The Limits of Cooperation: Soviet-German Military and Economic Supplies in 1939-1941 and the Motives of the Soviet Leadership

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (004) ◽  
pp. 121-136
Author(s):  
Aleksandr SHUBIN
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Victoria Smolkin

When the Bolsheviks set out to build a new world in the wake of the Russian Revolution, they expected religion to die off. Soviet power used a variety of tools—from education to propaganda to terror—to turn its vision of a Communist world without religion into reality. Yet even with its monopoly on ideology and power, the Soviet Communist Party never succeeded in overcoming religion and creating an atheist society. This book presents the first history of Soviet atheism from the 1917 revolution to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book argues that to understand the Soviet experiment, we must make sense of Soviet atheism. It shows how atheism was reimagined as an alternative cosmology with its own set of positive beliefs, practices, and spiritual commitments. Through its engagements with religion, the Soviet leadership realized that removing religion from the “sacred spaces” of Soviet life was not enough. Then, in the final years of the Soviet experiment, Mikhail Gorbachev—in a stunning and unexpected reversal—abandoned atheism and reintroduced religion into Soviet public life. The book explores the meaning of atheism for religious life, for Communist ideology, and for Soviet politics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 274-287

The paper highlights the consultation process of Soviet-Chinese-North Korean leaders on the ceasefire issue during the Korean War and their respective positions. The author stresses that the Armistice Agreement, signed in July 1953, was in response to the demands of the Soviet leadership to rush to end the war with Stalin’s death, rather than reflecting the wishes of the communists. The forced repatriation of the prisoners of war demanded by the communists was also frustrated and the war was a tie that almost returned to its pre-war state.


2019 ◽  
pp. 512-519
Author(s):  
Teymur Dzhalilov ◽  
Nikita Pivovarov

The published document is a part of the working record of The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on May 5, 1969. The employees of The Common Department of the CPSU Central Committee started writing such working records from the end of 1965. In contrast to the protocols, the working notes include speeches of the secretaries of the Central Committee, that allow to deeper analyze the reactions of the top party leadership, to understand their position regarding the political agenda. The peculiarity of the published document is that the Secretariat of the Central Committee did not deal with the most important foreign policy issues. It was the responsibility of the Politburo. However, it was at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee when Brezhnev raised the question of inviting G. Husák to Moscow. The latter replaced A. Dubček as the first Secretary of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969. As follows from the document, Leonid Brezhnev tried to solve this issue at a meeting of the Politburo, but failed. However, even at the Secretariat of the Central Committee the Leonid Brezhnev’s initiative at the invitation of G. Husák was not supported. The published document reveals to us not only new facets in the mechanisms of decision-making in the CPSU Central Committee, the role of the Secretary General in this process, but also reflects the acute discussions within the Soviet government about the future of the world socialist systems.


Author(s):  
N. D. Borshchik

The article considers little-studied stories in Russian historiography about the post-war state of Yalta — one of the most famous health resorts of the Soviet Union, the «pearl» of the southern coast of Crimea. Based on the analysis of mainly archival sources, the most important measures of the party and Soviet leadership bodies, the heads of garrisons immediately after the withdrawal of the fascist occupation regime were analyzed. It was established that the authorities paid priority attention not only to the destroyed economy and infrastructure, but also to the speedy introduction of all-Union and departmental sanatoriums and recreation houses, other recreational facilities. As a result of their coordinated actions in the region, food industry enterprises, collective farms and cooperative artels, objects of cultural heritage and the social and everyday sphere were put into operation in a short time.


1991 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-100
Author(s):  
Cris Shore

THE 1990 MAY DAY PARADE IN MOSCOW'S RED SQUARE provided an extraordinary spectacle of the growing dilemma faced by the Soviet leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev, flanked by members of the Politburo, stood atop the Lenin Mausoleum while below an angry crowd of demonstrators booed, jeered and defiantly waved placards and portraits of opposition politicians. It was an historic occasion, reminiscent of the last days of the CeauSescu regime in Romania. Not since Lenin's day had there been a public demonstration of this kind in Red Square. This was the first time since the Bolshevik Party appropriated the International Labour holiday to celebrate its own power that the May Day parade had been disrupted. The symbolic significance was all too apparent: the key event in the calendar of Soviet political ritual had been visibly wrecked, the communist leadership had appeared weak and isolated, and even at the sacred heartland of Lenin's shrine Gorbachev's authority was being challenged and undermined by an angry Soviet public. From being a symbol of workers’ solidarity and Soviet military might, May Day had become further testimony to the crisis of legitimacy in the Soviet regime.


2020 ◽  
pp. 46-53
Author(s):  
Yuri Borko ◽  

The first part of the article shows that in the mid-1960s some Soviet researchers of the European integration problems concluded that integration did not correspond to the Leninist-Stalinist theory of the general crisis of capitalism. On the contrary, it corresponded to some Western concepts of the custom union, the common market, and economic integration. A new approach to the European integration studies was offered by the Institute of World Economy and International Relation (IMEMO), established in 1956. For many decades IMEMO was serving as the focal point for the European integration studies, and was providing the Soviet leadership with analytical information. The number of inquiries from authorities increased significantly. Firstly, it can be explained by the achievements of integration. Secondly, it was due to the growth of economic cooperation between the USSR and the EEC. Thirdly, Moscow defined new foreign policy priorities towards Western countries including Europe. There were two turning-points of bilateral relations: with France – in 1966, and with Germany – in 1969. The Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established during final session of the top-level Conference of European States in Helsinki in August 1975. Fourthly, experience of the EEC was relevant for the COMECON


1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 156-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrejs Penikis

On October 20, 1989 the Harriman Institute's Nationalities and Siberian Studies Program of Columbia University sponsored a panel discussion entitled, “The Baltic Republics Fifty Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” The panel, consisting of Dr. Allen Lynch, Dr. Stephan Kux, Mr. Jenik Radon and Mr. William Hough, analyzed the current situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as in the other republics from a variety of perspectives, and debated the motivations and appropriateness of the response of the Western powers to the growing strength of the various independence movements in the Baltic republics. The following edited transcript of those proceedings points up the complex and contentious nature of the status of the Baltic republics in the era of Gorbachev, in both the domestic (Soviet) and international contexts. Nationalist leaders within the Soviet Union debate the appropriate tactics and pace to pursue their goals. The Soviet leadership dabates the extent to which autonomy may be granted to the nationalities. Western leaders consider their options in responding to the changes in the Soviet Union, changes which necessitate an overhaul of policies nearly a half-century old as well as some “new thinking” on their parts. The discussion centered on two issues: (1) What in general has been the response of the West to nationalist movements in the USSR and how appropriate has that response been? (2) Is there any validity to claims of Baltic “exceptionalism”? The following introduction comments briefly on these issues and places them into perspective by drawing on the discussion and exploring several key points.


Author(s):  
Jeronim Perović

The territory of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (apart from a small sector at Mozdok) was never occupied by the Germans, and while many of its residents certainly had sympathies with the Germans, there was never wholesale collaboration with the enemy. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership later added “collaborationism” to the catalogue of accusations used as a pretext to expel the Chechens and other North Caucasians peoples from their homelands. This chapter discusses this tragic, and highly controversial, chapter of North Caucasian history by following the life story of Khasan Israilov, one of the most prominent Chechen rebels who led the anti-Soviet insurgency from 1941 until his death in 1944. The chapter draws to large parts on the unpublished (and to date unknown) diaries of Israilov, which he had ostensibly written during the period 1941–3. These memoirs are among the rare accounts by an anti-Soviet resistance fighter that have survived and show that the path to armed resistance was not foreordained. In order to understand the motivation for Israilov’s choice, the ambiguities of his biography must be taken into account.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 730-758
Author(s):  
BRIAN BRIDGES

AbstractThe Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) became the focus of intense competition between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s, when it was more commonly known as Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union viewed the MPR as an ideological and strategic ally, and was determined to defend that state against the increasingly adventurist actions of the Japanese military based in northern China. Japanese ambitions to solve the so-called ‘Manmo’ (Manchuria-Mongolia) problem led the Soviets to initiate ever-closer links with the MPR, culminating in the 1936 pact of mutual assistance which was intended to constrain Japanese pressure. Using unpublished Japanese materials as well as Russian and Mongolian sources, this article demonstrates how the Soviet leadership increasingly viewed the MPR as strategically crucial to the defence of the Soviet Far East.


2021 ◽  
pp. 21-55
Author(s):  
Mie Nakachi

As the victory over the Nazis came into sight and the demographic disaster became apparent, the Soviet leadership keenly felt the need to strengthen pronatalist policy. Several proposals submitted in 1943–1944 expanded existing pronatalist measures without a fundamental change in the vision of population growth. However, Khrushchev, proconsul of devastated Ukraine, submitted the most comprehensive overhaul based on a new vision for population and pronatalism. The government policy reveals a two-faced practice of Bolshevik language, claiming to “protect motherhood” when addressing the masses, and non-Bolshevik discourse, population engineering language, among the top leadership. In the final law, policymakers prioritized giving men the incentive to father extramarital children over assuring the overall well-being of unmarried mothers and their children. This chapter traces the creation of the 1944 Family Law, legislation that definitively shaped the postwar generation in a deeply gendered manner.


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