scholarly journals Constitutional Complaint in Indonesia Through the Lens of Legal Certainty

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57
Author(s):  
Standy Wico ◽  
Michael Michael ◽  
Patricia Louise Sunarto ◽  
Anastasia Anastasia

To date, there is no trial mechanism for Indonesian citizens to claim their rights through the constitutional complaint, even if the Constitutional Court has existed since 2003. In fact, civil rights guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution are often ignored by the government even though these rights are essential in promoting the rule of law. This paper aims to revisit the range of constitutional complaints and further consequences about the legal certainty by taking into account the rationale of civil rights protection following the establishment of the Constitutional Court for adjudicating civil complaints. This study uses juridical research with normative and comparative approaches. In this context, a constitutional complaint is different from the judicial review for which, the actions of government officials are deemed to be detrimental and violate the constitutional rights of citizens. Rather, it is an adjudication for protecting civil rights when it is found the constitutional rights are breached by the government so that each citizen has legal standing before the Constitutional Court. As for the effort to apply legal certainty to constitutional complaints, a legal basis is needed, namely the laws that regulate and their application. By doing so, it can be implemented after amending the 1945 Constitution that outlines the additional power-wielding to the Constitutional Court. KEYWORDS: Constitutional Complaint, Constitutional Court, Indonesian Constitution.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Dorf ◽  
Michael S. Chu

Lawyers played a key role in challenging the Trump administration’s Travel Ban on entry into the United States of nationals from various majority-Muslim nations. Responding to calls from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which were amplified by social media, lawyers responded to the Travel Ban’s chaotic rollout by providing assistance to foreign travelers at airports. Their efforts led to initial court victories, which in turn led the government to soften the Ban somewhat in two superseding executive actions. The lawyers’ work also contributed to the broader resistance to the Trump administration by dramatizing its bigotry, callousness, cruelty, and lawlessness. The efficacy of the lawyers’ resistance to the Travel Ban shows that, contrary to strong claims about the limits of court action, litigation can promote social change. General lessons about lawyer activism in ordinary times are difficult to draw, however, because of the extraordinary threat Trump poses to civil rights and the rule of law.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-171
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

This work grew out of a series of lectures that were delivered over atwo-year period between 1996 and 1998 at the Centre of Islamic andMiddle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and AfricanStudies (SOAS), University of London, on the genera] subject of the rule oflaw in the Middle East and Islamic countries. Subsequently, materials wereadded dealing particularly with issues relating to human rights law. Thecontributors to this work are a combination of legal academics, human rights activists, lawyers and judges, who hale from various countries in theArab world, Iran, the United States, Great Britain and Germany.There are a total of fourteen separate chapters, of varying length andquality. The book is not lengthy - including notes and authors’ biographies,it is 180 pages long. The average length of each chapter is between ten andfifteen pages. Despite the diversity of countries surveyed, all the essays areconcerned with generic questions regarding the rule of law, whether in atheoretical sense, viz., whether the notion that legitimate governmentalaction is limited to those acts that are deemed lawful by a pre-existing setor rules, or in a practical sense, viz., assuming that the formal legal regimeof a given state recognizes the rule of law in a theoretical sense, whetherthe coercive apparatus of the state in fact recognizes legal limitations onits conduct.Perhaps the most interesting (it is certainly the most lengthy, at 35 pages),and most important, essay in this work is the very fiit one, authored byAdel Omar Sherif, an Egyptian judge, wherein the author provides a digestof the landmark decisions of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.While the work can be criticized for taking on the appearance of a meresurvey of decisions, without taking a critical perspective to the Court’sprecedents, it is nonetheless a very valuable contribution for those lawyersand scholars who cannot read Arabic but nonetheless wish to gain insightinto Egypt’s legal culture. The modest task of relating the decisions ofEgypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court is especially important given thecliches regarding the absence of effective judicial institutions in the Arabworld. Sherifs contribution effectively dispels that myth. His article revealsthe Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to be a vibrant institution thattakes its constitutional duties seriously, and discharges those duties withintegrity, and when it finds that the government has acted unlawfully, it willstrike down the offensive legislation, or rule against the government ...


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-253
Author(s):  
Prianter Jaya Hairi

In 2017, Constitutional Court has received three calls for judicial reviews regarding treachery (makar) article in the Criminal Code. These articles deemed to be contradicting with the principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression. This study analyzes the important issue that is being debate in those judicial reviews. One of those is about the argument which says that the absence of the definition of treachery in the Criminal Code has caused a violation of legal certainty. Besides, the rule of treachery in the Criminal Code has also considered to have caused a violation of freedom of expression which has been guaranteed by Constitution. Analysis shows that the absence of treachery definition in the Criminal Code is not something that instantly becomes a problem in its application that causing the loss of legal certainty. Law enforcer, especially judge, in enforcing the rule of law must always use the method of law interpretation which appropriate with legal norm. With systematic interpretation, treachery can be interpreted according to the sentence of the rule as a unity of the legal system. In this case, the term treachery as regulated in Article 87 of the Criminal Code can be systematically interpreted as the basis for Article 104-Article 108 of the Criminal Code, Article 130 of the Criminal Code, and Article 140 of the Criminal Code which regulates various types of treason and their respective legal sanctions for the perpetrators. Further, on the argument that the articles of treachery in the Criminal Code also can not necessarily be said to limit the freedom of expression, because every citizen’s freedom has limitation, including the limitation of law and human rights. AbstrakPada tahun 2017, Mahkamah Konstitusi telah menerima tiga kali judicial reviewterhadap pasalpasal tindak pidana makar dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP). Pasal-pasal ini dipandang bertentangan dengan prinsip kepastian hukum dan kebebasan berekspresi. Tulisan ini menganalisis substansi yang menjadi perdebatan dalam perkara judicial review tersebut. Di antaranya perdebatan mengenai tidak adanya definisi istilah makar dalam KUHP yang menyebabkan persoalan kepastian hukum. Selain itu, pengaturan tindak pidana makar dalam KUHP juga dinilai melanggar kebebasan berekspresi yang telah dijamin oleh konstitusi. Analisis terhadap persoalanpersoalan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa ketiadaan definisi kata “makar” dalam KUHP bukanlah merupakan sesuatu yang serta merta langsung menjadi persoalan dalam penerapannya sehingga menyebabkan hilangnya kepastian hukum. Penegak hukum, terutama hakim, dalam menegakkan peraturan hukum selalu menggunakan metode penafsiran hukum yang sesuai dengan kaidah ilmu hukum. Dengan penafsiran sistematis, makar dapat dimaknai sesuai kalimat dari peraturan sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem hukum. Dalam hal ini, istilah makar yang diatur dalam Pasal 87 KUHP, secara sistematis dapat ditafsirkan sebagai dasar bagi Pasal 104-Pasal 108 KUHP, Pasal 130 KUHP, dan Pasal 140 KUHP yang mengatur tentang jenis makar beserta sanksi hukumnya masing-masing bagi para pelakunya. Selain itu, mengenai argumen bahwa pasal-pasal makar dalam KUHP berpotensi melanggar HAM dan dipandang bertentangan dengan konstitusi dapat dikatakan tidak beralasan. Sebab kebebasan HAM setiap orang tidak tanpa batas, di antaranya dibatasi nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 881
Author(s):  
Iva Amiroch

Regional Head Elections regulated in Act No. 10 Of 2016 and Government Regulation No. 151 of 2000. So it will be described how the normative study the relationship between the Act No. 10 of 2016 by Government Regulation No. 151 of 2000 and how the relevance of critical studies law OF No. 10 of 2016 with a norm of life in society. Normatively Act 10 of 2016 is higher position with Government Regulation No. 151 of 2000, which is in line with the principle of Lex Superiori Derogat Lex inferiori, namely the rule of law higher can cancel the legal regulations below or lower, in other words lower regulation becomes invalid if it is contrary to a higher rule thereon, it is necessary synchronization between legislation No. 10 of 2016, with the Government Regulation. The problematics arise when there is a Constitutional Court decision No. 42 / PUU-XIII / 2015 annul Article 7, paragraph 2 (g) of the Act No. 10 of 2016, however, the cancellation should also be seen from the law of life in society (Living Law ).Keywords: Regional Head Election; Norms; Law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Loammi Wolf

Section 81 of the Constitution regulates promulgation through publication as part of the legislative process (ie, a procedural norm). The provision further creates a presumption that unless the legislature explicitly determines a commencement date in an Act it enters into force upon promulgation. The commencement date of legislation is thus part of the contents of a statute (ie, a substantive norm), which must be determined by the legislature when adopting the legislation. In a number of judgments, however, the Constitutional Court espoused the idea that the commencement date is part of the legislative process instead of being part of the contents of a statute. Thus it allowed the legislature to delegate its power to determine a commencement date for legislation to the president as head of state in transgression of section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the Constitution: this provision only mandates a delegation of core legislative powers to another legislative body. The confusion is partly due to an initial tendency of the Constitutional Court to interpret constitutional provisions in isolation and partly to the unconsidered re-importation of Westminster constitutiona common law. In the Westminster system a delegation of the power to determine a later commencement date for legislation (ie, after promulgation) to the executive and/or head of state was justified in terms of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty, however, was abolished in 1994: such a delegation of power is no longer compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state. Compatible with sections 44(1)(a)(iii), 55(2)(b)(i), 79 and 87 of the Constitution. Lately, the Constitutional Court even ruled that the power to determine a commencement date for legislation is an executive power, which is to be exercised in terms of sections 85 and 101 of the Constitution, although section 81 explicitly confers this power upon the legislature. A reconsideration of the Court’s interpretation of section 81 is therefore overdue: it not only compromises legislative power and the separation of powers, but goes to the substance of the rule of law and legal certainty as foundational values of the constitutional state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (25) ◽  
pp. 28 ◽  
Author(s):  
H Erli Salia

The Constitutional Court is the state agency that was born after the reform in 1999. Through the changes to the Constitution of 1945, the Constitutional Court is authorized to examine  laws (acts) against the Constitution. In addition there are other powers to protect the fundamental rights relating to the constitutional rights of citizens. As a state agency has the authority of the Constitutional Court, among others, as the supreme interpreter of the constitution in addition to realizing the democratic government, the Constitutional Court to act as the guardian of democracy, protection of constitutional rights of citizens and the protection of human rights.Key words: the rule of law, democracy, constitutional court


2020 ◽  
pp. 109-150
Author(s):  
Waldemar Walczak

The article presents multifaceted considerations and results of analyses concerning the necessity to perceive the phenomenon of corruption through the prism of a gross violation of constitutional values, the principles of the rule of law and social justice. The main focus is on discussing civic rights that are effectively eradicated by corruption, at the same time emphasizing a holistic and systemic approach to understanding and interpreting specific processes and decisions confirmed in practice. At the beginning, it is explained why a broad research perspective should be adopted to understand the essence of corruption. An important argument supporting the correctness of the adopted approach are statements contained in the Government Program for Counteracting Corruption 2018–2020. Next, the most important constitutional values and civil rights are indicated, which are not respected and remain only in the declarative sphere as a result of corrupt practices. In order to prove the illusory nature and facade of certain provisions of the Polish Constitution, important statements contained in the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal are quoted, and then these interpretations are analyzed in relation to real situations occurring in everyday reality. These problem issues are presented from the perspective of the constitutional principle of equality before the law, social justice and non discrimination. It is also noted in this regard that corruption activities are precisely the main factor leading to the division of citizens into two separate categories according to the way they are treated. Finally, it is mentioned that in the European Union ever greater emphasis is currently being placed on compliance with the rule of law. This problem is closely related to the need to understand the negative consequences of corruption as an element that undermines trust in the state, constitutional order and the rule of law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Ani Triwati ◽  
Subaidah Ratna Juita ◽  
Tri Mulyani

<p>Dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013, untuk upaya hukum luar biasa yaitu peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali. Putusan MK yang memperbolehkan upaya hukum luar biasa peninjauan kembali lebih dari satu kali tersebut, berkaitan dengan kepastian hukum dan keadilan. Apabila peninjauan kembali diperbolehkan lebih dari satu kali tetapi tidak ada pembatasan sampai berapa kali maka perkara tersebut tidak akan ada akhirnya, bahwa adanya asas litis finiri oportet (setiap perkara harus ada akhirnya) tidak akan terpenuhi. Beberapa permasalahan yang perlu dibahas adalah apakah dengan adanya Putusan MK No. 34/PUU-XI/2013 dapat memenuhi nilai keadilan dan kepastian hukum. Selanjutnya bagaimana pengaturan mengenai peninjauan kembali sebagai implementasi Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013 agar asas kepastian hukum dan asas litis finiri oportet akan terpenuhi. Putusan MK No. 34/PUU- XI/2013, yang menyatakan bahwa Pasal 268 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 dan tidak mempunyai kekuatan mengikat, dapat memenuhi kepastian hukum tanpa mengabaikan nilai keadilan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pihak kepentingan terpidana yang mana dengan diperbolehkannya peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana lebih dari satu kali, memberikan kesempatan untuk memperoleh kebenaran materiil dan keadilan sehingga dapat diperoleh kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan bagi terpidana mengenai perkara yang dihadapi. Untuk memenuhi asas litis finiri oportet, perlu dilakukan pengaturan bahwa untuk upaya hukum peninjauan kembali dalam perkara pidana dapat dilakukan dua kali, hal ini dilakukan untuk mencapai kepastian hukum yang berkeadilan. Di satu pihak peninjauan kembali dapat dilakukan lebih dari satu kali untuk mencari kebenaran materiil dan memenuhi nilai keadilan. Di lain pihak adanya pembatasan permohonan peninjauan kembali yang boleh dilakukan dua kali adalah untuk menjamin kepastian hukum, sehingga nilai kemanfaatan, keadilan dan kepastian hukum dapat terpenuhi.</p><p>With the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, for an extraordinary legal remedy which reconsideration can be done more than once. Constitutional Court ruling that allows an extraordinary legal remedy reconsideration more than once that, with regard to legal certainty and justice. If allowed to review more than one time but there are no restrictions on how many times it is the case there will be no end, that the principle of litis finiri oportet (every case there should be eventually) will not be met. Some issues that need to be addressed is whether the Constitutional Court No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 can satisfy the value of justice and legal certainty. Furthermore, how the arrangements regarding the review of the implementation of the Constitutional Court as No. 34 / PUU-X / 2013 that the principle of legal certainty and the principle of litis finiri oportet will be met. Constitutional Court decision No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013, which states that Article 268 paragraph (3) of Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and has no binding force, can meet the legal certainty without ignoring the value of justice. It can be seen from the interests of the convict which the permissibility of judicial review in criminal cases more than once, providing an opportunity to acquire the material truth and justice so as to obtain legal certainty to convict justice regarding the case at hand. To meet the principle of litis finiri oportet, it is necessary that the arrangements for legal remedy reconsideration in criminal cases can be done twice, this is done to achieve a just rule of law. On the one hand, the review can be performed more than once to search for the material truth and fulfill justice values. On the other hand the restrictions on the reconsideration request should be done twice is to ensure legal certainty, so that the value of expediency, justice and the rule of law can be fulfilled.</p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document