Bottled water and groundwater in Ontario: Can free market environmentalism resolve the emerging conflicts?

Nestlé Waters’s recent purchase of a well and water-taking rights in the Township of Centre Wellington, Ontario, has garnered national and international attention, raising concerns about how groundwater resources should be managed. In this paper, we explore free market environmentalism as a way to resolve groundwater management and water-takings issues in Ontario. Controversy over groundwater resources and their use, as illustrated by the recent case in Ontario, has become more prevalent globally as concerns about groundwater quality and scarcity develop. Our results suggest that, in theory, the incorporation of private property rights and the common law principle of riparian rights into provincial groundwater allocation mechanisms has the potential to resolve the emerging conflicts in Ontario. However, our analysis reveals that the current level of politicization in Ontario’s water allocation and pricing systems, combined with the current lack of adequate monitoring and documentation of groundwater use, are significant barriers to implementing a resource allocation mechanism for groundwater based on the principles of private ownership and riparian rights. We address these limitations to gain a deeper understanding the implications of the current water-takings system in Ontario, and conclude that these limitations deserve greater social and political attention if these controversies are to be resolved. While free market environmentalism has solutions to offer to Ontario’s groundwater management issue, the current political and institutional approaches to groundwater allocation and pricing in Ontario do not allow for them to be fully applied.

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Tropical Deforestation: Can Property Rights Stem the Tide?

SURG Journal ◽

10.21083/surg.v8i2.3200 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 45-54

Author(s):

Daniel Bayley

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Tropical Forests ◽

Private Property ◽

Free Market ◽

Tropical Deforestation ◽

Private Ownership ◽

Private Property Rights ◽

Effective Form ◽

Tropical Forest Management ◽

Market Environmentalism

In this report the property right structures surrounding tropical forest management are analyzed with a specific case study presented on tropical forests in Honduras. In order to adequately understand the set of property rights in place surrounding tropical forests, the applicable sets of property rights are laid out and explained (private, common, state, and open access). It is argued that the current property rights regimes in place surrounding tropical forests are inadequate and are the issue leading to high levels of deforestation. Conflicts and controversies surrounding the issue are presented for a counterargument and separate view of the issue. It was found that the current property rights regime in Honduras is inadequate for effective resource management as it lacks enforceability along with structure and is the prominent issue surrounding tropical deforestation. Private property rights were the most effective form of property rights found for maintaining natural resources, and it is therefore recommended that private ownership be instilled upon tropical forests to reduce the rate of deforestation. Free Market Environmentalism (FME) is offered as a solution to the current methodology for the management of tropical forests, as it advocates for private ownership and an enforceable set of rights. Therefore, it is recommended that a private property rights regime following the FME methodology replace existing state property rights in order to stem the tide of tropical deforestation.

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Libertarianisms

10.1093/oso/9780198803355.003.0007 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Daniel Halliday

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Private Property ◽

Private Property Rights ◽

Classical Liberal ◽

Inherited Wealth ◽

Left And Right ◽

The Common

This chapter considers various arguments both for and against taxing inherited wealth, each of these being associated with some or other type of libertarian outlook. Libertarianism in the Lockean guises (‘left’ and ‘right’ varieties) is distinguished from its classical liberal alternative, which downplays the Lockean emphasis on private property rights in favour of a more defeasible case for small government and low taxation. These different perspectives generate a variety of quite different arguments about inheritance, some more persuasive than others. Some attention is paid to the common claim that inheritance taxes ‘punish’ virtue and generosity. It is then argued that a Rignano scheme may be particularly attractive in light of certain left-libertarian commitments and as a way of accommodating a classical liberal concern about perpetual savings.

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A Free-Market Environmentalist Transition toward Renewable Energy: The Cases of Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom

Energies ◽

10.3390/en14154659 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 14 (15) ◽

pp. 4659

Author(s):

William Hongsong Wang ◽

Vicente Moreno-Casas ◽

Jesús Huerta de Soto

Keyword(s):

United Kingdom ◽

Renewable Energy ◽

Private Property ◽

Free Market ◽

State Intervention ◽

Tax Rate ◽

Reform Agenda ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Market Environmentalism ◽

The Uk

Renewable energy (RE) is one of the most popular public policy orientations worldwide. Compared to some other countries and continents, Europe has gained an early awareness of energy and environmental problems in general. At the theoretical level, free-market environmentalism indicates that based on the principle of private property rights, with fewer state interventionist and regulation policies, entrepreneurs, as the driving force of the market economy, can provide better services to meet the necessity of offering RE to protect the environment more effectively. Previous studies have revealed that Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have made some progress in using the market to develop RE. However, this research did not analyze the three countries’ RE conditions from the perspective of free-market environmentalism. Based on our review of the principles of free-market environmentalism, this paper originally provides an empirical study of how Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have partly conducted free-market-oriented policies to successfully achieve their policy goal of RE since the 1990s on a practical level. In particular, compared with Germany and Denmark, the UK has maintained a relatively low energy tax rate and opted for more pro-market measures since the Hayekian-Thatcherism free-market reform of 1979. The paper also discovers that Fredrich A. Hayek’s theories have strongly impacted its energy liberalization reform agenda since then. Low taxes on the energy industry and electricity have alleviated the burden on the electricity enterprises and consumers in the UK. Moreover, the empirical results above show that the energy enterprises play essential roles in providing better and more affordable RE for household and industrial users in the three sampled countries. Based on the above results, the paper also warns that state intervention policies such as taxation, state subsidies, and industrial access restrictions can impede these three countries’ RE targets. Additionally, our research provides reform agendas and policy suggestions to policymakers on the importance of implementing free-market environmentalism to provide more efficient RE in the post-COVID-19 era.

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THE CONSTITUTION OF NONDOMINATION

Social Philosophy and Policy ◽

10.1017/s0265052510000130 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 261-289 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Guido Pincione

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Private Property ◽

Free Market ◽

Economic Power ◽

Free Entry ◽

Political Decision ◽

Private Property Rights ◽

Goods And Services ◽

State Interference ◽

Political Decision Making

AbstractPincione argues that procedural constitutional guarantees of market freedoms best protect individuals from domination. If he is right, Philip Pettit's claim that various forms of state interference with private markets are needed to forestall domination will prove to be unwarranted. Pincione further contends that market freedoms are best protected by procedural rules for political decision-making, as opposed to constitutional guarantees of private property and other substantive rules.Central to his position are claims that the dispersion of economic power precludes domination, and that free entry into markets furthers such dispersion. As against the idea that the state is in a better position to disperse economic power, Pincione argues that the constitutional provisions needed to implement that idea are contestable, and to that extent require interpretive powers that themselves involve domination. Only a constitution that, as a side effect of its procedures for political decision making, generates full private property rights holds out hope of shielding citizens from domination. This is so, because a plurality of suppliers of goods and services is a structural feature of the free market, in a sense of “structural” that matters for measurements of domination based on fairly uncontroversial claims about persons and resources.

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Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history

Journal of Institutional Economics ◽

10.1017/s1744137410000378 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 7 (4) ◽

pp. 473-498 ◽

Cited By ~ 134

Author(s):

HA-JOON CHANG

Keyword(s):

Economic Development ◽

Institutional Economics ◽

Private Property ◽

Free Market ◽

Development Theory ◽

Private Property Rights ◽

Dominant Discourse ◽

Heterogeneous Samples ◽

Poor Understanding ◽

Economic Development Theory

Abstract:The article tries to advance our understanding of institutional economics by critically examining the currently dominant discourse on institutions and economic development. First, I argue that the discourse suffers from a number of theoretical problems – its neglect of the causality running from development to institutions, its inability to see the impossibility of a free market, and its belief that the freest market and the strongest protection of private property rights are best for economic development. Second, I point out that the supposed evidence showing the superiority of ‘liberalized’ institutions relies too much on cross-section econometric studies, which suffer from defective concepts, flawed measurements and heterogeneous samples. Finally, I argue that the currently dominant discourse on institutions and development has a poor understanding of changes in institutions themselves, which often makes it take unduly optimistic or pessimistic positions about the feasibility of institutional reform.

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Free market for the environment

Economic Policy ◽

10.18288/1994-5124-2019-1-116-125 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 116-125 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Government Regulation ◽

Private Property ◽

Free Market ◽

Market Price ◽

Modern Society ◽

Tragedy Of The Commons ◽

Free Market Price ◽

The Commons ◽

Laissez Faire ◽

Market Environmentalism

The tragedy of the commons is responsible for many, if not all, of the environmental problems concerning natural resource preservation that we face in modern society. The tragedy of the commons describes a situation in which resources held “in common”, namely, public resources, are depleted or mistreated by collective action. Basically it means lack of private ownership and almost inevitably leads to a misallocation of resources. And yet, the predominating kinds of solutions proposed to solve these problems involve increased government regulation—effectively expanding the scope of the very tragedy of the commons which lies at the heart of the problem in the first place. The present paper advocates an alternative: free market environmentalism. It is not a contradiction in terms, despite how that phrase sounds to the modern ear. In this paper we attempt to demonstrate that laissez-faire capitalism is our last best hope for protecting the environment. Free market environmentalism centers around private property rights and thus a decentralization of environmental decision-making. Effective choices made about scarce resources must be based upon free market price signals and incentives. The lack of laissez-faire capitalism applied to earth’s natural resources distorts both of these indicators—causing poorly made and oftentimes destructive decisions. A free market solution to the environment creates the most value for society, allows for open and continuous entrepreneurial innovation, and economically empowers those who are the most environmentally vulnerable.

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Drone Delivery and the Takings Clause

10.37419/jpl.v6.i2.3 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

pp. 169-176

Author(s):

Brian M. Miller

Keyword(s):

Private Property ◽

Case Law ◽

Private Land ◽

Negative Externalities ◽

Private Property Rights ◽

The Common ◽

Per Se ◽

Low Altitude ◽

Takings Clause ◽

The Government

Amazon, Inc.’s fledgling drone shipping service, “Prime Air,” and similar services, may pose a new threat to private property rights. Companies that ship by drone would likely have to fly the drones over private land. But who owns the low-altitude airspace above private land? That issue is unsettled, but the common law supports the view that low-altitude airspace belongs to the landowners beneath. If that is correct, companies like Amazon have two main options to get drone shipping off the ground: (1) pay the landowners on the intended routes for an easement through their low-altitude airspace, or (2) count on the government to compel easements through these spaces. The second option presents a Takings Clause problem. Because forced easements of flight intrude on landowner rights, landowners burdened by drone easements could potentially prove a per se taking. But even if drone easements are not per se takings, case law and the “character of the government action” factor in the Penn Central analysis give landowners a fighting chance to prove a regulatory taking. Overall, the Takings Clause could be a valuable tool for both economic efficiency and equity, requiring beneficiaries of drone easements to compensate those burdened by the easements. If drone shipping takes off in the U.S., current law may ensure that the negative externalities will not fall solely on the surface landowners.

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Privatization in economic theory

Panoeconomicus ◽

10.2298/pan0701103d ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 54 (1) ◽

pp. 103-118 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Maja Drakic

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Economic System ◽

Market Economy ◽

Private Property ◽

Choice Theory ◽

Free Market ◽

Mass Scale ◽

Equilibrium Models ◽

Dominant Form ◽

Private Property Rights

In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way ? which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non ? economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That?s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I?ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.

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Applying and assessing free market environmentalism to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s coltan resources: Challenges and possibilities

SURG Journal ◽

10.21083/surg.v7i1.2025 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 5-16

Author(s):

Benjamin Baena ◽

Amy Bronson ◽

Tobias Jones ◽

Lindsey Champaigne

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Private Property ◽

Democratic Republic ◽

Free Market ◽

Resource Curse ◽

Effective Property ◽

Environmental Problems ◽

Economic Thought ◽

Individual Property ◽

Market Environmentalism

Coltan is the commonly used term for tantalum, a metal used in electronics, when sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This article considers that a “resource curse,” where a resource-rich country paradoxically experiences low social and economic development, is occurring in the DRC with respect to this mineral. The school of economic thought known as free market environmentalism broadly prescribes free markets, individual property rights, and common-law liability as the incentives to reduce environmental problems. While it is a less-common and sometimes controversial perspective on solving environmental problems, an analysis of a free market environmentalist perspective of coltan mining in the DRC provides alternative perspectives on solving a “resource curse,” such as effective property rights as put forward by Moriss (2009). Considering the practicality of implementing free market environmentalist principles in a war-torn country with weak governance, this article theorizes that the Congolese government could respond to the recent Congo Conflict Minerals Act within the American Dodd-Frank Act (2010) by implementing licenses to mine coltan resources that closely resemble private property rights, drawing on Pearse (1988), in areas of the DRC less affected by conflict. Keywords: Democratic Republic of Congo; coltan; tantalum; mining; free market environmentalism; property rights (privatization of)

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