Extending the Powers of Constitutional Court, While Limiting and Focusing the Judicial Review: Some Considerations on the Impact of Recent Romanian Constitutional 'Reform' in the Activity of the Constitutional Court and of the Ombudsman

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liviu Damsa

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.



2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaki Ulya

AbstractRelationship problems Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court re-strained due to the addition of authority in the appointment of judges first instance courts. It is set in the third package of legislation, namely Law No. 49 of 2009, Law No. 50 of 2009 and Law No. 51 of 2009. The three laws are carried out judicial review to the Constitutional Court by Decision No. 43/ PUU-XIII/ 2015. The Constitutional Court stated that the expansion of the authority of the Judicial Commission against the constitution and interfere with the independence of judges as an independent institution. The purpose of this paper is to examine the decision is linked to the independence of judges and the impact of such decision to the authority of the Judicial Commission.IntisariDilematika hubungan Komisi Yudisial dan Mahkamah Agung kembali renggang akibat adanya penambahan wewenang dalam pengangkatan hakim peradilan tingkat pertama. Hal tersebut diatur dalam ketiga paket undang-undang yaitu Undang-Undang Nomor 49 Tahun 2009, Undang-Undang Nomor 50 Tahun 2009, dan Undang-Undang Nomor 51 Tahun 2009. Ketiga undang-undang tersebut dilakukan yudicial review ke Mahkamah Konstitusi dengan Putusan Nomor 43/PUU-XIII/2015. Mahkamah Konstitusi menyatakan bahwa perluasan wewenang Komisi Yudisial bertentangan dengan konstitusi dan mengganggu independensi hakim sebagai lembaga mandiri. Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk mengkaji putusan tersebut dikaitkan dengan independensi hakim serta dampak dari putusan tersebut terhadap wewenang Komisi Yudisial.



2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-145
Author(s):  
Darmiwati Darmiwati2021

Fiduciary is the transfer of ownership rights to an object on the basis of trust provided that the object whose ownership rights are transferred remains in the control of the owner of the object. In the implementation of fiduciary, the goods that are pledged remain in the power of the debtor. Fiduciary guarantees are security rights for movable objects, both tangible and intangible and immovable objects, especially buildings that cannot be encumbered with mortgage rights. The principle of the object of the fiduciary guarantee is the creditor's trust in the debtor. In the fiduciary guarantee law, if the debtor defaults, the object of the fiduciary guarantee will be handed over to the creditor for the purpose of fiduciary execution. The fiduciary guarantee law gives the creditor the right to carry out the execution of the fiduciary guarantee object, the existence of this power, the creditor can withdraw the fiduciary guarantee object by means of parate execution. However, with the Constitutional Court Decision Number 18/PUU-XVII/2019 regarding the application for judicial review of Article 15 section (2) and section (3), which requires a breach of contract agreement between the creditor and the debtor and the debtor's willingness to submit the object of collateral, has eliminated the rights of creditors and eliminated the principle of material rights. Based on these problems, the question in the research is how to execute the object of fiduciary security after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 18/PUU-XVII/2019 and what is the impact of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 18/PUU-XVII/2019. The legal research method in this paper is normative juridical which is reform oriented research. The conclusion in this study should be in the fiduciary guarantee certificate including the completeness of the default clause, to strengthen the evidence that the debtor has committed a breach of contract. If the debtor (fiduciary giver), after being agreed by the parties, is deemed to be in breach of contract (default), the execution of the object of the fiduciary guarantee can be carried out independently.



2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Edi Hudiata

Since the verdict of the Constitutional Court (MK) Number 93/PUU-X/2012 pronounced on Thursday, August 29, 2013, concerning the judicial review of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Islamic Banking, it is no longer dualism dispute resolution. The verdict as well as strengthen the jurisdiction of Religious Court to resolve Islamic banking disputes. In consideration of the judges, judges agreed stating that Article 55 paragraph (2) and (3) of Law No. 21 of 2008 which is an ideal norm, contains no constitutional problems. The problem is the explanation of the constitutional article 55 paragraph (2) of the Act. The emergence of the Constitutional Court verdict No. 93/PUU-X/2012 which substantially states that the explanation of Article 55 paragraph (2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 does not have binding force, basically does not violate the principle of freedom of contract which is common in contract law. The parties are allowed to make a dispute resolution agreement out of religious court based on provisions as Act No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Keywords: dispute resolution, legal certainty and the principle of freedom of contract





Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey

Many Indonesians—primarily those living in rural areas—still follow customary law (adat). The precise rules and processes of that adat differ significantly from place to place, even within short distances. This chapter shows that for many decades, adat has been subservient to national law. State-made law overrode it, leaving it applicable only in a very small proportion of cases where no national law applied, where judges could apply it as ‘living law’. Even in these cases, many judges ignored adat or distorted it when deciding cases. The 1945 Constitution was amended in 2000 to require the state to formally recognize and respect customary law, as practised in traditional communities. The Constitutional Court has given effect to this in various judicial review cases, as have some statutes enacted in the past decade or so. However, this constitutional and statutory ‘protection’ has been impeded in practice by requirements for traditional communities to be formally ‘recognized’ by their local governments, many of whom have been unresponsive to calls for recognition.



1977 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Livneh

It is difficult to see the connection between these two topics, but on 25 February 1975 the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany gave a decision of great importance in both fields, and although Israel adheres to another system of law, in the opinion of the writer, this decision is of great interest here too.The amendment of the German law relating to abortions, whose constitutionality was examined in the judgment mentioned, is part of a reform movement spreading from Europe to the Americas in the West and to Russia, India and Singapore in the East. It began to have influence upon legislation between the two wars (Russia 1920, Scandinavia and Switzerland in the 1930's), but gathered momentum particularly during the last decade (one of the earlier laws in this series is the English Abortion Act, 1967; one of the latest, the French Law of 17 January 1975).



1936 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 816
Author(s):  
Charles Grove Haines


ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-306
Author(s):  
Danushka S Medawatte

AbstractIn this paper, I attempt to examine the evolution of judicial review of legislation in Sri Lanka with a view to better understanding how it has impacted the democratic fabric and constitutional matrix of Sri Lanka. The impact that judicial review of legislation has had on rights jurisprudence, enhancement of democracy, prevention of persecution against selected groups are analysed in this paper in relation to the Ceylon Constitutional Order in Council of 1946 (‘Soulbury’ Constitution) and the two autochthonous constitutions of Sri Lanka of 1972 and 1978. The first part of the paper comprises of a descriptive analysis of judicial review of legislation under the three Constitutions. This is expected to perform a gap filling function in respect of the lacuna that exists in Sri Lankan legal literature in relation to the assessment of the trends pertaining to judicial review of legislation in Sri Lanka. In the second part of the paper, I have analysed decided cases of Sri Lanka to explore how the judiciary has responded to legislative and executive power, and has given up or maintained judicial independence. In this respect, I have also attempted to explore whether the judiciary has unduly engaged in restraint thereby impeding its own independence. The third part of the paper evaluates the differences in technique and stance the judiciary has adopted when reviewing draft enactments of the national legislature and when reviewing draft or enacted statutes of Provincial Councils. From a comparative constitutional perspective, this assessment is expected to provide the background that is essential in understanding the island nation’s current constitutional discourse, transitional justice process, and its approach to human rights.



1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Dawn Oliver

First, I want to express my gratitude and sense of honour in being invited to deliver the Lionel Cohen lecture for 1995. The relationship between the Israeli and the British legal systems is a close and mutually beneficial one, and we in Britain in particular owe large debts to the legal community in Israel. This is especially the case in my field, public law, where distinguished academics have enriched our academic literature, notably Justice Zamir, whose work on the declaratory judgment has been so influential. Israeli courts, too, have made major contributions to the development of the common law generally and judicial review very notably.In this lecture I want to discuss the process of constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, and to explore some of the difficulties that lie in the way of reform. Some quite radical reforms to our system of government — the introduction of executive agencies in the British civil service, for instance—have been introduced without resort to legislation. There has been a spate of reform to local government and the National Health Service.



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