scholarly journals Possible approaches to reducing the risks of nuclear escalation at the regional level

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Pavel Zolotarev
Keyword(s):  
High Precision ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Nuclear Potential ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Nuclear Systems

The article deals with issues related to the task of reducing the risks of escalation of a local military conflict to the level of a nuclear one. To find ways to solve this problem, three aspects are considered – doctrinal, concerning official views on the use of nuclear weapons; features of the means of delivery of tactical nuclear weapons; features of the storage of tactical nuclear ammunition; the influence of high-precision weapons. The main doctrinal provisions are considered for Russia, the United States and China. The conclusion is substantiated that it is expedient to consolidate in the doctrinal documents of nuclear states or in other forms of mutual obligations the provision that each state will develop new non-nuclear systems of armed struggle with a simultaneous reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring security. To reduce the risk of escalation of the conflict to a nuclear one, it is proposed to work out the issue of refusing to create and deploy delivery vehicles that allow their use for both conventional and nuclear strikes. Relevant proposals have been made regarding the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons carriers and storage sites for nuclear charges, aimed at minimizing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. An assessment of the capabilities of high-precision weapons to disrupt strategic stability when trying to use them for decapitating or disarming strikes is carried out. The conclusion is made about the unreality of such scenarios. A comparative analysis of the risks of escalation of military conflicts to the nuclear level was carried out for the European and Asia-Pacific regions. Taking into account the achieved level of survivability of the Chinese nuclear potential and the prospects for its development, it is assumed that there is a higher risk of an escalation of a military conflict for the European theater. 

«Nuclear Alarms» at Korean Peninsula

2013 ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
A. Fenenko
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Korean Peninsula ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Fuel Cycle ◽  
Nuclear Fuel Cycle ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Plutonium Production

During the last twenty years Washington has used the “counter-proliferation strategy” in Korean Peninsula. The Americans demanded that North Korea eliminate its nuclear arsenals and plutonium production facilities under the watchful eye of the “five powers’ commission” or the IAEA. Pyongyang's recent military provocation may now raise the specter of the United States or even South Korea delivering non-nuclear strikes against its nuclear facilities. That would give the USA an opportunity to raise the question of whether certain regimes should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons or even to develop nuclear fuel cycle capacity. The last crises demonstrated that under certain circumstances North Korea could also initiate a military conflict in East Asia.

X. Growing Tension and the Threat of War in the Southern Caspian Sea: The Unsettled Division Dispute and Regional Rivalry

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 575-591
Author(s):  
Hooman Peimani
Keyword(s):  
Caspian Sea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Caspian Region ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
The Caspian Sea ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
American Military ◽  
Military Presence ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Southern Caspian Sea

AbstractThe absence of an acceptable legal regime for the division of the Caspian Sea among its five littoral states has created grounds for conflicts, crises, and wars in the Caspian region, a situation worsened since 2001 when Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan found each other on a collision course over the ownership of certain offshore oilfields. The region has since been heading towards militarization, while the persistence of conflicts over the Caspian Sea's division has prepared the ground for military conflicts. Fear of lagging behind in an arms and the manipulation of conflicts by the United States and Turkey have further encouraged militarization. Against this background, certain factors, including Turkey's efforts to deny Iran political and economic gains in the Caspian region, the growing American military presence in Eurasia, and the expanding American-Azeri military ties since 11 September 2001 will likely contribute to the creation of a suitable ground for a military conflict in the Caspian region.

scholarly journals Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
The Military ◽  
Control Regime

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

scholarly journals Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Critical Factor ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Past ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Small Force

Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.

scholarly journals Offensive Weapons and the Future of Arms Control

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Nancy Jane Teeple
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cruise Missile ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
The Future ◽  
Nuclear Systems ◽  
Cruise Missiles

With a focus on the strategic competition between the United States and Russia, this paper explores the prospects for the future of arms control under an intensifying nuclear security dilemma. The end of stability-enhancing agreements such as the INF Treaty and Open Skies has accelerated the arms race. What is the future of New START and are we likely to see any extension beyond 2021? The relationship between arms control and strategic stability is part of this evaluation, particularly with respect to how states view the concept framed within their national security interests. The provocative role that offensive – deterrence by denial – capabilities play in contributing to strategic instability is central to this study. This work looks particularly at new systems designed for asymmetric advantage, including those that can defeat strategic defences, such as longer-range cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles. Under conditions of modernizations and upgrades to nuclear arsenals, including the entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems that can threaten a first strike, this work considers how a dialogue on limiting dangerous systems could be initiated between the US and Russia. Could New START be revised – or a new treaty established – to limit advances in cruise missile technology, hypersonics, missile defences, and tactical nuclear weapons?

Nuclear Deterrence during the Period of Confrontation

2015 ◽  
pp. 30-39
Author(s):  
A. Savel'ev
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Problem Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear Targeting ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Security Problem ◽  
Massive Retaliation

The article focuses on the main aspects of nuclear deterrence concept, including the mechanism of its application during the period of international tension. The author pays attention to the strategic triad configuration which makes nuclear deterrence more effective and reliable. Along with it the credibility of nuclear deterrence is also under consideration as a very important element of the overall problem analysis. The central part of the article is devoted to the problem of nuclear targeting and possible application of nuclear weapons in case the deterrence failed, and the decision to use these weapons were taken. The author argues that there is no rational variant to apply nuclear weapons without unpredictable and deadly reaction from the opposite side. There is no hope to achieve any positive result after the first use of nuclear weapons – whether strategic or tactical. Thus, a massive counterforce strike cannot prevent from a massive retaliation resulting in the complete annihilation of the rivalries. A limited strike against strategic offensive forces of the opponent can be interpreted as a massive strike ending with massive retaliation. A single strike cannot solve any military problem and, moreover, may give strategic initiative to the opponent. Tactical nuclear forces can be used in different, but generally “unproductive” ways – whether against the own territory, or by solving only limited tasks, while producing an unpredictable reaction from the opponent. The author comes to a conclusion that the nuclear weapon is only an instrument of self-destruction which cannot solve any security problem. It can only play a symbolic role in terms of the country's prestige, and nothing else. Finally, the author insists that the strategic stability concept started to play a counter-productive role in the U.S.-Russia strategic relations, and must be substituted by a new approach to security. This approach should reject the central idea of strategic stability which calls for preserving a powerful retaliatory potential. Acknowledgements. The publication is prepared with financial support of the Russian Foundation for Humanities; Project № 15-37-11136 “The Influence of Technological Factors on the Spectrum of Threats to National and International Security, Military Conflicts and Strategic Stability”.

Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea's Nuclear Threats

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Kodama
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Willingness To Use

Abstract With the spread of nuclear weapons to regional actors facing adversaries with superior conventional and nuclear forces, the prospect of deliberate nuclear first use is no longer unthinkable. This is especially the case with North Korea, which not only faces strong incentives for first use in a crisis but also has made the threat of first use a key component of its nuclear posture. To analyze the emerging US-DPRK deterrence relationship, this article presents a framework for outlining North Korea's calculus of when first use is rational, and examines the interaction between North Korea's threshold for first use and the United States’ perception of that threshold. By conceptualizing this interaction with four ideal-typical dyads, this article argues that the most stable dyad is one in which the United States recognizes that North Korea has the capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons at low crisis thresholds.

scholarly journals Russia's Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Anya Loukianova Fink ◽  
Olga Oliker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Strategic Stability

At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.

15. The USA, China, and rising Asia

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cox
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Pacific Region ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
American Hegemony ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the United States’ relations with China and other countries in Asia. It considers how a region wracked by insurgencies and wars for almost forty years was transformed from being one of the most disturbed and contested in the second half of the twentieth century, into becoming one of the more stable and prosperous by century’s end. The chapter begins with a discussion of the United States’ relations with Japan and then with China and Korea. It shows that at the end of the Cold War in Europe, hostility continued in the Korean peninsula, and that North Korea has consciously used nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in order to ensure the survival of the regime. The chapter concludes by assessing the outlook for the Asia-Pacific region and future prospects for American hegemony in East Asia.

MISSILE DEFENSES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN ASIA: EVIDENCE FROM SIMULATIONS

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jaganath Sankaran
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Asia Pacific Region ◽  
Simulation Experiments ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Us

Abstract The contention over the quantity and quality of regional missile defenses forward-deployed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region animates much of the US–China disagreement about strategic stability. The Chinese argue that the deployed assets exceed reasonable defensive requirements and suggest that if these missile-defense deployments continue, they will be forced to increase the size of their nuclear arsenal. In disagreement, the United States claims that regional missile defenses are defensive by design, limited in scope, and necessary to defeat a North Korean missile campaign. In this article, a series of simulation experiments were developed to empirically test these opposing arguments over missile defenses and strategic stability. The simulations indicate that current deployments are necessary for defense and proportional to the threat. The analysis also argues that current deployments do not possess the ability to alter the US–China strategic nuclear balance significantly. The article concludes with a discussion of other subjective aspects of national security that may explain Chinese concerns and explore possible ways to reassure China.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document