scholarly journals Anschauung, Anschauen (Intuition)

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Hennigfeld
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Intellectual Intuition ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Debates ◽  
Lexical Field ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
Eidetic Intuition

Since Plato’s metaphor of the light of knowledge used in the “Allegory of the Cave” from his dialogue Politeia, the concepts of Anschauen or Anschauung (intuition) and their corresponding lexical field, including the terms light, sun, and eye, represent key notions and much-debated issues in philosophical thinking. In his literary, scientific, and philosophical writings, Goethe does not articulate a systematic and explicit theory of these concepts; on the contrary, most of his remarks on the topic of “intuition” are aphoristic or tacitly integrated into his poetic and scientific works. One of his main contributions to the philosophical debates surrounding Anschauen and Anschauung is that he developed and integrated into his works different modes of a specifically creative and productive—as opposed to a merely receptive and sensory—form of Anschauen. This productive form of Anschauen, for which he also uses the terms “Phantasie” (phantasy), “Einbildungskraft” (imagination), “exakte sinnliche Phantasie” (exact sensory phantasy or imagination) or “anschauende Urteilskraft” (intuitive power of judgment) in various contexts, can serve as both a creative faculty in his poetry and a precise scientific or philosophical instrument of cognition. Within the context of the philosophical tradition, and apart from the heritage of Plato and Platonism, Goethe’s notion of Anschauen can be understood, on the one hand, in the context of classical German philosophy and its debates on “anschauender Verstand” (intuitive understanding) and “intellektuelle” or “intellektuale Anschauung” (intellectual intuition). On the other hand, it is also phenomenologically grounded and anticipates the main insights of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and the phenomenological movement in the 20th century, one of the most important of which is the so-called phenomenological Wesensschau (eidetic intuition).

scholarly journals A Geometria Dinâmica se Constituindo com as Ideias Geométricas de Edmund Husserl

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 120
Author(s):  
José Milton Lopes Pinheiro
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Dynamic Geometry ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Computer Technologies ◽  
The One

Intenciona-se neste estudo compreender como se constituem as ideias husserlianas sobre Geometria e, como essas ideias podem se atualizar na constituição da Geometria Dinâmica. Para isso, são destacadas as ideias de Husserl que constituem um solo sobre o qual ele expõe seu pensar filosófico sobre a Geometria. Traz-se essas ideias articulando-as com a Geometria Dinâmica, que se presentifica em um tempo distante daquele em que Husserl expõe seus pensamentos. Husserl não vivenciou os avanços da ciência que nos faz disponível atualmente as tecnologias informáticas, portanto, em seus trabalhos não constam qualquer pensamento de uma Geometria com softwares. Assim, este estudo visa também, trazer compreensões de como pode se presentifica o pensamento husserliano nessa geometria que se atualiza com as tecnologias informáticas. Percebe-se convergências possíveis do pensamento husserliano à Geometria Dinâmica, quando o mesmo diz da espacialidade e dos invariantes que se mostram em variações possíveis.Palavras-chave: Geometria. Geometria Dinâmica. Husserl. EspacialidadeAbstractIn this study we intend to understand how the Husserlian ideas about Geometry are constituted and how these ideas can be updated in the constitution of Dynamic Geometry. For this, are highlights the ideas of Husserl that constitute a solo on which he exposes his philosophical thinking on the Geometry. It is brought these ideas by articulating them with Dynamic Geometry, which presents itself at a time distant from the one in which Husserl exposes his thoughts. Husserl did not experience the advances of the science that makes us available today the computer technologies, therefore, in his works do not include any thought of a Geometry with softwares. Thus, this study also aims to bring understanding of how Husserlian thinking can be present in this geometry that is updated with computer technologies. It is perceived possible convergences of Husserlian thought to Dynamic Geometry, when it says of spatiality and invariants that show themselves in possible variations.Keywords: Geometry. Dynamic Geometry. Husserl. Spatiality.

Das Zwischenreich (τὸ μεταξύ)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Hogrebe
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Henry David Thoreau ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Peter Handke ◽  
Intermediate Space ◽  
The Subject

In this book, Wolfram Hogrebe deals with the realm of the intermediate – an ancient philosophical tradition according to which philosophical thinking is concerned with a kind of intermediate space that holds the orders of concepts and ideas in a remarkable limbo. The in-between is, as it were, a medium sustaining both thoughts and languages and is thus likely to disclose uncharted areas where thinking itself changes. Hogrebe shows how frequently this in-between, which has also been known to surface in experiences of nature, is the subject theme of a host of different philosophers and poets such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Martin Heidegger, Henry David Thoreau and Peter Handke.

Colloquium 4 A Man of No Substance: The Philosopher in Plato’s Gorgias

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
S.Montgomery Ewegen
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
The One ◽  
The City

Abstract At the center of Plato’s Gorgias, the shameless and irascible Callicles offers an attack against philosophy (484c and following). During this attack, he describes philosophy as a pastime fit only for the young which, if practiced beyond the bloom of youth, threatens to render those who practice it politically inept and powerless. Moreover, when taken too far, philosophy provokes the city into stripping the philosopher of all of his rights and property, leaving him with no οὐσία at all (486c). Thus, according to Callicles, far from making one powerful within the city, philosophy ultimately renders one impotent and utterly without substance. In what follows I argue that the Socrates of the Gorgias agrees with this characterization of the philosopher as the one who lacks power and οὐσία. However, whereas Callicles sees such a condition as the most worthless and pitiable sort, Socrates sees it as the unique and singular posture from out of which true philosophical thinking, and true political power, are possible. As I will show, through the course of the Gorgias as a whole, Socrates offers a counter-discourse that presents the philosopher as a powerless person lacking οὐσία who is precisely thereby able to undertake a pursuit of the truth and the good. Phrased otherwise: Socrates takes ignorance understood as lack or powerlessness to be the very condition for the possibility of philosophy and true political power, while showing rhetoric understood as the pretense of wisdom to be an obstruction to these.

Hegel on the Nature of Scepticism

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 80-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar H. Heidemann
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Knock Down ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Early View ◽  
The One ◽  
Intrinsic Feature

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.

scholarly journals Heidegger's concept of 'Being-There' and fundamental concepts of traditional ontology

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-291
Author(s):  
Milotka Molnar-Sivc
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Being There ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Although the question of relationship between basic concepts of traditional ontology and central concepts of fundamental ontology is not a topic which is systematically dealt with in Being and Time, it is obvious that some of the theses which are crucial not only for Heidegger's interpretation of philosophical tradition, but also for the whole project of fundamental ontology, concern this 'conceptual scheme'. In fact, the backbone of Heidegger's critical confrontation with dominant philosophical conceptions is the question of relationship between the concept of 'substance' and the concept of 'Being', i.e. the discussion of philosophical doctrines in which 'Being' is reduced to 'substance'. Besides this context, which concerns the ontological problematics in the strict sense, it is possible to show that the refutation of the basic categories of traditional ontology is an issue which has a decisive role in more concrete phases of the realization of the project of fundamental ontology. This is especially confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of 'Being-There'. The interpretation of Heidegger's treatment of the relationship between the concepts of 'Being-there', 'existence' and 'existentials' on the one hand, and the concepts of 'substance', 'essence' and 'categories' on the other, shows that one of Heidegger's basic theses is that a transformation of concepts of traditional ontology is necessary for an appropriate understanding of human being.

scholarly journals PAKARTOJIMAS IR NIHILIZMAS

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 46-59
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Models ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Western Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Text Fragment ◽  
Western Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Universal Structure ◽  
The One

Straipsnio tikslas yra atskleisti Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje savitai įsitvirtinusios patyrimo struktūros, įvardijamos pakartojimu, nihilistinę prasmę. Šioje hermeneutinėje analizėje, viena vertus, re­miamasi tam tikra nihilizmo samprata, numatančia du nihilizmo teorinius modelius – nihilizmą, parem­tą Überwindung teorija, ir nihilizmą, paremtą différance idėja. Kita vertus, remiamasi tam tikru („onto-teologiniu“) pretekstu Vakarų mąstymo tradicijoje atpažįstant pakartojimo struktūrą – Pauliaus Laiško efeziečiams Ef. I, 10 teksto fragmentu, laikomu paradigmine pakartojimo struktūros išsklaida. Herme­neutinė analizė projektuojama į Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno filosofiją, atskirus jų mąstyme atpažįstamus pakartojimo invariantus atskleidžiant kaip minėto Pauliaus Laiško fragmento eksplozijos atvejus. Ke­liamas klausimas, kas yra pakartojimas, kur slypi jo negatyvumas ir kaip pasirodo jo nihilistinė prasmė? Kaip šioje negatyvumo ir nihilizmo atskleistyje „tarpininkauja“ différance? Straipsnyje parodoma, jog skirtis kaip neigimo judesys, atstovaujantis nihilistinei logikai, gali būti traktuojamas ir vien formaliai, ir realiai. Skirties kaip realaus neigimo traktavimas Kierkegaardo ir Agambeno mąstyme atitinka pačios patirties struktūros – pakartojimo – ontologinį (tikrovišką) įšaknytumą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pakartojimas, nihilizmas, différance, negatyvumas, laikasPakartojimas ir nihilizmasRita Šerpytytė   AbstractThe purpose of this article is to reveal the nihilistic sense of an experiential structure, which has been distinctively rooted in Western philosophical tradition. On the one hand, this hermeneutical analysis will be based on a certain conception of nihilism presupposing two theoretical models of nihilism – nihilism, which refers to the theory of Überwindung, and nihilism associated with the idea of différance. On the other hand, it builds upon a certain (the so-called “onto-theological”) pretext, which might be used for recognition of the structure of repetition in Western tradition of thinking, – i.e. the fragment of a text from St. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians Eph. I, 10 – the paradigmatic passage proposing this universal structure of repetition. Focused both on philosophy of Kierkegaard and Agamben, hermeneutical analysis will aim to disclose the separate invariants of such repetition as cases of explosion of the mentioned text fragment. The question is raised – what is repetition? Where does its negativity lie? How does its nihilistic sense appear? How does the différance mediate in this process of revealing of negativity and nihilism? The article argues that difference, as a motion of negation representing nihilistic logic, can be treated both in merely formal and in a realistic way. The treating of différance as real denying in Kierkegaard’s and Agamben’s thinking corresponds to the ontological rootedness of the very structure of experience – repetition.Keywords: repetition, nihilism, différance, negativity, time

The Subversion of Plato's Quasi-Phenomenology and Mytho-Poetics in the Symposium

Janus Head ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Bert Olivier ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The One

Is there a significant difference between Plato's texts and what is known as 'Platonism', that is, the philosophical tradition that claims Plato as its progenitor? Focusing on the Symposium, an attempt is made here to show that, far from merely fitting neatly into the categories of Platonism—with its neat distinction between the super-sensible and the sensible—Plato's own text is a complex, tension-filled terrain of countervailing forces. In the Symposium this tension obtains between the perceptive insights, on the one hand, into the nature of love and beauty, as well as the bond between them, and the metaphysical leap, on the other hand, from the experiential world to a supposedly accessible, but by definition super-sensible, experience-transcending realm. It is argued that, instead of being content with the philosophical illumination of the ambivalent human condition—something consummately achieved by mytho-poetic and quasi-phenomenohgical means—Plato turns to a putatively attainable, transcendent source of metaphysical reassurance which, moreover, displays all the trappings of an ideological construct. This is demonstrated by mapping Plato's lover's vision of 'absolute beauty' on to what Jacques Lacan has characterized as the unconscious structural quasi-condition of all religious and ideological illusion.

Temporality and Existence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Problem Of Time ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
New Beginning ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

This chapter brings Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose different phenomenological styles are normally opposed, into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim that temporality is not a contingent attribute of existence. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness and the world, the inside and the outside, sense and non-sense, are interdependent beings. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem of time is the problem of the subject's relation to time. The chapter examines how Merleau-Ponty's position in Phenomenology of Perception becomes the intermediary position between, on the one hand, the completion of the tradition and the fulfillment of modernity represented by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and, on the other hand, the “new beginning for thought” that Heidegger wants to promote, insofar as he attempts to assume or take on metaphysics.

Nietzsche’s Therapy of Therapy

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Faustino
Keyword(s):  
Western Culture ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Basic Features

AbstractThis paper examines Nietzsche’s relation to the therapeutic philosophical tradition paradigmatically represented by the Hellenistic schools. On the one hand, given his project of rehabilitating Western culture and his understanding of the philosopher as a “physician of culture”, Nietzsche seems also to hold a therapeutic understanding of philosophy; on the other hand, he is extremely critical of any (philosophical, moral or religious) attempt to heal mankind. This paper does not aim to solve this tension but rather characterizes Nietzsche’s endeavor in this respect as a therapy of therapy. Through analysis of a) the basic features of the Hellenistic conception of philosophy, b) Nietzsche’s development of the analogy of the “philosophical physician”, c) his diagnosis of culture, and d) his criticism of previous therapists, I show that Nietzsche can be formally included in this tradition of thought, even if this inclusion has implications for the tradition itself. As I suggest, given the self-referentiality of Nietzsche’s therapy, his inclusion in this tradition might in fact simultaneously entail its own self-suppression.

scholarly journals What's Special about the State?

Utilitas ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
HELENA DE BRES
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
The State ◽  
Welfare Consequences ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Debates ◽  
Special Duties

Many of us think that we have duties of distributive justice towards our fellow citizens that we do not have towards foreigners. Is that thought justified? This article considers the nature of the state's relationship to distributive justice from the perspective of utilitarianism, a theory that is barely represented in contemporary philosophical debates on this question. My strategy is to mount a utilitarian case for state-specific duties of distributive justice that is similar in its basic structure to the one that is standardly mounted for special duties towards the near and dear. I begin with a discussion of whether or not the co-citizen relationship can be justified in terms of its welfare consequences. I then consider what the answer to that first question implies concerning the duties of distributive justice that arise within that relationship.

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