U.S., China, and Brazil

Author(s):  
José Augusto Guilhon-Albuquerque

China and the U.S. are currently the two most important trade partners of Brazil. Brazil is engaged in complex bilateral relations with both countries in political, security, and economic affairs. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first one compares Brazil’s bilateral relations with the U.S. and China by reviewing the developments of their diplomatic relationships in the past decades. The following section discusses how China’s rise may affect U.S. interests in Brazil and its region. The third section analyzes areas in which the competition between the U.S. and China could be positively affected by Brazilian courses of action in foreign policy. Finally, there is an analysis of possible U.S. foreign policy orientations toward Brazil and its region.

Author(s):  
A. A. Kireeva

The article deals with the transformation of Japan’s strategy vis-a-vis China. China and Japan are the most powerful states in East Asia in economic, political and military dimensions. They constitute two poles which shape the regional subsystem of international relations. China’s rise presents a considerable challenge for Japan’s foreign policy alongside with immense opportunity for the state’s development, with Japan’s and China’s positions, as well stability in East Asia resting upon Japan’s strategy towards China. Japan’s China strategy in the aftermath of World War II prior to 2010-2011 can be characterized as engagement with elements of containment. Japan has to a significant degree accommodated China’s rise by facilitating the successful implementation of its grand strategy, seen as the restoration of a great power status that China lost in the 19th century opium wars. The beginning of the 21st century saw a reassessment of Japan’s foreign policy and adopting a proactive stance. There is a divergence of opinion as to Japan’s strategy towards China in 2000s: while a number of scholars believe that there was a shift to balancing, others conclude that no such trend existed and “hedging” would be a more accurate definition, as it enables a state to protect from risks with regional coalitions. The early 2010s have seen Japan’s China strategy increasingly transforming into balancing and containment influenced by Japan’s growing perception of China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea as a threat to its security. However, there is growing possibility of adopting a “dual hedging” strategy, as China is first of all regarded as the key economic partner for Japan’s successful development.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-101
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Simons

Six former U.S. State Department officials, all of whom were involved in U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration, respond to the article by James Blight and janet Lang. Their reactions vary, but one common point of concern is whether Blight and Lang are correct in arguing that “empathy” as an organizing concept or analytical tool will be useful “not just in conferences in which the past is revisited, but also in the present and future, when it really matters.” Even though most of the commentators accept at least some of the points about the U.S.-Soviet détente in the late 1970s, they have questions about the conceptual underpinnings of the article. The forum ends with a response from Blight and Lang.


Asian Survey ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 629-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Lynch

The tendency for Chinese foreign policy elites to securitize culture in international relations by portraying it as a zone of intense contestation with other states suggests that China’s rise will be rocky. Some seek to defend China’s cultural autonomy from American hegemony, others, to establish Chinese domination over weaker states.


Subject Japan's foreign policy strategy. Significance Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has changed core structures and frameworks within which Japan's foreign and defence policies are made. These changes can be seen as responses to the rise of China. Impacts Japan will use aid to counter China's influence, competing on quality and a record of delivering on promises. Laws passed under Abe could allow much greater defence cooperation with Australia and India. India is a future partner in Japan's developing relationship with Africa to compete with China’s Africa strategy.


Asian Survey ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Heberer

In 2013, China’s new party and state leadership specified its domestic and foreign policies in the context of Xi Jinping’s vision of the “Chinese Dream.” A new reform package modifying China’s growth and development model has been announced. In foreign policy, a debate has commenced regarding another side of the “Chinese Dream”: China’s rise as a “Great Power.”


China Report ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-265
Author(s):  
Raviprasad Narayanan

Three decades of economic reform have led to a comprehensive recasting of China’s geostrategic priorities in its immediate periphery. China’s relations with Myanmar are an instance of a bilateral relationship that has gone from strength to strength in the past two decades following internal political upheavals in the late 1980s that motivated the two countries to reach out to each other following international opprobrium. This article will explain the strategic nature of relations between Myanmar and China in the last decade and attempt to posit this equation in a South Asian context. The structure of the article includes includes four sections—the first section is a brief introduction that captures five decades of relations between Myanmar and China from 1950 to 2000; the second section examines the comprehensive nature of their bilateral relations; the third section analyses mutual perceptions; and the concluding section focuses on the impact China–Myanmar relations has on the South Asian region. There are two central arguments in this research article—the first revolves around the hypothesis that Myanmar–China relations are motivated by geo-strategic and geo-economic considerations. The second argument rests on the premise that there is no ‘client dependency’ in this bilateral relationship and China–Myanmar relations while ‘close’ and ‘friendly’ do have their share of concerns.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks ◽  
William C. Wohlforth

Unipolarity is arguably the most popular concept used to analyze the U.S. global position that emerged in 1991, but the concept is totally inadequate for assessing how that position has changed in the years since. A new framework that avoids unipolarity's conceptual pitfalls and provides a systematic approach to measuring how the distribution of capabilities is changing in twenty-first-century global politics demonstrates that the United States will long remain the only state with the capability to be a superpower. In addition, China is in a class by itself, one that the unipolarity concept cannot explain. To assess the speed with which China's rise might transform this into something other than a one-superpower system, analogies from past power transitions are misleading. Unlike past rising powers, China is at a much lower technological level than the leading state, and the gap separating Chinese and U.S. military capabilities is much larger than it was in the past. In addition, the very nature of power has changed: the greatly enhanced difficulty of converting economic capacity into military capacity makes the transition from a great power to a superpower much harder now than it was in the past. Still, China's rise is real and change is afoot.


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