scholarly journals A Study on the Nuclear Potential Strategy of North Korea in the 1950s and 1960s: Focusing on the Continuance and Change of the Peaceful Utilization Policy of Nuclear Power

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-93
Author(s):  
정현숙
2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei N. Lankov

This article, based on newly declassified material from the Russian archives, deals with the fate of non-Communist parties in North Korea in the 1950s. Like the “people's democracies” in Eastern Europe, North Korea had (and still technically has) a few non-Communist parties. The ruling Communist party included these parties within the framework of a “united front,” designed to project the facade of a multiparty state, to control domestic dissent, and to establish links with parties in South Korea. The article traces the history of these parties under Soviet and local Communist control from the mid-1940s to their gradual evisceration in the 1950s.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. A09
Author(s):  
Thomas Lean ◽  
Sally Horrocks

Between the 1950s and the 1980s the British nuclear industry engaged with ordinary people in a wide range of ways. These included articles in the print media, exhibitions and educational resources as well as through open days, developing nature reserves and building relations with the local communities around nuclear sites. This paper draws on recently collected oral history interviews and archival material to consider what was one of the largest and best resourced efforts to communicate science to the British public between the 1950s and the 1980s.


Significance Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has made steady progress in nuclear weapons technology. The July 4 ICBM test reflects its progress on delivery systems with longer ranges and increased sophistication. Pyongyang routinely claims to possess the status as a full nuclear power with the ability to retaliate with strategic nuclear arms against a US attack. Impacts Beijing is likely to share Washington’s concerns about nuclear technology transfer by a more secure North Korean regime. However, Washington is likely to position more rapid-strike conventional forces in the region, over China’s vociferous objections. Once North Korea is confident in its deterrent, it may be willing to offer a cessation of testing in exchange for sanctions relief.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1895
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962097133
Author(s):  
Min-hyung Kim

This article seeks to provide a theoretically compelling account for North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and explores its implications for East Asian security. Its main research question is as follows: despite the obvious risks of going nuclear, what makes North Korea so desperate in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities? Contrary to the extant accounts that only emphasize either nonsecurity variables or an “external security” factor, this article conceptualizes North Korea’s security considerations as “regime survival” and explains its strategic choice from it. The central thesis of this article is that North Korea’s decision to go nuclear is a strategic choice, of which the purpose is to achieve its goals of safeguarding independence from external powers as well as ensuring regime security. North Korea pursues nuclear weapons because they not only protect Pyongyang’s regime from foreign aggressions but also help to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s domestic power. North Korea also seeks nuclear weapons in order to safeguard its independence and autonomy from China because the removal of China’s influence is critical to ensuring its regime survival in the long run. North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and its emergence as a de facto nuclear power have significant implications for East Asian security.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 160-183
Author(s):  
Avram Agov

The decade of the 1950s was a formative period for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (dprk), one that shaped its integration into the international socialist system. This article examines the interaction between North Korea’s internal (institutional) and external (international) integration into the socialist system that, at this time, the Soviet Union and its East European bloc allies dominated. It argues that North Korea was more integrated into the socialist world than its nationalist ideology implied. The 1950s marked the culmination of the dprk’s connectivity to the international socialist world. The narrative begins in the second half of the 1940s with the building of North Korea’s socialist system. It then focuses on East European bloc aid to North Korea during and after the Korean War, as well as the dprk’s reactions to this fraternal assistance. By the second half of the 1950s, North Korea came to associate integration with dependency, generating nationalist impulses in dprk policy and laying the foundation for the juche (self-reliance) paradigm. North Korea’s nationalist ideology was part of a broader post-colonial nation building drive, but socialist interdependency also played a role in the dprk’s divergence, after the early 1960s, from the Soviet bloc and the People’s Republic of China.


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