Visegrad countries and the remaining countries of the EU as well as variations within the Visegrad group itself, focusing on the main drivers of economic globalisation – international trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration. The development of public opinion since the financial and economic crisis in 2009 indicates that Visegrad countries should not be treated as a uniform bloc of globalisation sceptics as there are significant differences in opinion between the more pessimistic Czechs and Slovaks and the more optimistic Poles and Hungarians. Their globalisation scepticism also varies across different dimensions of globalisation and is fuelled by different motivations.


Subject Reactions to Brexit among eastern EU member states. Significance Leaders of the Visegrad Group (V4) of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have called for a major institutional overhaul of the EU following the UK vote to leave the EU ('Brexit'). They singled out the EU's handling of the migration crisis as a key factor behind the 'Leave' victory in the UK referendum, and rejected calls from Brussels and several member states for closer integration, instead demanding that powers be repatriated to national capitals to restore citizens' trust and make the EU more democratically accountable. Impacts The V4 will seek to mend relations with Berlin, in the relatively favourable political constellation in Germany before the 2017 elections. V4 governments will aim to hold 'mini-lateral' consultations with the United Kingdom on the terms of its planned exit from the EU. Brexit will dominate Slovakia's EU presidency, with V4 coordinating their responses to help limit the negative fallout for the region.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Věra Stojarová

AbstractThe paper looks at the political party scene in Visegrad countries before and after the influx of refugees and compares how much the negative reactions were instrumentalised not only by the extremist and radical right parties but by the newly emerged populist formations as well as the well-established mainstream parties across the whole political spectra. Until the “migration crisis”, the far right parties focused mainly on Roma issue, anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-establishment and used anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-German, anti-Czech, anti-Slovak or anti-Hungarian card. Since 2015, the parties re-oriented against immigrants, more precisely against the Muslims presenting them as a threat and also increased their criticism on the EU. However, the mainstream parties also accepted far right topics and actively promoted them. The result is then mainstreaming of xenophobia, nationalism and marginalization of far right parties as their flexible voters move to the populist subjects.


Author(s):  
Daria Sevastianova ◽  
Leili Rustamova

This article analyzes the German leadership in settlement of the three crises faced by the European Union – the eurozone crisis (2009-2015), migration crisis (2015-2020), and COVID-19 crisis (2020-2021) – in order to determine the specificity of the leadership of Germany in the EU. The conceptual approach for the analysis includes the leadership criteria offered by the German researcher Joachim Schild, which allow drawing the line between the hegemonic and non-hegemonic leadership, as well as consider the factor of legitimacy and soft power. The author also discusses the role of factors that hold back the fulfillment of the leadership potential of Germany. The novelty this research consists in application of this approach for determining the specificity of German leadership on the example of settlement of crises and challenges faced by the European Union, including the ongoing crisis caused by COVID-19 pandemic. The use of case study method allows concluding that Germany, indued with, is capable to show its leadership potential only in the conditions of cooperation with France. The author believes that its successful leadership is impeded by the domestic political factors and politicization of the European agenda in the EU member-states. The relevance of drawn conclusions consists in their contribution to further analysis and forecast of the foreign policy actions of Germany aimed at settling the COVID-19 crisis and other challenges faced by the European Union at the current stage of development.


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