Traditional and Customary Law: Adat

Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey

Many Indonesians—primarily those living in rural areas—still follow customary law (adat). The precise rules and processes of that adat differ significantly from place to place, even within short distances. This chapter shows that for many decades, adat has been subservient to national law. State-made law overrode it, leaving it applicable only in a very small proportion of cases where no national law applied, where judges could apply it as ‘living law’. Even in these cases, many judges ignored adat or distorted it when deciding cases. The 1945 Constitution was amended in 2000 to require the state to formally recognize and respect customary law, as practised in traditional communities. The Constitutional Court has given effect to this in various judicial review cases, as have some statutes enacted in the past decade or so. However, this constitutional and statutory ‘protection’ has been impeded in practice by requirements for traditional communities to be formally ‘recognized’ by their local governments, many of whom have been unresponsive to calls for recognition.

Author(s):  
Viktoriia Chokhrii ◽  

The article is devoted to the consideration of problematic aspects of the implementation of administrative responsibility for non-payment of child support, is used in the form of socially useful work. In particular, the essence of this type of administrative penalty is revealed. The study focuses on the problematic issues that arise in the implementation of the imposed administrative responsibility in the form of socially useful work. A number of problems concerning the legal application of Article 183-1 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses (hereinafter – the Code of Administrative Offenses) and ways of their solution have been outlined. Amendments to the current legislation of Ukraine are proposed in order to improve the implementation of resolutions in cases of administrative offenses. In particular, it is proposed to monitor the workload of the staff of the territorial bodies of the State Executive Service in Ukraine and analyze their staffing standards and functional responsibilities for the preparation of materials under Article 183-1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. In addition, it was proposed to improve the organization of the performance of socially useful work by local governments by conducting appropriate explanatory work and methodological assistance to local governments in organizing the solution of this issue. The article proposes to transfer control functions to the executive body, and to improve the duty imposed on local governments to provide socially useful work is to improve, including amendments to the labor legislation of Ukraine. It is noted that when drawing up an administrative offense or making a decision in the case, it is necessary to find out the presence or absence of circumstances that for good reasons made it impossible for the debtor to pay child support, or the existing alimony arrears for the past period. The expediency of development of methodical recommendations for local self-government bodies concerning the order of definition and performance of socially useful works is substantiated.


Author(s):  
Laura Thaut Vinson

This chapter explores the problem of rising pastoralist–farmer and ethnic (religious and tribal) violence in the pluralistic Middle Belt region of Nigeria over the past thirty to forty years. In particular, it highlights the underlying issues and conflicts associated with these different categories of communal intergroup violence, the human and material costs of such conflict, and the broader implications for the Nigerian state. The federal government, states, local governments. and communities have not been passive in addressing the considerable challenges associated with preventing and resolving such conflicts. It is clear, however, that they face significant hurdles in resolving the underlying grievances and drivers of conflict, and their efforts have not always furthered the cause of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Greater attention to patterns of inclusion and exclusion and to the allocation of rights and resources will be necessary, particularly at the state and local government levels, to create a more stable and peaceful Middle Belt.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Jefri Porkonanta Tarigan

Fungsi negara tidak hanya sebagai regulator (pengatur) dan umpire (wasit), namun juga berfungsi sebagai provider (penyedia) dan entrepreneur (pengusaha). Oleh karena itu, sudah seharusnya negara terlibat langsung dalam usaha penyediaan listrik untuk kepentingan umum bagi sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat sebagaimana amanat Pasal 33 UUD 1945. Usaha penyediaan listrik untuk kepentingan umum dengan unbundling system yaitu terpisahnya antara usaha pembangkitan, transmisi, distribusi, dan penjualan listrik, telah dinyatakan inkonstitusional oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Putusan Nomor 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, bertanggal 15 Desember 2004. Namun kemudian adanya putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 149/PUU-VII/2009, bertanggal 30 Desember 2010, justru dipandang sebagai peluang dibolehkannya kembali sistem unbundling dalam usaha penyediaan listrik sebagaimana ketentuan Pasal 10 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2009 tentang Ketenagalistirkan. Hal tersebut kemudian mendorong diajukannya kembali permohonan pengujian terhadap ketentuan Pasal 10 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2009. Melalui Putusan Nomor 111/PUU-XIII/2015, bertanggal 14 Desember 2016, Mahkamah Konstitusi pun menegaskan bahwa unbundling dalam usaha penyediaan tenaga listrik adalah tidak sesuai dengan konstitusi.The function of the state is not only as a regulator and referee, but also serves as provider and entrepreneur. Therefore, the state should be directly involved in the business of electric providing for the public interest to the greatest prosperity of the people as mandated by Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. The unbundling system in electric providing for the public interest is the separation between the business of generation, transmission, distribution, and sales. The unbundling system has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in Decision Number 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 dated December 15, 2004. However, the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 149/PUU-VII/2009 dated 30 December 2010, is judged as an opportunity to re-enable the unbundling system in the business of electric providing as stipulated in Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 30 Year 2009 about Electricity. It then encourages the re-submission of the petition for judicial review of the provisions of Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 30 Year 2009. Then, through Decision Number 111/PUU-XIII/2015, dated December 14, 2016, the Constitutional Court confirm that unbundling in the business of providing power electricity for public interest is inconstitutional.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mei Susanto

Doktrin Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) yang dahulu dipercaya hanya sebagai negative legislature telah bergeser menjadi positive legislature. Menjadi pertanyaan, apakah doktrin MK sebagai negative legislature maupun positive legislature, dapat pula dimaknai sebagai negative budgeter dan positive budgeter dalam pengujian Undang-Undang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (UU APBN). Berdasarkan hasil kajian konseptual dan pendalaman terhadap beberapa putusan MK dalam pengujian UU APBN, secara nyata dan dalam keadaan tertentu, doktrin MK sebagai negative legislature dapat dimaknai sebagai negative budgeter dalam bentuk pernyataan mata anggaran tertentu dalam UU APBN bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. Bahkan dapat pula dimaknai sebagai positive budgeter karena MK juga mengharuskan pemerintah dan DPR untuk menambahkan mata anggaran tertentu dalam UU APBN. Hal tersebut tidak lain sebagai bentuk diakuinya supremasi konstitusi, sehingga MK yang berperan sebagai the guardian constitution harus menjaganya. Apalagi dalam UUD 1945 terdapat pasal yang spesifik menyebut batas minimal anggaran pendidikan 20% dan pasal-pasal lain yang mengharuskan APBN harus dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat.The doctrine of the Constitutional Court which was previously believed to be only as a negative legislature has shifted into positive legislature. The question, is the doctrine of the Constitutional Court as a negative legislature and a positive legislature can also be interpreted as a negative budgeter and a positive budgeter in the judicial review of the State Budget Law. Based on the result of conceptual study and deepening of several decisions of the Constitutional Court in the judicial review of the State Budget Law, in real and in certain circumtances, the doctrine of the Constitutional Court as a negative lagislature can be also interpreted as a negative budgetary in the form of specific budget items in the State Budget Law contradictory to the 1945 Constitution. Also as a positive budgeter because the Constitutional Court requires the executive and the legislative to add a specific budget in the State Budget Law. It is a form of recognition of constitutional supremacy, so that the Constitutional Court can role as the guardian constitution. Moreover in the 1945 Constitution there is a specific article that mentions the minimum limit of 20% education budget and other articles that require the state budget should be used for the greatest prosperity of the people.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jundiani Jundiani

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menggambarkan secara sistematis hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan kewenangan kelembagaan negara setelah perubahan UUD 1945. Metode penelitiannya adalah penelitian hukum-normatif dengan menggunakan pendekatan konsep dan perundang-undangan. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa adanya perubahan mendasar terkait dengan pola pembagian kekuasaan pada tiga cabang kekuasaan ; legislatif, eksekutif, dan yudikatif. Lembaga berwenang dalam pembuatan UU, lembaga eksekutif tetap dalam tugas pemerintahan dan lembaga yudisial telah memperkuat fungsi dan peranannya di bidang peradilan dengan membentuk institusi baru yaitu Mahkamah Konstitusi. Lembaga ini mempunyai kewenangan melakukan uji materi (judicial review) UU atas UUD, yang sebelumnya menjadi tugas dari MA.<br /><br />The objective of this research is to systematically describe aspects relating to the authority of state instrumentalities after the amandment of UUD 1945. The method of this research is normative- legal research using conceptual legislation approaches. The result reveals a fundamental changing on authority distribution pattern within three authority branches: legislative, executive and judicative. The legislative body of the state holds an authority to dispense regulations, while the executive body is responsible for running the governance, and the judicial body strengthens its function and its role in court system and possesses authority to form new institution namely Constitutional Court. This institution has the authority to undertake judicial review on the Constitution which is used to be the responsibility of Supreme Court.<br /><br /><br />Kata Kunci: Kewenangan Kelembagaan Negara, Perubahan UUD 1945<br /><br />


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Diya Ul Akmal ◽  
Fatkhul Muin ◽  
Pipih Ludia Karsa

AbstractThe Constitutional Court is a state institution that has the authority to reviewing laws against the Constitution (Judicial Review). Several times in issuing its decisions, the Constitutional Court has acted as a Positive Legislator. The potential for a legal vacuum as the implication of revoking a law is large. and also the slow formation of laws by the legislative body (DPR) and the lack of quality of regulations. The current law making does not pay attention to legal ideals based on Pancasila so that the resulting legal products lose their meaning. This has resulted in many people whose constitutional rights have been violated. The state should be present to give full constitutional rights to its citizens. The Constitutional Court needs an additional authority to maintain the supremacy of the constitution. additional authority as a preventive mechanism is Judicial Preview. The French state places Judicial Preview as an authority of the Constitutional Council. Austria and Germany apply Judicial Preview as a preventive measure for losses that can occur if the Draft Law is passed. A renewal of the Constitutional Law to perfect existing ones makes the prospect of Judicial Preview in Indonesia an Urgency for immediate implementation.Keywords: Constitutional Court, Authority, Judicial Preview AbstrakMahkamah Konstitusi merupakan lembaga negara yang memiliki kewenangan pengujian Undang-Undang terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar (Judicial Review). Dalam mengeluarkan putusannya Mahkamah Konstitusi beberapa kali bertindak sebagai Positif Legislator. Potensi terjadinya kekosongan hukum sebagai implikasi dicabutnya suatu Undang-Undang sangatlah besar. Ditambah dengan lambatnya pembentukan Undang-Undang oleh lembaga legislatif (DPR) serta kualitas peraturan yang kurang. Pembuatan Undang-Undang saat ini tidak memperhatikan cita hukum yang berakar pada Pancasila sehingga produk hukum yang dihasilkan kehilangan maknanya. Hal ini mengakibatkan banyak masyarakat yang dilanggar hak konstitusionalnya. Negara seharusnya hadir untuk memberikan hak konstitusional secara penuh kepada warga negaranya. Untuk mencegah hal tersebut maka Mahkamah Konstitusi membutuhkan suatu kewenangan tambahan untuk menjaga tegaknya supremasi konstitusi. Kewenangan tambahan sebagai mekanisme preventif tersebut berupa Pengujian Rancangan Undang-Undang (Judicial Preview). Perancis menempatkan Judicial Preview sebagai kewenangan dari Constitutional Council. Austria dan Jerman juga memberlakukannya sebagai tindakan pencegahan. Pembangunan Hukum Konstitusi untuk menyempurnakan yang sudah ada menjadikan prospek Pengujian Rancangan Undang-Undang di Indonesia menjadi urgensi untuk segera diterapkan.Kata Kunci: Mahkamah Konstitusi, Kewenangan, Judicial Preview


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 809-819
Author(s):  
Janos Fazekas

The main aim of this paper is to investigate a quite unexamined area: the relationship between political question doctrine and local governments in Hungary. The research focuses on the decisions of Hungarian courts and the Constitutional Court made on this matter. The paper takes under investigation some local governmental acts which have not been reviewed by any court. The main purpose of the research is to find out whether it is possible to take local governmental acts under efficient judicial review in Hungary?


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 79 ◽  
Author(s):  
José María Lafuente Balle

Resumen:El art. 155 de la Constitución regula la coerción federal (federal coercion) con un texto inspirado en el art. 37 de la Ley Fundamental de Bonn, si bien presenta alguna importante diferencia, particularmente por la distinta configuración electoral del Senado y el Bundesrat. Su redacción es un ejemplo característico de la ambigüedad propia de los preceptos constitucionales; y su interpretación padece de que carece de desarrollo legislativo y precedentes históricos. Con su Resolución de 27 de octubre de 2017, el Senado ha aplicado por vez primera el art. 155 por entender que la Generalitat había incurrido en desobediencia a la Constitución. La autorización al Gobierno central conllevó el cese del Gobierno de Cataluña y la posterior disolución del Parlamento autonómico. Dos han sido los recursos de inconstitucionalidad instados, respectivamente, por el grupo parlamentario de Unidos-Podemos y por la Diputación Permanente del Parlamento de Cataluña. En este trabajo se aborda su análisis jurídico y se arriesga el vaticinio de Sentencia que habrá de dictar el Tribunal Constitucional.Summary:1. Introduction: A highly political, ambiguous and vague rule; 2. Section 155 and regional tenseness. Examples of Comparative Law; 3. The unavoidable reference to the federal coercion in Germany. Section 155 and its comparison with section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn; 4. The STGC of 5th of March, 1936; 5. The state coercion of section 155; 6. The former formal procedures to the state coercion of section 155; 7. The supposed facts in which section 155 is applicable; 8. The procedure of the state coercion; 9. The measures covered by section 155; 10. The exceptional political and legal application of section 155; 11. The injuction of the Spanish Government and the Order of the Spanish Senate of 27th of October, 2017; 12. The application of the state coercion of section 155 in Catalonia; 13. The procedural question of the judicial review of the Order of the Senate; 14. The motion filed by the political party UNIDOS-PODEMOS claiming that the application of section 155 is against the Spanish Constitution; 15. The Opinion 14/2017 of the Catalan Consell de Garanties Estatutarias. The motion filed by the Catalan Parliament for judicial review against the Order of the Spanish Senate; 16. The material question: Does the bloque de constitucionalidad entails a limit before section 155?Abstract:Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution regulates federal coercion by means of a text inspired in section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn, although the former presents some important differences, especially due to the different electoral configuration of the Spanish Senate and the Bundesrat. The wording of section 155 is a good example of the characteristic ambiguity of constitutional texts. Its interpretation suffers from a lack of legislative development and former precedents. By means of the Order of 27th of October, 2017, the Spanish Senate has applied for the first time section 155, understanding that the Catalan Generalitat had violated the Constitution. The authorization given to the Spanish Government entailed the dismissal of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia and the dissolution of the Autonomous Parliament. Two motions have been filed,one by the parliamentary group Unidos-Podemos, and another by the DiputaciónPermanente of the Parliament of Catalonia. This paper tackles the legal analysis of section 155, and risks predicting the future ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-143
Author(s):  
Nova Yarsina

The purpose of this study is to examine human rights over water after the abolition of Law Number 7 of 2004 concerning Water Resources by the Constitutional Court. The research method used is normative juridical. Later there was an opinion that if the state was unable to guarantee the fulfillment of human rights over water, then the water supply was carried out by a third party. The state must regulate the appropriateness of control over water sources, affordability of prices, guarantees for water health. For the realization of these things, a system of regulation must be made. An independent regulatory body can also be formed, public participation, and sanctions against violations. In essence, every regulation issued by the local government related to water use actually makes water as "Economic goods". Commercialization and privatization of water services is not an illegal thing as long as it can improve clean water services so that public access to water also increases. Local governments should be able to understand that commercialization of water resources by setting drinking water tariffs that exceed the capacity and reasonableness of the community actually results in reduced community access to water resources, especially clean water and drinking water. The poor and marginalized are the most vulnerable groups to the failure to fulfill the right to water by the State. To see the extent to which the fulfillment of the right to water by the state apart from the perspective of the executive authority, it is necessary to look at court decisions that can reflect the fulfillment of the right to water especially after the abolition of Law Number 7 of 2004 concerning Water Resources by the Constitutional Court and return to Law Number 11 of 1974 concerning Irrigation.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter “the Constitution”), provided an opportune moment for the courts, especially the Constitutional Court to ensure an appropriate balance in the development of the principles and values of the doctrine of separation of powers vis-à-vis those of judicial review. The Constitution is framed in a manner that entrenches a system of checks and balances (this is deduced from the manner in which the various chapters of the Constitution are structured, dealing with the roles of the legislature, executive and the judiciary). This system gives the general public a legislative and executive authority that is accountable to them subject to judicial review by an independent judiciary. The system of checks and balances affirms the limited power of the legislative and executive authorities which is confined within the constraints of constitutional values and principles. The importance of checks and balances is similarly endorsed by Edwards as a system that has ushered in a new process of the regulation of state authority in the new dawn of democracy. This system envisages a move away from a culture of authority of the apartheid rule to one of justification of the new constitutional dispensation. He substantiates his argument by pointing out that the new process of regulating state authority has enabled the courts to educate other branches of government through principled and robust articulations of the foundational and constitutional values of the Constitution in a democratic society. Against this background, the purpose of this note is to provide a brief overview of the Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa (2008 (10) BCLR 968, hereinafter “Merafong”) judgment. The particular emphasis on this judgment is its potential to defer the judicialauthority (which the author refer to as a “political doctrine”) to the state. The objective is to analyse this doctrine and evaluate it against the development of substantive principles of judicial review. This purpose is motivated by Chaskalson CJ’s argument in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa (2000 (3) BCLR 241). Chaskalson CJ in this case held that the Constitutional Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its main function as the final andindependent arbiter in the contest between the state and its citizens. In Merafong, the court created an impression of having misconstrued this purpose and the objectives it has to fulfil. This note is limited to the “political approach” which the court emphasisedwithout much thought, and attempt to address the question of public involvement in legislative processes raised in this case. It alsoacknowledges that the court has affirmed its independence as the guardian of the Constitution in the regulation of state authority and advancement of the principles of judicial review, but its lack of consistency in its adopted approach is a worrying factor and a causefor concern for the regulation of state authority.


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