constitutional inflation
One of the methods that the authority uses to empty the constitutional text of its content and prevent it from achieving its goal is its resort to the two phenomena of “constitutional inflation” in sites that the nation does not need, and “constitutional failure” in sites that are expected from the text to protect public rights and freedoms or prevent an authority from overpowering the rest of the authorities. This is how the authority did in the Syrian constitution of 2012. It resorted to both phenomena together to achieve its goal of using the constitution as a tool and not as a control of the authority’s work. If legislative inflation is clear to legal jurisprudence, constitutional inflation is shrouded in ambiguity, so it resorted to a procedural definition of the research paper and considered every constitutional rule that does not bear the status of binding as a type of inflation. then I applied this definition to the general principles contained in the Syrian constitution in 32 articles, unlike democratic constitutions, which are shortened to articles regulating the general principles of the state. It became clear to me that only five articles are binding and the rest are non-binding guiding articles that are not suitable for reliance on judicial review. I have studied the rule (Islamic jurisprudence is a major source of legislation) in Syria and Egypt, and it has become clear to me that the authority intends to put it into place as a kind of distraction from paying attention to the rest of the constitution’s rules regulating public liberties and powers, even though the constitutional doctrine considers them to be non-binding. The struggle between the components of the people is still going on when drafting any constitution on general principles, most of which do not carry legal value.