scholarly journals A Geometria Dinâmica se Constituindo com as Ideias Geométricas de Edmund Husserl

Author(s):  
José Milton Lopes Pinheiro

Intenciona-se neste estudo compreender como se constituem as ideias husserlianas sobre Geometria e, como essas ideias podem se atualizar na constituição da Geometria Dinâmica. Para isso, são destacadas as ideias de Husserl que constituem um solo sobre o qual ele expõe seu pensar filosófico sobre a Geometria. Traz-se essas ideias articulando-as com a Geometria Dinâmica, que se presentifica em um tempo distante daquele em que Husserl expõe seus pensamentos. Husserl não vivenciou os avanços da ciência que nos faz disponível atualmente as tecnologias informáticas, portanto, em seus trabalhos não constam qualquer pensamento de uma Geometria com softwares. Assim, este estudo visa também, trazer compreensões de como pode se presentifica o pensamento husserliano nessa geometria que se atualiza com as tecnologias informáticas. Percebe-se convergências possíveis do pensamento husserliano à Geometria Dinâmica, quando o mesmo diz da espacialidade e dos invariantes que se mostram em variações possíveis.Palavras-chave: Geometria. Geometria Dinâmica. Husserl. EspacialidadeAbstractIn this study we intend to understand how the Husserlian ideas about Geometry are constituted and how these ideas can be updated in the constitution of Dynamic Geometry. For this, are highlights the ideas of Husserl that constitute a solo on which he exposes his philosophical thinking on the Geometry. It is brought these ideas by articulating them with Dynamic Geometry, which presents itself at a time distant from the one in which Husserl exposes his thoughts. Husserl did not experience the advances of the science that makes us available today the computer technologies, therefore, in his works do not include any thought of a Geometry with softwares. Thus, this study also aims to bring understanding of how Husserlian thinking can be present in this geometry that is updated with computer technologies. It is perceived possible convergences of Husserlian thought to Dynamic Geometry, when it says of spatiality and invariants that show themselves in possible variations.Keywords: Geometry. Dynamic Geometry. Husserl. Spatiality.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Hennigfeld

Since Plato’s metaphor of the light of knowledge used in the “Allegory of the Cave” from his dialogue Politeia, the concepts of Anschauen or Anschauung (intuition) and their corresponding lexical field, including the terms light, sun, and eye, represent key notions and much-debated issues in philosophical thinking. In his literary, scientific, and philosophical writings, Goethe does not articulate a systematic and explicit theory of these concepts; on the contrary, most of his remarks on the topic of “intuition” are aphoristic or tacitly integrated into his poetic and scientific works. One of his main contributions to the philosophical debates surrounding Anschauen and Anschauung is that he developed and integrated into his works different modes of a specifically creative and productive—as opposed to a merely receptive and sensory—form of Anschauen. This productive form of Anschauen, for which he also uses the terms “Phantasie” (phantasy), “Einbildungskraft” (imagination), “exakte sinnliche Phantasie” (exact sensory phantasy or imagination) or “anschauende Urteilskraft” (intuitive power of judgment) in various contexts, can serve as both a creative faculty in his poetry and a precise scientific or philosophical instrument of cognition. Within the context of the philosophical tradition, and apart from the heritage of Plato and Platonism, Goethe’s notion of Anschauen can be understood, on the one hand, in the context of classical German philosophy and its debates on “anschauender Verstand” (intuitive understanding) and “intellektuelle” or “intellektuale Anschauung” (intellectual intuition). On the other hand, it is also phenomenologically grounded and anticipates the main insights of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and the phenomenological movement in the 20th century, one of the most important of which is the so-called phenomenological Wesensschau (eidetic intuition).


Author(s):  
S.Montgomery Ewegen

Abstract At the center of Plato’s Gorgias, the shameless and irascible Callicles offers an attack against philosophy (484c and following). During this attack, he describes philosophy as a pastime fit only for the young which, if practiced beyond the bloom of youth, threatens to render those who practice it politically inept and powerless. Moreover, when taken too far, philosophy provokes the city into stripping the philosopher of all of his rights and property, leaving him with no οὐσία at all (486c). Thus, according to Callicles, far from making one powerful within the city, philosophy ultimately renders one impotent and utterly without substance. In what follows I argue that the Socrates of the Gorgias agrees with this characterization of the philosopher as the one who lacks power and οὐσία. However, whereas Callicles sees such a condition as the most worthless and pitiable sort, Socrates sees it as the unique and singular posture from out of which true philosophical thinking, and true political power, are possible. As I will show, through the course of the Gorgias as a whole, Socrates offers a counter-discourse that presents the philosopher as a powerless person lacking οὐσία who is precisely thereby able to undertake a pursuit of the truth and the good. Phrased otherwise: Socrates takes ignorance understood as lack or powerlessness to be the very condition for the possibility of philosophy and true political power, while showing rhetoric understood as the pretense of wisdom to be an obstruction to these.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 80-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar H. Heidemann

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 92-104
Author(s):  
Brankica Popovic

From the title itself is transparent issues being discussed in this paper, and this is the attitude of intuition and science, processed phenomenological method. This issue is important when it comes to the interest of the authors in this subject and attachment to Edmund Husserl. The reasons are still some situations and the author Faced with adequate problems. In this case, the crisis in which we find along with the author that a similar crisis in which he was Edmund Husserl. Return the original, the one fundamental common in times of crisis - as well as that of her mother?s lap. As there are reasons that led to it time their inevitable reduction in order to clear the path to move ahead more effectively with prospects. These reasons are cognitive-methodological, because knowing them and guided methodology lead to the creation of the human world, mostly poor and inhumane, and the necessary correction. The cognitive method that offers to the phenomenological method, the core of which consists of intuition, reduction of intentionality, as opposed to those methods that dominate the rational basis. In fact, in a dualistic relationship rational and intuitive knowledge lies the possibility of establishing a better foothold as a refuge or unity of the world and man, and providing opportunities for their improvement or humane given. Thoroughness is the knowledge, the cognitive experience as such it contains always one intentio, a ?producing? a moment which is always related to some objectivity, and that it is not this objectivity nor mere subjectivity, but one in which the both meet. Thus, the intention and the secret lies the foundation for understanding the world, and she in turn in its nakedness is always a straightforward procedure as the immediate unity of subject and object of knowledge or something intuitive.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loreta Poškaitė

Vilnius UniversityThis article deals with the treatment of human talent (cai 才) in pre-imperial and early imperial China and concentrates on its relationship with other Chinese philosophical and anthropological concepts and the general cultural context. On the one hand, it analyses the moral meaning of talent, discussing its relationship with the concept of xian 贤 ( the worthy) in Classical Confucianism, and on the other hand it analyses its relationship with the concept of de 德 (virtue) as it was treated from Classical Confucianism and Legalism to the Six Dynasties. The latter analysis is based mainly on books by Xu Gan Zhong lun 中论 (Balanced Discources) and Liu Shao Renwuzhi 人物志 (The Study of Human Abilities), paying special attention to the infiltration of the Legalist understanding of cai into those books. The second problem discussed here is the relationship of cai and human nature (xing). The author argues that the discussions concerning human resources or talent in pre-imperial and early imperial China were inseparable from the anthropological and philosophical thinking on human nature and from the resolution of political problems. The understanding of human resources in China had from the very beginning a strong motivation for applicability in the political sphere, and this was a contribution not only of Confucian thinkers, but also by the schools of Legalists, Logicians (or School of Names), and Dialecticians (or School of Yin-yang). This could be the reason why the Chinese avoided the mystification, essentialisation and romanticisation of human talent, as happened in Western culture (especially with the titanism of the Renaissance and beyond).


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 37-42
Author(s):  
Iva Draskic-Vicanovic

Historically, philosophers have in the main treated Sophists and Socrates and Plato as two opposite streams of philosophical thinking. And they certainly are the philosophical oppositions as to the question about both status of knowledge and status of value (ethical and aesthetical). But there seems to be something in common to Socrates and Plato on the one side, and to Sophists, namely Gorgias, on the other. This paper recognizes the philosophical enthusiasm, zeal and ardour as that notion under which united and consolidated Sophists', Socrates' and Plato's philosophy and that is, at the same time, original and unique product of Mediterranean spirit and culture.


Author(s):  
I. S. Safuanov ◽  
V. A. Chugunov

In this article, possible ways of use of computers for the teaching of advanced sections of mathematics that traditionally belong to undergraduate curricula, namely elements of calculus, number theory and abstract algebra are considered. Use of computer technologies can help also to implement such approaches as genetic method and the use of various modes of representation in education. According to cultural-historical theory of L. S. Vygotsky, computer technologies can be considered as the tool for the construction of concepts in the process of learning. The most appropriate for teaching advanced mathematics are such computer algebra systems as Maple, Mathematica, and various systems of dynamic geometry. We will consider the possibilities of Geogebra for the work with functions at the initial stages of undergraduate calculus courses, namely for the work with concepts of limits and derivatives of functions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abedi Ardakani ◽  
Mohammad Ali Tavana ◽  
Gholamreza Mohebzadeh Nobandegani

As a conservative philosopher, Leo Strauss reconsiders and criticizes modern political thought methodologically and epistemologically, in that he believes it has faced crises leading history of philosophical thinking to deviate. To put simply, Strauss claims that the major part of critical thinking arisen in the West is the by-product of the modern political thought. According to this, the present paper reviews Strauss’s critique of modern political thought, putting the question “what kind of insights and enlightenments does Strauss’ critique of modern political thought encompass?” As a finding of the research, we can hold that Strauss attempted to show that methodology of historical and epistemology of relativism governing modern political thought disregard trans-spatial and timeless principles of natural law; as a result, it substitutes suspicion for real knowledge and certainty.Thus, it encourages nihilism; on the one hand, it introduces any form of autonomous agreement by human beings as fair right, as it neglects universal morality on the other hand, turning it to the matter of validity. Therefore, it resorts to irresponsibility, and eventually introduces human reason as the only instrumental benchmark for living rules, which in turn encompasses the emergence of totalitarianism. The method of the research is an analytical-descriptive method.


Phronesis ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Schäfer

AbstractTo most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. I.8[51] that 'last matter' is 'evil', and even 'evil itself'. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have thought of matter, the sense-making εσχατον of his derivational ontology from the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus's tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task of interpreting Plotinus's texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter's totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to 'matter per se ' (for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy – not in itself (for it isn't), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the αυτο κακον as a prima facie -reading of Enn. I.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the αυτο κακο&ν, far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single κακα(hence the Platonic αυτο). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil.


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