scholarly journals United States National Space Security Policy and the Strategic Issues for DOD Space Control

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Perdomo



1993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott R. Nichols ◽  
Howard J. Wiarda


2020 ◽  
pp. 385-399
Author(s):  
Nicole J. Jackson


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon C. Halaychik

The Russian Federations drive to reestablish itself as a global power has severe security implications for the United States, its Arctic neighbors, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole. The former Commander of United States Naval Forces Europe Admiral Mark Ferguson noted that the re-militarization of Russian security policy in the Arctic is one of the most significant developments in the twenty-first century adding that Russia is creating an “Arc of steel from the Arctic to the Mediterranean” (Herbst 2016, 166). Although the Russian Federation postulates its expansion into the Arctic is for purely economic means, the reality of the military hardware being placed in the region by the Russians tells otherwise. Implementation of military hardware such as anti-air defenses is contrary to the stipulated purposes of the Russian Government in the region. Therefore is the Russian Federation building strategic military bases in the Arctic to challenge the United States hegemony due to the mistreatment against the Russians by the United States and NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.



Author(s):  
Stephen R. Burant

Both Ukrainian and Polish policymakers have come to use the term strategic partnership to characterize the relationship between their two countries. Teodozii Starak, an adviser to the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland, has stated that strategic partnership "means that both [Ukraine and Poland] demonstrate coordinated stances and support each other in the most important political areas. " However, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma also regularly uses the term to characterize his country's relations with Russia. In addition, Ukrainian officials have labeled China, the United States, Germany, and Bulgaria as Ukraine's strategic partners. The use of the term with reference to Russia-with which Ukraine throughout the 1990s has had serious political differences-or Bulgaria or China, which are not priorities for Ukrainian foreign and security policy, appears to strip it of any significance; the term implies, at best, a goal, or, at worst, a public relations effort.



Author(s):  
E. V. Batueva

The development of ICT and the formation of the global information space changed the agenda of national and international security. Such key characteristics of cyberspace as openness, accessibility, anonymity, and identification complexity determined the rise of actors in cyber space and increased the level of cyber threats. Based on the analyses of the U.S. agencies' approach, the author defines three major groups of threats: use of ICT by states, criminals and terrorists. This concept is shared by the majority of the countries involved in the international dialogue on information security issues and is fundamental for providing cyber security policy on both national and international levels. The United States is developing a complex strategy for cyber space that includes maximization of ICT's advantages in all strategically important fields as well as improvement of national information systems and networks security. On the international level the main task for the American diplomacy is to guarantee the U.S. information dominance. The United States is the only country that takes part practically in all international and regional fora dealing with cyber security issues. However process of the development of a global cyber security regime is not going to be fast due to countries' different approaches to key definitions and lack of joint understanding of cyber security issues as well as due to the position of the countries, among all the United States, that are not interested in any new obligatory international norms and principles. Such American policy aims at saving the possibility of using cyberspace capacity in reaching political and military goals, thus keeping the global leadership.



Author(s):  
G. Privett ◽  
S. George ◽  
W. Feline ◽  
A. Ash

The current UK’s National Space and Security Policy states that the identification of potential on-orbit collisions and warning of re-entries over UK sovereign territory is of high importance, driving requirements for indigenous Space Situational Awareness (SSA) systems capable of delivering these products. The UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) is examining options for the creation of a distributed network of longitudinally distributed, low cost commercial–off-the-shelf electro-optical sensors to support survey work and catalogue maintenance. To effectively exploit this, a robust data handling system is required to autonomously detect satellite trails in a manner that can handle variable target intensities, periodicities and rates of apparent motion, as well as meteors and aircraft. Data captured during the United Kingdom/New Zealand Automated Transfer Vehicle-5 (ATV-5) deorbit observation trial have been employed to inform the development of a prototype processing pipeline for autonomous on-site processing. The approach taken employs pre-existing and documented tools such as Astrometry.NET and DAOPHOT from the astronomical community, together with image processing and orbit determination software developed in-house by Dstl. Some preliminary results from the automated analysis of data collected from wide angle sensors are described, together with an appraisal of the limitations of the proposed system and our plans for future development



Author(s):  
Min-hyung Kim

Abstract Given the limits of the prevailing hedging account for Seoul’s puzzling behavior that is in conformity with the interests of its adversary (i.e. North Korea) and potential threat (i.e. China) rather than those of its principal ally (i.e. the United States) and security cooperation partner (i.e. Japan), this article emphasizes the impact of the progressive ideology on Seoul’s security policy. In doing so, it calls for attention to a domestic source of ideology in explaining the security behaviors of a secondary state, which is under-researched and thus is poorly understood.



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